POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

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Volume LXXII *March 1957* *Number 1*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

POLITICAL THEORY: WHAT IS IT?

I

THE answer, in a brief space, to so large a question as "What Is Political Theory?" can only be sketched in broad outline. The purpose here is rather to challenge criticism than to end it, and to restate with emphasis the theme of a revolution in approach begun three decades ago, a revolution which can be said to have had as its keynote "taking political science seriously".[1]

The first and patent distinction in politics is between political theory and political action. The distinction is yet perhaps not quite so patent as some people suppose. It is questionable whether anyone is competent as a teacher in political theory who has taken no part in political practice, and this with a fairly wide perspective—any more than an economist is likely to be a safe guide in practice who knows nothing of the inside of a bank, a factory or a trade union. This does not, therefore, mean that he has to be a banker or manager, still less a partisan of labor or management. It does not mean that the act and direct experience are all. It does not mean, by analogy, that no surgeon should practice until he has had an operation performed on him. But we can agree with Lenin, following Marx, on the fusion of theory and practice. Graham Wallas, whose tradition I wish to exalt (since it has been perhaps too much forgotten where it should have most been commemorated), was probably right in stressing the value of practical experience, for example, in local government. Too many academic textbooks are in-

[1] This paper was delivered as the Inaugural Lecture of the Bronman Professor of Political Science, McGill University, on October 22, 1956.

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deed compiled from blue books, and are even misleading about what actually and particularly does happen. In the strong words of John Dewey, in his *Reconstruction of Philosophy*, "forbidden by conditions and held back by lack of courage from making their knowledge a factor in the determination of events", these exponents of the spectator theory "have sought a refuge of complacency". Conversely, in the words of a former President of Columbia University who is President of the United States, there is an untapped and unapplied "reservoir of knowledge".

Amid so many hysterical laments about "the end of civilization", it is yet the atomic scientist and not the supposedly constructive social scientist who remains in demand. When the public asks to have its problems answered "by a scientist", what is meant is usually a physicist, although his views here professionally may be of little more weight than any layman's. The so-called "great issues" are dealt with by rhetoric. Not only in popular parlance, but in assessing allocations from the budgets of governments for research, the term "scientists" means "the physical scientists", pure and impure. The others are felt to be concerned with speculation, description and anecdote. The atom-splitter and the orthodontist collect the fees.

Politics, like Gaul, is divided into three parts. From the *practice* of politics, at least in theory, we distinguish the *theory*. But the theory itself is divided into *political science* and *political philosophy*. Uncertain usage darkens counsel. Perhaps it does not matter what terms we adopt; but it does matter that the usage should be consistent.

The utmost caution is yet required, at the very beginning, in defining our "field" of politics, with which theory as a whole has to deal. There is the gravest risk that, explicitly or tacitly, we shall adopt a definition which will illicitly affect our conclusions. Given the character of the hat, we can know what rabbits can be first packed in and then brought out of it. Less logical positivism in philosophy and more logical analysis in politics would be a good thing, attending to the precise use of words and relating these words, not first to metaphysical abstractions such as sovereignty, independence, liberty, democracy and socialism or capitalism, but to the objects of sensuous experience. Let us attend to

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the actual activities and avoid what has been termed " meta-politics ".

When the popular use of words is ambiguous it is prudent to turn back to etymology and origins. I am content provisionally to use the word " politics " as Aristotle used it. This includes the operations of the *polis* (which, as Professor Robert M. MacIver has stressed, is not " the Modern State "), the structure of the family, the control of slaves, the morphology of revolutions and comments on that " pure democracy " which, until Dr. Gallup, we had come to forget all about. It includes national politics, municipal and international, patriarchy, " ecclesiastical polity ", and the structure of trade unions and employee organizations. It is the business of the political theorist to consider all these things and perhaps to reach startling and overlooked conclusions, and thus to keep his subject fresh. Genius (such as Rousseau had, who was otherwise a creature ill-educated, misleading, sentimental, confused and dishonest) consists in doing just this. The wider description, which is the classical one, will save us from being gripped by the dead hand of the seventeenth century and paralyzed by the totalitarianism of Leviathan or even by the false (and correlative) individualism of Hobbes. It will emancipate us from Bodin and the lawyers. Let us get back to Aristotle.

II

Political science, which is one part of political theory, is indistinguishable, in my view, on any intellectually respectable grounds from sociology. Academically, of course, they have been distinguished because the younger discipline (to this day unrepresented by any chair in some of Britain's ancient universities) was left with the unconsidered trifles of divorce, juvenile delinquency, collections of comic strips (as Professor David Riesman records) and talk of princes and propaganda, pressure groups and matriarchs and things. All that was really " dignified " was appropriated by political scientists, shaped in the schools of history and law. This, however, was merely an unhappy accident, like the bondage in Germany, illustrated by Professor Theodore Abel, of the sociologists to the philosophers. The preservation of this distinction of sociology and political science, at a time when

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some of the most fascinating developments in the sciences came from the border-line areas, has a sterilizing effect. The repudiation of this artificial distinction (a distinction recently remade in one great American university), as not neutral but actively pernicious for students, has certain healthy consequences. First, it directs the attention of the student to the relations and structure of society as a whole, and rids him of the illusion that a particular form or organization of society, arising between the fifteenth and the seventeenth century in part of Europe and called the "modern state", is a form static, eternal, unalterable and worshipful. However, much contemporary political theory, not least that which has to do with the balance of power, is in fact still static and vitiated in this way. It repeatedly forgets that human society has innumerable forms, functionally distinguishable or historically succeeding each other, and that every human being is a member of many social organizations, not only the state or nation, no one of which is *perfecta* in the sense of being completely independent of the other functioning forms.

We are all practicing political pluralists; and the development of human choice and responsibility depends upon this social practice. Error arises from the tacit "axioms" and unexamined premises of political theorists. It arises from this too casual and uncritical delimitation of the field itself as "study of the state", which delimitation is unconsciously biased and prejudiced in terms of a nationalist *Zeitgeist*.

Secondly, the assimilation of fields brings into proper harmony the sociologists' and the politicists' general theory of society. At a recent faculty seminar in the University of Minnesota it was interesting to observe political scientists, when discussing laws, regularities of conduct and the formulation of constants, readily adducing in evidence the formulations of such a sociologist as Max Weber; nor can any political theorist worth his salt afford to remain ignorant of the work of Durkheim,[2] Pareto and Weber, or, indeed, of Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton. Thirdly, as Pro-

[2] *Cf.* the writer's introduction to Durkheim's *Rules of Sociological Method* (1938, translation by S. A. Solovay and J. H. Mueller), and Durkheim's *Division du Travail Social*, translated by my friend and sometime student, Professor George Simpson.

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fessor David Easton, in *The Political System*, has recently pointed out, the scientific handicap in the recently fashionable treatment of politics (I do not think that Bentham and the Utilitarians were guilty) is that it has become a matter of discussing cabinets and wars and treaties, so that the instances which the student has to observe comparatively are few and, even so, owing to distances of time, place and environment, not strictly comparable. There are only about eighty sovereign states to deal with as specimens or, again, if we follow Professors Toynbee and Teggart, between twenty-one and twenty-six separable "cultures". Occasionally the student is bedeviled, in terms of social organisms, by false analogies from biology, and the eighty sovereign states become eighty mammal Leviathans. Even comparisons of parties, so well conducted, for example, by Professor Maurice Duverger, who has supplied us, if not with laws, yet with rules, can become a field of false analogues in less masterly hands. The curse of politics, as of many ancient disciplines such as law, is that it has tended to be altogether too grand in treatment for its good, and to neglect the trivial and common detail of circumstance. A return to the Utilitarian modest outlook, before the neo-Hegelians took over, would be beneficial—a return to Sidgwick instead of Bosanquet, Bentham instead of Hegel and (as newest fashion) of Marx. Alternatively, attention is concentrated upon the mere description of institutions to the disregard of theory, the kind of thing that Lenin anathematized. Thanks to a false start, no progress is made. The sociologist, on the contrary, rightly takes for his study myriads of individual acts and thousands of relations between groups. Here are bases for authentic comparisons and, in the best tradition of Aristotle and Machiavelli, for the observation of constants. We might do well to get back yet further than Sidgwick, to Machiavelli, especially to the *Discorsi*.

Fourthly, it is the supreme virtue of the fusion of sociology and political science that it could enable us to be sharp-eyed for *the phenomena of control* in its many forms, over all the processes of the whole social field. Instead of a static description, whether comparative or not, of objects (and this exact Linnaean task is, of course, strictly necessary, but yet requires selection and direction, and not merely what it is

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the vogue to call "serendipity"), this new fusion points forward to detect a process and a function, in a dynamic field, going beyond mere schematic definition of limits. First is the control process; then the resulting systems and their specific functions; then the more detailed organization and institutionalization of these systems in history. We have to watch scrupulously and to state overtly what we are taking as the *unit* for study in our system or society. I suggest that it is the *act of control;* "the acts of individuals". As D. C. Somervell says, abridging Toynbee: "Society is a system of relations between individuals."

The doctrine of equilibrium, which has value as to ideal norms and which Professor Easton perhaps too flatteringly attributes to myself, needs to be used critically. The political norm or functional model is indeed the moving equilibrium of contentment—whether or not contentment is "a good thing"— and, as Pareto and Freud indicate, societies tend to revert, from disturbance, to tried equilibria in the political market. But, too easily, we can fall into a complacent Spencerian theory of "adjustment to social environment" (known or assumed), which could be even fascist and certainly corporative in implication. Lionel Trilling has recently emphasized the dangers of this sociological heresy.

We can call politics, if we like (along with Professor V. O. Key), "the study of government", provided that we bear in mind that "government" here must be used merely as a synonym for "control", and carries no necessary implication of presidents and cabinets; that our theory has to cover the arguments of anarchism; and that we must beware of the fallacy of loaded terms and of packing into our definition an authoritarianism at the beginning which we hope, as I have said, to pull out of the hat at the end. We can also call it "the study of power and influence" if, with George Washington, we bear in mind that "influence is not government". "Politics", writes Max Weber in *Politik als Beruf,* "is the struggle for power or the influencing of those in power, and embraces the struggle between states as such and between organized groups within the state." (One of the most brilliant and original contributors in this field, Professor Harold D. Lasswell, also uses this word "influence".) But Weber's work, too long unnoticed and now perhaps by compensation

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overpraised, also includes a typological treatment by social rôles, as that of the King, of the Premier, of the Old Man, of the Housewife—maybe of the Premier as the Old Man! Sociologically, I regard this as dangerous ground. I am frank to say that I find this route leads to the *tief* and "squashy" as of a marsh, so that a man thinking he stands on firm ground finds that he sinks. It may be suited to *Geisteswissenschaft.* It may well be suggestive for the social historian, like "the sociology of knowledge" of Max Weber and Scheler, praised by Mannheim and properly criticized by Dr. K. R. Popper. But it lacks the precise edges of lucidity; and for the advancement of learning by clear lights may be substituted only the pale academic glow of a Weberian jack-o'-lantern.

Further, we can choose to say, with Parsons and Shils, that "political science" is concerned only with "a class of concrete phenomena" of government, without tarrying to analyze or define precisely what "government" may be. But this contention both is the precise opposite of that here urged and, in ordinary terminology, presents difficulties in seeing how Plato's *Republic* or Hobbes's *Leviathan* or Rousseau's *Social Contract* could, for the most part, be brought under the caption of "politics", which is here described as a matter of study of a subsidiary species of concrete phenomena. Of course, if it is suggested that all these social themes, so far as they are not proper to anthropologist, psychologist and historian, should be regarded as sociology, and the political scientists given a semi-honorable discharge as *defuncti officio,* this writer will have no objection. The difficulty, on the contrary, with some sociologists is that they are so modest and absorbed in detail as to be unhelpful. In all this I do not wish to criticize or even to seem to correct the careful definitions of the sociologists; but rather to put on the defensive the political scientists, and to suggest that most of them have become too content to allow the sociologists to do their work in general theory for them.

III

However, to note the relations between political theory and practice, or to say that he who professes the subject

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must be at once sociologist and political scientist, is not yet to define what we regard as *the field* of political science.[3] It has been outstandingly done by members of what I have elsewhere called the Chicago School, who here lead the world, especially the late Professor Charles E. Merriam and Professor Harold D. Lasswell (although today there seems to be a "Chicago School" of a markedly different temper, illustrated, for example, by the somewhat Treitschkean views of Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and by the anti-intellectualism of Professor Daniel Boorstin and, in his Walgreen Lecture, by Professor Eric Voegelin). Reference may be made to Professor Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930) and to Lord Russell's much later book, entitled *Power* (1938). Briefly and schematically, the field of political science is *the field of study of social controls,* or, more specifically, of the control relationship of human, and even animal, wills. (A study of ants gives us comparative notions on totalitarianism; that of apes can give us, without false analogy, notions of a society ruled by the dominant male; that of swallows ideas of an ordered and ritualistic anarchism as in a free dance; and that of rats and hens comparisons with the learning behavior and pecking system among men!)

Nothing can be nearer to the core of political studies, or of greater quotidian practical importance, than the observation of the conditions most suited to obedience to law. And yet a study of such a significant question as whether men obey with less resistance under a system of a few laws of general character, or under a multiplicity of detailed regulations, would probably be far better carried out by comparison of obedience to regulations in two factories (perhaps in different communities) or to traffic regulations or to local government by-laws, yielding a multiplicity of instances, than in the field of statute laws where, in two comparative communities, other factors will more readily enter in and the specimens be less numerous and less pure. We owe to Professor G. C. Homans' *The Human Group* numerous examples of detailed studies illustrating, by modest instances, our actual practices

[3] This the present writer is endeavoring to do in a longer study on Political Elements, a general theory of politics; but in some measure he also did it in work in 1927 and 1930 in *The Science and Method of Politics* (New York, 1926) and *The Principles of Politics* (New York, 1930), both of which it is hoped will be republished.

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in obedience or disobedience to rules, of the highest normative interest alike to lawyer, student of industrial relations and political scientist. Likewise the study of groups need not necessarily be limited, as Professor David Truman points out, to civil groups. Distinguished work on the relation of the power structure and interest groups has been done by Professors Odegard, Herring and Truman, as it has been done in the more formal (although not always constitutionally recognized) case of parties, from Ostrogorski and Michels to Duverger. This work is all part of what the latest UNESCO *Report on the Teaching of Political Science* (1956) calls "politicization", that is, the extension of the approach by study of the distinctive political function of control, in areas other than civil dominion. This and the use of the power hypothesis are perhaps the two revolutionary changes in political science in the last thirty years—they have, in the words of the *Report,* "affected the *nature* of political science."

If we take a plunge into abstraction—both the abstraction which follows practice, of supposing that ends can be selected to the extent of disregarding discussion of alternatives, and the abstraction which selects certain behavior, as in *homo politicus,* as likely to be a schema of primary emphasis or interest for this study of means—then we do no more than does any other science. In the words of Professor Morris Cohen (perhaps with a slight overemphasis), "every branch of science aims to assume the form of rational mechanics or geometry, in which we do not directly deal with the realm of existence but with the realm of validity." The abstract schemata must be checked by the amassment, through field work, of accurate facts. For example, such a socio-legal issue as prohibition could not be confronted until in lieu of moral generalities we broke up the problem and engaged upon a precise sociological analysis. The sole test is whether these abstractions or paradigms will be useful from the point of view of systematic understanding, insight and foresight.

The concept of political science as concerned with *means,* as distinct from political philosophy as concerned with *ends* (thereby clarifying, by the distinction, what it is that theorists may be talking about) I have not developed here.[4] Precisely,

[4] I have touched on this in my article in the *Western Political Quarterly,* for December 1956.

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we are not so much concerned with the historical "person" in his embarrassing individual riches, or with the abstract person or "actor *qua* actor", but with the "act". The unit of political science is the individual act of control. The only danger will be the quite reprehensible one of certain economists, and especially of certain tract-writing divines among the classical economists, that we may confuse the abstract schemata, the abstractions of the subject, with Natural Law, and then confound this in turn with moral imperatives. Professor Durkheim's sociological hypotheses or laws were sometimes fitted into the secularist educational propaganda of the Third French Republic; but I would not suppose that sociologists and political scientists (called by Sir John Seeley "politicists") in general would be so foolish. A hypothesis is a hypothesis, and an abstract definition is an abstract definition. The test is interpretative utility.

No science (and we shall later discuss whether we should say "no philosophy") is much interested in its own past errors. What matters is the contemporary situation of the discipline; and how far it has evolved that systematic general theory, or what Lasswell and Kaplan call "conceptual framework", which is one of the best indications of scientific maturity, and which is far removed from preoccupation with institutional anecdote or with political pamphleteering and such rhetoric.

IV

We have here sought to provide a general definition of the field of political science, and have broken down certain otiose barriers and ancient obstructions. But a definition, even if of a dynamic process and not of static skeletons—that "politics is the study of the control relationship of wills" ("persons" would be too historically rich a term not to be misleading and even Carlylean, as well as obscuring the activities of groups)—is itself static and dead. It indicates to us *where* to look, but not *for what* to look. If the field is to come to life and if great progress, as with Adam Smith and Ricardo, or even with Marx, is to be made, we require certain vitalizing and, I may say, "lucky" hypotheses, often put forward almost arbitrarily and wilfully, looking at the data from the angle of "as if". We have to see patterns in the wallpaper

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which were there all the time; which no one had seen before; but which no one can fail to see again. We need sudden flashlights. On the other hand, we need the humility to recognize that the hypothesis is only a hypothesis and not a dogma; that there are no "single causes" or simple explanatory keys to the whole matter; and that when the secondary laws become altogether too complex to reconcile in experience with the primary law, we shall have to find some new, broader hypothesis, as Henri Poincaré said, scientifically to cover the whole.

The hypotheses with which I personally have worked I do not propose to develop or to discuss at length here. Professor Thomas I. Cook, of Johns Hopkins, in the UNESCO survey has described my approach as "postulational" or hypothetical, and that of Professor Lasswell as "psychological". He has also elsewhere designated us both as "the dead-end kids" of contemporary political theory.[5] On the other hand, an eminent Canadian colleague has averred that I have earned the damning appelation of "the contemporary Machiavelli". I confess that I do not know which of these appellations to accept. Maybe Machiavelli himself was also "a dead-end kid". I also would not venture to provide a defense of Professor Lasswell's position because he is far more competent than I to do that himself. It may be that he is less patently "psychological" and Freudian in his later works than in his former.

I have from the beginning always been unashamedly "psychological" in the sense of Graham Wallas and James Bryce, although I would be the first to admit that the doctrines of the Freudians and Adlerians today are modified from what was so confidently asserted thirty years ago (and even that the Master changed and saturninely ate his own offspring, Freud adding Adler's "power-lust", now called "death-instinct", to his own plain lust). The days when, as it has been said, the psychoanalysts were excitedly sniffing like hounds at the trunk of the Tree of Knowledge are now long ago. And so it was really perhaps wiser to proceed by hypothesis than by any one psychological school, although perhaps the "hypothesis" was an egg no fuller of meat than

[5] He was, however, elsewhere good enough to refer to us as "founding fathers".

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was the direct study, by Lasswell, of *Psychopathology and Politics.* What is at least true is that my hypothesis was much the same as the theme of Professors Merriam and Lasswell, who were among " the founding fathers " (although of a restatement and renaissance), which so much preceded the popularization by Bertrand Russell, in *Power,* but of which some germs were yet in Lord Russell's *A.B.C. of Bolshevism.* It sought to advance systematically (while paying appropriate homage) beyond mere Hobbesian guesswork and pseudo-geometry to the empiric test and prediction.

The theory was that, as stated by Lasswell, " political science is the study of the sharing and shaping of power "—or, as I would say, " of the phenomena of control, with the provisional hypothesis of some basic but ill-understood urge to power as a determinant." It is within the strict limits of hypothesis in the process of testing that we may properly refer to politics as the science of power. In the early days this doctrine, which theory has now attained its quarter century or jubilee, was a very suspect, heretical and unpopular one. Today the number of books on politics bearing the word " power " in their title has become almost fantastic, so that the thesis, at this level of popular usage, may be alleged to have vindicated itself. Rather today what may be required is, not a denial of the proposition, but a much closer analysis of what is meant by " power " than has, in all cases, been undertaken. It may be that major species of the urge to power are neurotic and can be allayed, without the stability of social control being lost or even diminished. The view that all politics is power politics, as well as the reaction against the moral views of Archbishop Fénelon and of Lord Acton, in his famous letter to Bishop Creighton, that " power is poison " and that " power tends to corrupt ", has passed from novelty to platitude and from platitude to distortion. In the sequence stated by Dean Inge, first men said it was impossible or untrue; then that it was immoral; and then that they themselves had said it all along.

The power theory of politics operates, it must be insisted, as a hypothesis about *homo politicus,* not as a dogma about political means. It may be that, if the facts of control are sustained by a widespread, although not universal, urge to control, some species of this urge are pathological rather

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than normally psychological. We must not expose the theory to the criticism made by Bishop Butler on Hobbes, that words were distorted so as to enable power to explain everything. Unlike the Marxian materialist or economic explanation of history (if indeed this is, as I think, the substantial Marxian position), it is not uni-causal. There are many factors at work. It is a hypothesis built upon the fusion between the theory of Hobbes (and, in part, Machiavelli) and the clinical experience of Adler, and of Freud in some phases. It is encouraged by the early attempts of Aristotle to propound a science of revolutions. So far as I personally am concerned, the work of A. F. Bentley, with his protest against what is now called "metapolitics", entered into the development not at all. I had not read his work, except most casually, or appreciated his weight. The hypothesis must be judged by its utility in illuminating the field on the assumption of certain major factors, and by showing up certain primary constants. It will have to be modified as our psychological knowledge develops. Clearly the theory of the power-urge does not directly cover the psychological behaviors of "withdrawal" and "passivity", in so far as these are not mere tactical pretenses; but it can assume that actors adopting these behaviors do not shape the political scene, but are material moved about upon it—or are even persons in flight from responsibility, at the best negatively influential by tending to *anomie*. These can be persons desirous only of being controlled or of escaping from this whole web of responsibilities, as well as persons constructively seeking to maintain rational and confidence-giving controls, as distinct from neurotic and distrustful controls or Caliban resistances. Max Weber indeed insists that the problem is of the study of "leadership". Very different yet is behavior (such as the Gandhian) which seeks to master the situation by conduct which involves a subtler, although very ancient, interpretation of the meaning of power.

It is one thing to take as our field all that conduct and functioning concerned with control of one man over another, or of the group over the individual, or of group over group—and, although these configurations may be dissimilar in attitude, they are not so dissimilar as to lack psychological continuity in explanation (or moral continuity). Upon

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these controls or stable order all social organization rests, and to ensure them institutional organizations came into being. "The characteristic act of 'power politics' may be defined as an activity that builds, consolidates and keeps in being aggregates of men", writes Bertrand de Jouvenel in a recent suggestive little essay in the *Cambridge Journal.* It is another, and further, thing to suggest that these controls arise from the normal demands of human beings, even in seeking their own fuller liberty, and do not simply come into being because society has to impose them, as a kind of mechanism or artifact of civilization, upon the unspoiled nature of instinctive or nobly savage man—although the anarchists and some passages in the works of Rousseau and of Condorcet may support this belief. If so many institutions, statecraft, priestcraft and the rest, are corrupting and evil, how then, we may ask, did they spring from a human nature so entirely good? And Freud (here like Hobbes), in reply, can point out to us that these controls arise, not because of some artificial social or legal "institutions" of authority, as external as Hume supposed, but because human nature not only requires but, despite schizophrenic revolts of which Freud speaks in *Civilization and Its Discontents,* even demands these controls.

This proposition, moreover, does not spring from the arbitrary or abstract delimitation of a field by prima facie inspection, but is a hypothesis debatable and needing empiric test. The linked relation of the dual polar demands for freedom and for authority is, indeed, the *fons et origo* of political science and, as such, comparable to the linked relations in economics of demand, supply and competitive price. The superficially paradoxical relation sets a problem for which, by one hypothesis or another, we have to offer to the politician indications of some scientifically satisfactory and practically tolerable solution of predictive use. That "internal freedom to fulfil demand in a society varies, *ceteris paribus,* inversely with external pressure" seems to me to be one of those observations, perhaps as commonplace as the laws of physics, which yet remains, on my analysis, the statement of a constant and the formulation of a *law,* not isolated but logically coherent with our general theory. A corollary would be that when the need for protection against external

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pressure is removed, the suppression of internal freedom produces (as in Poland) an unbalance, chemically explosive and impossible to be maintained except by direct force. Even the law of gravitation itself merely states a tendency, circumstantially confuted in particular cases, as is shown by the fact that we debate these issues where we do, and not in the center of the earth or, as yet, in the focal hell of the sun's interior. It is not my view that what I would choose to call this "law of inverse ratio" is so superficially based upon human nature as to be merely a statistical statement of frequent accident or a kind of useful gadget which happens to hold true under particular conditions of the *faits socials,* as in the case of certain working rules, such as the so-called "law of the cube" in party elections. Moreover, it has the closest practical bearing upon the evolution of tyranny. Any dullard or defeatist can, of course, say that along these lines we have not got very far. The question rather is: What has he done to get us farther?

V

The Power Theory I am content to have developed, and to hope to continue to develop, elsewhere. What I am concerned more to do now is to utter a warning against what seem to me to be certain dangerous abuses or misunderstandings of it. In a preface to *World in a Trance,* by a distinguished German writer, Dr. Leopold Schwarzschild, Professor Denis Brogan wrote: "Power, military power, is as important in world history as it has ever been, and it has not been and it will not be abolished by pious opinions, by sermons and resolutions", of the kind upon which George Kennan has commented at length as too characteristic of the American tradition and scene. This was well said and I am sure that, by it, Professor Brogan did not propose to identify power with military power. A more ambiguous passage is to be found in *American Strategy in World Politics* by the late Professor Nicholas J. Spykman, of Yale. He writes: "International society is a society without a central authority to perceive law and order, and without an official agency to protect its members in the enjoyment of their rights. The result is that individual states must make the preservation

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and improvement of their power position a primary objective of their foreign policy." This kind of power, which is to be "improved" or enlarged, is here becoming identified with that peculiar species of control, or of the power position, which we may call "dominance". It is a point upon which Machiavelli himself uttered certain warnings.

We may note, at this juncture, the views of another eminent writer whose opinions are, in many respects, consonant with the well-known and traditional German philosophy of the historian, von Treitschke, as expressed in his *Politics*. Here we have almost the antithesis of the sentimental and irresponsible rhetoric, designed to please an electorate which is content merely to regard wars as a species of accident, disturbing, expensive and foolish, a rhetoric condemned so downrightly by George Kennan. We have the antithesis of contentment with a United Nations which is "not even a like-minded club", as an alleged executive organ to enforce peace. I refer to the work of Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, with which I must confess to finding myself pretty markedly in disagreement. Professor Morgenthau, indeed, quite properly deplores what he terms "the state of political thought of our time" (1952). But I would submit that this is not to be remedied by a common confusion (of which the practical consequences will not be the less grave because they are common) between the genus "power" and the species "domination" or dominative power. Even, of all people, Hobbes, with his distinction between government by conquest and government by compact—which howbeit he did not, like Dante, carry through to its logical conclusion in sovereignty in the international sphere—was more circumspect.

In his *Politics Among Nations* (1948) Professor Morgenthau admirably writes: "The natural purpose of all scientific undertakings is to discover the forces underlying social phenomena and how they operate. . . . Social forces are the product of human nature in action." (Likewise John Plamenatz, of Nuffield College, Oxford, says: "This does not of course mean that there are no sociological laws. Social phenomena are to be studied like any other part of the natural world"—an area "still tainted with philosophy".) Morgenthau also says: "International politics, like all poli-

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tics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim." (He would not agree with a certain Member of Parliament for the Ince division of Lancashire, England, who said that "Mr. Nehru does not play at power politics".) Many of us indeed feel that America's reluctance to confront the responsible problem of power, which involves great costs, may end in military defeat; and that her quixotic and unconditional destruction of the balance of power and undue, illusionary building up of the power of the Russian dictatorship, in the later years of the Second World War, were a crime against democracy and herself. So far we may agree with what seems to be Professor Morgenthau's position. But how far, from the nature of the case, he is able sympathetically to enter into the distinctively American tradition is something which could merit further comment.

In his earlier *Scientific Man* vs. *Power Politics* (1947) Professor Morgenthau is even more explicit.

> This re-examination [of the Western tradition] must start with the assumption that power-politics, rooted in this lust for power which is common to all men, is for this reason inseparable from social life itself. In order to eliminate from the political sphere not power politics—which is beyond the ability of any political philosopher or system—but the destructiveness of power politics, rational faculties are needed which are different from, and superior to, the reason of the scientific age. . . . Contemptuous of power politics and incapable of the statesmanship which alone is able to master it, the age has tried to make politics a science. By doing so, it has demonstrated its intellectual confusion, moral blindness, and political decay.

Certain passages here recall the important but ambiguous *Das Dämonie der Macht* (1940) of Professor Gerhard Ritter, of Freiburg. As remedy for the deplorable situation, Professor Morgenthau forthwith volunteers to write a book (that under discussion) which will "lift a veil from a truth" —perhaps relative, since he has underwritten the credit of historical relativity in truth—"once known", and "do for theory and, in the long run, for the practice of politics all that a book can do." Few can say fairer than that.

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The present writer would submit that, properly understood, political science need be no such exercise in "scientific humanism" or "rationalism" as Professor Morgenthau supposes; and further that, properly analyzed, coöperation may also be a form of power, perhaps more subtle and difficult to construct, but also more stable than domination—although in ethics we may have to add that this coöperation, if it is to be in any valuable way preferable to domination, ought to be around certain principles, and not merely from the "desire to be liked". Nor must it be based upon masochism or lack of animal energy. But that it can be effective power in its own right—power to assure control both of consent in divers degrees within the group as well as by dominative power outside it—seems patent, and involves certain consequences limiting the undisciplined lust for domination, springing from fear and distrust. This important theme, however, which involves major syntheses of thought, cannot be further developed here. Once the theory here has been matured, it will be practical to start work on the collection of relevant data—e.g., in criminology, how far do we find a power structure set up, to protect themselves, in trades or professions by "brigands retired from business", and become respectable? How far is this historically true of the conduct of nations?

Within the field of political science, properly so called, one additional remark can appropriately be made here. In my *Principles* (1930) I endeavored to outline the concept of *a political market.* So far as useful, in constructing the political scheme, I indicated the analogous techniques of the so-successful methodological development of the sister science of economics. Professors Talcott Parsons and E. Shils have indeed recently spoken in terms, which they describe as economic, of "allocation", primarily on a psychological level; Professor George C. Homans, in *The Human Group,* has done the same; and Professor Sir Ernest Barker, in his latest works, has used the pattern of the market politically, but rather by way of analogy. However Parsons and Shils speak, strictly and not by analogy, of "making allocations [of facilities and rewards] among sectors of the population, most of whose claims"—they add in an optimistic sense, forgetting Hobbes's warning about the desire, without surcease,

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" for power after power until they be dead "—" will not too greatly exceed what they are receiving. Without a solution of this problem there can be no social system." Out of this problem of the market I developed the doctrine of a moving equilibrium, upon which Professor Easton comments and to which I have already referred, yielding pragmatic contentment as an optimum, and itself providing as in economics a norm, not in the sense of a moral imperative, but of a schematic ideal and recurrent tendency.

The mechanism of the market arises from the basic fact that every man wants as much fulfilment or gratification of his own will as he can, and would prefer both " to eat his cake and keep it ", to have political goods and services without cost; but that freedom, rigidly defined,[6] and authority, although not contradictory, are complementarily balanced. To secure the freedom that, for particular gratification, I want, I have in turn to give support, which must have its costs, to the relevant authority. In brief, I can*not* eat my cake and keep it: I am confronted (and even sovereign peoples are confronted) by the law of political choice. Balance is achieved when a man is getting, in the scheme of social controls, just as much as he can expect without feeling he is paying too much for it. The problem is, of course, simplified when there is that kind of " agreement on fundamentals " which the Marxists, for example, deny in existing society; and when culturally we have educationally " built in " the kind of desire, will and demand for which the social gratifications can readily be supplied by a benevolent and obliging authority. But this raises a subsidiary issue of education, and of what Walter Lippmann calls a " public philosophy " about expectations and rôles. Today too often " we don't know what to expect "; but the market goes on.

It may be objected that this schema, comparable to that of economics, is " only a method of talking ", of linguistic style; and this is patently true when we use such terms as " market ", " costs " and the like. However, although to avoid the multiplication of jargon our terms of description may be

[6] " Freedom ", which I agree with Professor K. J. Scott also includes moral " license ", must be sharply distinguished from " liberty within the law " which, authorized and approved, may carry those ethical overtones of " dignity " which M. de Jouvenel, in "A Discussion of Freedom ", demands.

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economic, the processes of exchange and covenant stand in their own right, asking for description. The terminology, whether economic or legal, is justified if it illuminates and serves in the analysis of the process.

Moreover, there is a practical justification. If, as free traders, we look at the higgling of the market without alarm, employers bidding against trade unions for legislation, and political parties offering their competitive legislative wares like Sears, Roebuck or Marshall Field catalogues to the elector-consumer, we are less likely to get into a frenzy of pseudo principles about the whole matter. We are more likely to take a detached and tolerant view, amid the party and national propaganda, of the objective claims which in fact have got to be met, in any given age (whatever we may personally think about them) owing to the quantitatively assessable volume of demand. We should rather expect to find political cycles, from stress upon liberty to stress upon security or authority, and back. Here is a school for diplomats. Incidentally, when we come to measure "volume of demand", we approximate to that quantitative approach to politics which, without going as far as Lord Kelvin's words—"only that is knowledge which can be weighed and measured"—in the famous inscription in Chicago University, is yet so wise and important to professional progress as distinct from anecdote and rhetoric. I would, however, warn that the collection of statistics of measurements, as it were for their own sake, can end in the sterile, trivial and misleading.

VII

This leads us to a further point, where we can pass across the border from political science to political philosophy. How far is there not only a pragmatic chaffering on the political market, striking various balances of power between individuals, groups and nations, if not an ideal equilibrium of contentment? How far is there also a rational quality of "just price" and of proper demand, volume apart, which if gratified could lead to a contentment that some hold has the character of being almost a moral imperative, end or goal—and, conversely, which if ungratified leads to assured discontent and to social "dysphoria" and ill-health? This is

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the issue of Natural Law and is, of course, an entire theme in itself. It is, however, noteworthy that such a publicist as Walter Lippmann has an obvious nostalgia for Natural Law as a basis for his "public philosophy"; that it has been the consistent contention of the Papacy and Catholic scholars; and that such a professional lawyer as Professor H. Lauterpacht, of Cambridge and now of the Permanent Court, has pointed to it as the required basis for a jurisprudence underlying all positive law. Recent jurisprudence has been befuddled by a school, lately fashionable in America, which, in the last resort, as Mr. Justice Holmes cynically pointed out, reduces the bases of law to the question "who can kill whom?" My personal position is that this age desperately needs a revival of Natural Law.

Properly stated, *the theory of Natural Law is not only defensible but essential*, and is the meeting ground between law and fundamental politics, sociology and, I would add, psychology. But it is important not to misunderstand what is implied. The subjectivism and wishful idealism, the notion of "natural rights" spattered around as from a metaphysical pepper pot, which did service for Natural Law from after Aquinas, or from the Reformation, to John Austen or later, must be dismissed. It is true that, in so far as the human being is a creature exercising choice, of latent powers and creative gifts, the Natural Law operative in the relevant segment of conduct must be rational and ethical, according to objective rules. Here the Catholic position stands. There are, however, vast segments of human conduct which depend upon the demands of the physiological system or of the psyche, conducting itself according to recognizable rules of behavior. These rules can be stated. They are empiric and can be tested; and with increasing medical and psychological knowledge we can know more about them.

This is not, as with Stammler, a matter of "natural law with changeable content", save so far as patently circumstances alter cases; but of development of knowledge about detail. We can, of course, defy these rules, constants of reaction or laws, if we choose—and here we are considering a far older concept of law than the statute law of jumped-up modern sovereign states. But, as with the law of gravitation for a man who leaps over a precipice, so here, if we break

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them, inevitably we pay the penalty. The formula for π remains π, whatever a legislator from Texas, according to the legend, may suggest it would more conveniently be, leaving out the decimal points and as enacted by the sovereign authority of Texas. Pavlov tells us that the impulse to freedom is indeed an instinct, because its total repression results in death. I owe to my old friend James Maxton, Clydeside M.P., the illustration that a Glasgow by-law which prohibits children playing in the streets when no playground provision is made, since it is of the nature and good health of children to play, is bad law, *nulla et vana*. Positive law with its instant sanctions aspires to be the *simulacrum* and implementation in detail of natural law with its final sanctions. The laws of political science are but the formulation of constants in social relations—formulations which, in so far as they are abstractions, are not to be confounded with natural law (an error made by some economists), but which, where they are adequate formulations of what happens, are identical with it. Thus, so far as we may choose to regard them as prudential commands, they can be broken at will. But the penalty will be paid. Positive law may, of course, formulate much else, which can even be quite effective, but has no sociological foundation in the constants of human nature. And, in reply to a criticism of what I have written, made by Dr. K. R. Popper, in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*,[7] I would say that this rational law is natural and indeed "naturalistic", in the sense of susceptible to empiric tests. But, as in medicine, those who think—as they need not—that there is any ethical imperative to keep healthy will observe this law as *also* a moral rule or moral norm.

VIII

The second great field or division of political theory is political philosophy. If I may quote Dr. Albert Schweitzer, "Intoxicated as I was with the delight of dealing with realities which could be determined with exactitude, I was far from any inclination to undervalue the humanities as others in a similar position often did." Just as I have suggested that political science is theoretically indistinguishable from

[7] Vol. I, pp. 208-9.

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sociology (unless maybe we identify the latter with anthropology), so I hold that political (and legal) philosophy is merely a part of the seamless robe of philosophy. It is Philosophy speaking with a social emphasis. Although I totally disagree, for the reasons already stated, with the dictum of Harold J. Laski, a great pamphleteer, that "Politics is a branch of Ethics", I entirely concur that Political Philosophy is this. Indeed Political Philosophy is more closely allied with Ethics in its content than Ethics is with either Logic or Ontology, which are traditionally regarded as parts of Philosophy. And for this reason, since I do not wish to involve myself here in a sweeping discussion of Philosophy, my remarks will be terse, even at the risk of seeming dogmatic. Actually they will be, not dogmatic, but highly speculative. Our concern here, as I have said earlier, is with the kingdom of ends or final values, with its instant practical bearing upon our policy in education. I would add that practical men would be ill advised to conclude that, if agreement cannot be reached here, the subject is unimportant. So soon as a man begins to ask, "what is for the national good?" or "what is the good society?", he is asking questions in philosophy. And, even if we cannot and will not all agree (although I understand that Professor Julian Huxley holds that we ultimately will), at least there is value in being able to state our own views lucidly; in educating ourselves out of a picayune provincialism; and in not arguing in favor of a self-contradictory position, unless we do so consciously because we hold the law of contradiction to be irrelevant.

I would begin by submitting the view, maintained in almost gnomic fashion by Wittgenstein, that "ethics is aesthetics". The view that the aesthetics, for example of the drama, must be an aesthetics only of *contemplation* and not of the will and *action* and that, in turn, we never contemplatively judge ethical fitness seems to me incapable of being sustained. I am sure that Wittgenstein did not mean, and I do not, that one should judge moral actions as if they were the smell of a rose, or any such "aestheticism" or "pretty-pretty". I do not think that even John Dewey, with his instrumental view of ethics, instrumental to success and progress, would have so supposed. What presumably was meant

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was that what Albrecht Ritschl called "value-judgments" and aesthetic judgments are both of the same genus, despite Ritschl's own view to the contrary. These judgments, I submit, are not solely subjective, but are based upon some objective condition which human beings as such agree to call beautiful. It is noteworthy how many of our ethical adjectives of appraisal are also aesthetic. I am prepared to be told even that this common quality of the aesthetic judgment, as in the relation of music to the mathematics of sound waves, has some correlation to the physio-electric functioning of the human brain and its harmonies. It is a field of which we know little and which offers an immense area for early and revolutionary exploration. There is, of course, in the history of art a vast record, equal to that of anthropology itself, of the eccentric variations of human taste. Nevertheless there is something called the beautiful, either in contemplation or action. In terms of it we directly and *individually* appraise disinterestedly even such a humdrum matter as duty. But there is also a canon of beauty about which people may be *educated;* and this has recently been stated by authors as dissimilar as the unorthodox Miss Gertrude Stein and the academic Sir Kenneth Clark. It is those who are recognized masters in art who form an Areopagus of taste. Students in philosophy who are looking for a new approach might be well advised to study that adopted from Shaftesbury to Schiller and Goethe, and from Hutcheson and Schelling to A. J. Balfour and Malraux. Actually theologians have been more appreciative of this route than philosophers, the Platonists apart.

Whatever may be the scarlet errors of the Existentialists, they will yet save us from the totalitarian monstrosity of supposing values to be based upon a built-in valuational system corresponding with "the social expectances" of the Joneses, with Big Brother enshrined within our own heads as the Super-Ego. The basing of ethics on judgments which are in their fundamentals or axioms aesthetic, whatever the rational or logical deductions, instead of upon anthropological mores and their ecological or historical relativism or upon ethical situationalism, is even more likely than Existentialism to be free from this inhuman error. This error can reduce the "respect for personality", about which we talk so

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much, to "our orientation towards another's 'orientation of action' towards the socially convenient and effectively functioning organization"—functioning, like rats, for survival or for gratification in ends unknown. I submit that this is a travesty of sound philosophy, despite my sincere respect for some of the scientists who have chosen this path. Inspecting the bath water, they have omitted to notice the baby. For the followers, however, of Durkheim who, for political reasons (if I may change metaphors), found Heaven in a sociological skyward projection of the unhappy Third Republic of France, an opiate for discontent found in a new secular and sociological religion of scientific humanism, it comes much too easy.

If my general philosophical approach is conceded, which could give us aesthetic absolutes, then certain consequences will follow. These values move on their own plane and are not to be confused with the important schema of positivist political science preoccupied with control-as-a-means and power (a positivism which yet is properly limited in historical application by its own abstractions and mechanical models). Elsewhere we can discuss whether power itself—for example, collective power for the human race to reach the stars—may not be far from ethically neutral as means, but actually valuable as collective end, and to be admired—in some measure. (It raised the nice theological point whether the omnipotence of God is part of the virtue of God.) We can appeal, as the Roman lawyers traditionally did in their quest for norms, to reason and instinct. But logic will lead us back to its own presuppositions or axioms—here, as we assert, aesthetic—which are not themselves consequences of logic. And instinct provides too limited guidance in so much of the casuistry and actual moral behavior of life.

There is, however, besides "reason and instinct", a third criterion of our ethical judgments. We have referred to certain aesthetic perceptions which, in the admirable words of the Stoics, "seize us with conviction as by the hair of the head". But there is also an Areopagus of judgment and education about these individual convictions, which save them from becoming crude, culturally unintegrated and provincial. The word "culture", it will be noted, has an ambiguous meaning—as when we speak of "an aboriginal

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culture" and when we speak (in almost a precisely opposite sense) of a "cultured person". *This third and corrective criterion is to be found in history,* but in history of a certain kind. History, which has no end of itself, may yet display a record of human evaluations. This is sharply different from regarding history as a philosophic saga of success, speaking by examples. I owe to my old and revered tutor, Professor Sir Ernest Barker, one of the best expositions of it in a recent book, his *Traditions of Civility,* where he did briefly what I endeavored to do at much greater length, in what was intended as a modest philosophy of history and values.[8] While allowing for what is rather pretentiously called the "sociology of knowledge", in this case the modest influence of the biography of the thinkers upon their thought and the difficulty of interpreting their scholastic thought and abstract errors without acquaintance with their living emotions and concealed prejudices, I was primarily concerned whether there were not a continuous main stream of human judgment of values, what I called *a Grand Tradition of Values.* The merit of the work of Sir Ernest Barker is that, picking up the best in Burke and avoiding the error of making Burke merely "patriotic", local, provincial and unexportable (as some now try to do), he ascended to the heights of a full humanism and not a secular humanism. We approximate to the great spirit of Goethe (who provided, through Wilhelm von Humboldt, some of the best insights of J. S. Mill), and even perceive how we can reach to yet more catholic and oecumenic heights.

IX

Does it, then, follow that we arrive at what is called "a public philosophy"? I can only reply in the words of a certain Warden of New College, Oxford, Dr. Archibald Spooner, a great humanist but a poor mathematician, who, being asked as a student how he had done in a geometry examination, replied: "I don't think I *proved* anything, but I rendered it very probable." In other words, in the necessary conditions of human ignorance, we cannot, in my view (as

[8] My *History of the Political Philosophers,* a necessary counterpart, and third volume in a trilogy, to my earlier methodological and scientific work.

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distinct from Dr. Huxley's), and must not expect uniform human agreement on any philosophy of ends and values. Such agreement, as the great Dr. Rashdall once said, will "depend upon whether there is an Inquisition or not." The compensation is that, whereas in heaven indeed ideally, with omniscience, we should have no need for freedom which then becomes a "perfect service", here we enjoy the pleasures of choice and error. But educated men can commend, like Bishop Butler, to the public a tradition as "very probable". And, although there is the healthy right to disagree and even be a sectary, *haereses opportet esse,* it is those who disagree who have the intellectual duty to inform their consciences and to give reasons for divergence. Societies can be expected to move along the broad lines.

I should state that I find myself in almost total disagreement with what Archibald MacLeish calls "the American Proposition", which I suspect may, by contrasuggestion, have stimulated Mr. Lippmann into writing his *Public Philosophy.* Naturally I do not agree that this American Proposition is indeed such, and is not merely Mr. MacLeish's Proposition, which is to the effect that men are not only free to think for themselves, are right to have thoughts on their own—Hobbes said no one could prevent that—but also "to believe as they think and to say as they believe . . . and to do as they say." The conclusion of this could be, not only that in a free country everybody is entitled to express his own opinion (as the saying is, "to shoot his mouth", short of obscenity) but also that—and this is, I suggest, the trend of Mr. MacLeish's argument—reversing the basic, prudent views of the Liberals about our "educated democracy", everybody is entitled to decide what is sound or convenient in education, and responsibly to respect no one man's views more than another's. Facts and opinions become "all born equal and democratic." This is contrary to common sense. Mathematics, for example, is not democratic; within its framework its conclusions hold firm whatever the vote may be. Opinions are not born free and equal, and sixty million Frenchmen or even six million Scotsmen can be wrong. What we can say is that, in judgments of taste and value, uniformity is improbable and, in a developing world, not even in totality desirable. I suppose the philosophical posi-

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tion sketched here, as much as those of Hume and Pascal and Newman, can be called conservative and (in some measure) skeptical. I am not sure that I would accept either description as adequate for what is a form of traditional humanism; but this cannot be argued here. It is more important to add that even such a conservative philosophy can be revolutionary, and that, for example, pure democracy, as understood from Aristotle to Rousseau, seems to me perhaps to involve the welcoming of a perpetual plebiscitary system, referred to by Renan and of which the apostle is Dr. Gallup, maybe operating in a world of very small states or cantons (the true benefactors of civilization) joined into very large regions, but which is scarcely discussed by politicians today, so preoccupied with the national power state.

Two last points. It is, I submit, implicit in what I have said that the rôle of the educator or teacher, endeavoring to instill a public philosophy, is an advisory and not an imposed rôle—just as parents today have learned not to impose marriage partners on their children but to be content to advise. We would rather be without élites holding the secular sword; but this does not mean that divine right lies automatically in the majority or that we have no need for instruction. To put the matter differently, I find myself in agreement with what I understand to be now the major contention of Professor Arnold Toynbee, that societies evolve, by virtue of the power of ideas; and that our own civilization is likely to evolve into a social form, of the administration of things (not of the reduction to objects of men by them) and of the cohesion of those of common values, more comparable —as also Augustine said—to a church than to a state, which latter has the *vis coactiva* as its distinctive characteristic and hallmark, stamped by the domination of men. Such a true community of values could, at least in some or other living form, persist whether under a totalitarian or under an individualistic and morally nihilistic or secularly indifferentist governmental régime, seeking to operate on it just as Greece, or Christianity, tutored Rome. However, such a community could not flower save in a culture unchilled by force and united in power-guarded freedom from tyranny.

Further, I wish to put on record my respect for the work of the late Professor Ernst Cassirer, especially in his *Essay on*

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Man. It is not enough to do as I have done, and to endeavor to state a tradition of values only in terms of the history of ideas, even if it be of what Plato called the architechtonic ones. The tradition of values is expressed more broadly in folk customs and, perhaps most richly of all, in the art forms, the drama and indeed, as with the Greeks, the sacred drama of civilizations. Professor G. C. Homans has also remarked on this rôle of religion. Here the culture comes symbolically to a focal point, and a social culture which is poor here is psychologically poor indeed. Sometimes, of course, this folk drama and symbolism does not transcend the province or nation. It is a vast triumph of the human spirit when it does, and passes into some catholic world-order. It is noteworthy how, in Dr. Ruth Benedict's description, the Amerindians of the Northwest are nurtured in an aggressive and dominative psychology, which is written large in their culture. The matter is of more than local interest since, in some measure, the West and, certainly, both the Marxists and their *frères ennemies,* the capitalists of the period of that classical economy in which Marx was nurtured, conditioned and indeed "dated", suffered from a markedly aggressive and dominative psychology and culture. On the other hand, as Dr. Benedict pointed out, the pacific Pueblo Indian, without being unauthoritative, diverted his energies into a daily and everyday dramatic *ritus* and ritual which kept him busy, coöperative and peaceful. But to explore the consequences of these reflections would carry us well beyond the boundaries of a philosophy merely political, and of political theory, and must be left to other occasions.

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THE DEMANDS OF POLITICS AND JOB-CENTERED UNIONS

THE benefits that unions might enjoy from political action have usually been judged upon ideological grounds rather than upon an analysis of the effects of political requirements upon the internal policies and procedures of unions. As a result of union participation in political processes, one might well expect changes within the union organization as well as outside in the political parties or legislative bodies. The commitment of a union to political work is a change of its former policies expressed in a new and different allocation of resources and new demands upon the thinking of union leaders and perhaps of the members generally. New loyalties may be stimulated, the rewards of leadership may be changed, and different bargaining values may appear in response to the requirements and limitations of political action in a democratic industrial society. The immediate alterations may have repercussions throughout the union, bringing unforeseen consequences deeper within the organization.

What might we expect to be the long-run effect upon American unions as they apparently involve themselves more and more in political activities? Professor Selig Perlman has suggested that as long as unions' political involvement results from an expansion of their job interests neither the nature nor goals of the unions will change. Only the political activities of the "intellectuals" whose aim is a new society will seduce the unions from their work of protecting the workers' jobs.[1] Perlman's thesis cannot yet be tested in the United States because in general the political activities of our unions in the past eighty years have not been constant and the political commitments have not been deep.

In the experience of Australian labor, however, there is a test of the compatibility of job-centered unionism and political action that grew out of the job goals of the unions.

[1] "Unionism in the Postwar Period", *Problems of the Postwar World*, ed. by T. C. McCormick (New York, 1945), p. 40.

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Australian unions had a long history and a remarkable achievement of a strong, job-centered program, 1850-1890. They have also had over sixty years of involvement in and deep commitment to political action. Up to the time the Australian unions began to turn to political action to strengthen and maintain their job-oriented gains, the work and major concern of the unions were directed toward the members' job problems. Thereafter the focus of union interest and action gradually changed until those unions most deeply committed to political work came to consider the workers' needs and interests at the job level as only peripheral matters.

Collective bargaining, both the agreement negotiations and grievance handling, provided a well-established and elaborate means of considering demands of the workers at the local level and of protecting his job rights. The testimony of the union leaders in 1890-1891 before a New South Wales parliamentary committee stressed that the bulk of union work was job-centered bargaining. The policies and procedures of the major unions described by the leaders indicate clearly the emphasis of union work.

In the organized coal mines, for example, the miners took their job grievances to local disputes committees who met with the colliery manager to settle the disputes according to the customs of the mine or the joint agreement. In the northern districts which included the biggest mines, the Miners' Association and the colliery owners set up a complete grievance system. All job disputes arising under the Agreement [2] or recognized customs were handled first by union and employer representatives in the mine. If not settled at that level the dispute went to a local mine arbitrator, chosen by both parties, and thence, if still not settled satisfactorily, to a permanent referee.

The 30,000 members of the Amalgamated Shearers' Union had a union representative (rep) at each shed or other place of work. His main duties were to police the agreement provisions and treat the members' grievances. That grievance handling was a vital part of union work is attested by the employer concern about the restrictions it imposed upon the

[2] The Newcastle Agreement of 1874 and 1886.

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employers' freedom to manage.[3] The Federated Seamen's Union had a union delegate in each crew to receive the workers' grievances and to act as a spokesman for the members. The union gave special job protection to the delegate because of his vulnerable position. The members of the Wharf Laborers' Union elected a vigilant officer at the place of work to whom they took their petty and daily grievances for adjustment. If he could not settle the dispute on the job, the matter was reported to the weekly meeting of a union disputes committee which could take the matter to higher management as it saw fit. The Trolley and Draymen handled job grievances under their collective bargaining agreements in a procedure similar to that of the Wharf Laborers.

Union members and local union representatives, generally, had responsible rôles to play in the important union function of protecting members at their jobs and maintaining the workers' rights. Workers were able to handle their complaints and grievances in the first instance, without resorting to work stoppages.

The unions were badly weakened by the great strikes of the early nineties when deflation and unemployment almost wiped out the gains that the unions had made. Without changing their purposes and aims, a number of the important unions decided to seek by political means those benefits, rights and protection which they could barely maintain in the face of the severe depression.[4]

The local, on-the-job activities, bargaining, and services gradually deteriorated among the Australian unions that began to rely upon political action after the start of the Labor party in 1891. Competent contemporary observers found that among most of the unions interest in the workers'

[3] See the testimony of Mr. H. Lowcock and Mr. A. Wilson, *Report of the Royal Commission on Strikes* (Sydney, 1891), and J. T. Sutcliff, *A History of Trade Unionism in Australia* (Melbourne, 1921), p. 126.

[4] H. Heaton, *Economic History*, W. F. A. Series No. 5 (Adelaide, 1925), p. 251. See comments by union leaders in the union newspaper, *The Hummer*, vol. 1, No. 12, 23 January 1892, p. 2; and vol. 1, No. 15, 13 February 1892, p. 2; E. M. Higgins, "A Hundred Years of Australian Politics", *Amalgamated Engineering Union Souvenir History* (Sydney, 1945), pp. 342-343 (hereafter referred to as the *AEU History*).

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job problems gradually diminished and the focus of union work became the centralized, politically directed activity of the full-time union officers. The change was noted as early as 1903 by Victor Clark who described the tendency of the Australian unions to use the machinery of government to secure benefits for the workers rather than to intervene directly in shop affairs.[5] He found that the unions had become in an important aspect organizations of voters with a premium upon mere numerical strength.

Mr. Justice Higgins, during his intimate study of Australian labor problems as head of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court, 1907-1920, noted the widespread lack of either union or management procedures at the place of employment for bringing workers and management together to discuss work methods and results. He found that union members had little opportunity to participate responsibly or regularly in shop decisions affecting their interests.[6]

Professor Carter Goodrich, writing in 1928, described the Australian unions as loosely organized at top and bottom. There was little rank-and-file organization in the factories, and union shop organization as well as member participation in union affairs was less vigorous than in the United States.[7]

The continuing and present absence of union organization at the shop level throughout Australian unions has also been more recently documented.[8] With few exceptions the unions today do not provide any explicit union grievance

[5] *The Labour Movement in Australasia* (New York, 1906), pp. 63-67.

[6] Henry B. Higgins, *A New Province for Law and Order* (Sydney, 1922), pp. 106-160.

[7] "The Australian and American Labour Movements", *Economic Record*, vol. IV, No. 7 (November 1928), pp. 193-208.

[8] Orwell deR. Foenander, *Studies in Australian Labour Law and Relations* (Melbourne, 1952), pp. 82 and 93. "The Personnel Function in Industry", *Bulletin of Industrial Psychology and Personnel Practice*, vol. V, No. 2 (June 1949), p. 11; "A Study in Joint Consultation", *ibid.*, vol. V, No. 4 (December 1949); "Wage Incentives in Operation: Case Study No. Three", *ibid.*, vol. VI, No. 3 (September 1950); "Joint Consultation: Case Study No. 5", *Personnel Practices Bulletin*, vol. 10, No. 3 (September 1954), pp. 6-15; "American Construction Companies in Australia", *ibid.*, vol. 12, No. 1 (March 1956), pp. 9-13. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), House of Rep., vol. 191, pp. 1317, 1460-1462.

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procedures. The unions do not even recognize as part of union work the methods that the workers use to settle their complaints. All too frequently the union officers try to patch up grievances only as an incident in settling a walk-out or a wildcat strike. The unofficial strikes force the unions to intervene since they threaten the stability of the union organization and may embarrass the unions' political position.

Of thirty-two unions that enroll two thirds of the total Australian membership, only three of the metal trades unions and the Gas Workers' Union charge their shop representatives with the responsibility to try to settle workers' grievances before notifying higher officials. In the rest of the unions the shop representative is only a dues collector, and the numerically large postal-workers' union, storemen-and-packers' union and coal-miners' union make no provision at all for a union representative on the job.[9]

That the present internal policies and procedures have developed only after the unions' entrance into political action is demonstrated clearly by the experience of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. For nearly twenty-five years after the beginning of the Labor party in 1891, the Engineers stood aloof from Labor's political efforts and worked to satisfy the local demands and needs of the workers in the shops. The union negotiated major agreements covering wages and the details of job conditions and job protection. The union was vitally concerned with the problems of overtime, length of the working day, piece work, apprenticeship rules, and the employment of unskilled workers.

The AEU affiliated with the Labor party in 1920 and expanded its organization, added personnel and increased its dues to meet the extra commitments of politics. Up to that time the union had shown great vitality and internal strength as it developed the position of the shop delegates (later called stewards) and met the needs of its members in the expanding metal trades industry.[10] The stewards were charged with the

[9] J. W. Kuhn, "Grievance Machinery and Strikes in Australia", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. 8, No. 2 (January 1955), pp. 173, 175.

[10] For an example of the delegates' vigilance and their work, see *Report of the Royal Commission Inquiring into Government Docks and Workshops* (Sydney, 1903), pp. 12, 91-95.

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duty to bring the members' grievances to the attention of management for settlement, and at regular, periodic meetings the top officers met with the stewards to keep in close touch with shop problems.

By the late twenties when the Engineers' political activities were well established, the importance of the shop stewards was considerably diminished. In 1928 the union leaders asked the Commonwealth government to appoint inspectors to see that the employers followed the customs of the trade and agreement provisions.[11] The request, unthinkable in an earlier day, indicated a weakness in the union shop organization that was in marked contrast to the strong control that the stewards had formerly had.

The union did not secure government aid in policing the shops and gradually the work was assumed by the organizers (similar to business agents in American unions) who visited the shops from time to time. With their limited access to the workshops, the organizers were not especially effective. The union again turned to the government in 1940 and had to ask for protection and guarantee of the organizers' policing work.

From the mid-twenties on, the AEU no longer pressed vigorously for employer recognition of shop stewards and their right to handle grievances. Even when the Arbitration Court in the early thirties granted a mandatory provision for employer recognition of stewards, the AEU made no demands for enforcement. Not until the last years of World War II did the union even bother to secure company recognition of its stewards from such large firms as the Ford Motor Company and Broken Hill Proprietary, Ltd., at Port Kembla.

The vacuum among almost all Australian unions at the job level goes far toward explaining the success of the Communists in capturing control of the shops, the formation of unofficial inter-union shop-steward committees, and the heavy incidence of stop-work meetings and one-day strikes over minor problems which in this country the workers could settle easily and peacefully through the grievance process.[12] Certainly the way the unions exclude themselves

[11] *AEU History*, p. 132.

[12] J. W. Kuhn, "A Note on Communists and Strikes in Australia", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. LXX, No. 1 (March 1955).

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from the work of representing and protecting the workers in their immediate and everyday concerns stands in striking contrast to the vital internal activities of the unions before they became involved in political action.

II

If the unions' political action has indeed caused the internal deterioration of union organization and changed the focus of union concern, we need to examine the processes through which political requirements and limitations impinged upon the original job-centered activities of the unions.

The most obvious and direct way in which political action weakened the unions internally was through the explicitly made decisions to change the emphasis of union work. Efforts and funds formerly used to maintain the union were diverted to political activities, for there is no evidence to indicate that most unions increased their dues, personnel or facilities when they first turned to politics in the eighteen nineties. Union tactics, but not the traditional job-centered aims, were changed. Ballots instead of strikes,[13] legislation instead of negotiated agreements, and appeals to parliament instead of grievance procedures were to become union business and the means whereby injustices would be righted. Some union leaders indicated that they believed that not only general worker demands but also individual grievances would be handled through the Labor party.[14] The members were to support Labor in parliament so that each worker might be "able to secure redress for industrial wrongs through the legislature."[15] The Labor party would "watch the interests of workers both inside and outside of Parliament."[16]

[13] T. A. Coghlan, *Labour and Industry in Australia* (Melbourne, 1914), pp. 1842, 1958 and 1896; *The Hummer*, vol. 1, No. 15 (13 February 1892), p. 2; E. A. Barker, *The A.R.U. and Arbitration: An Historical Survey* (Sydney), p. 16.

[14] W. G. Spence, *Australia's Awakening* (Sydney, 1909), pp. 520-593. See the statement by William Lane, influential Australian labor leader, quoted by Lloyd Ross, *Australia*, ed. by C. Hartley Grattan (Berkeley, 1947), p. 242.

[15] Quoted in "Brief History of the A.W.U.", *The Golden Jubilee of the Worker, 1890-1940*, p. 56.

[16] *The Hummer*, vol. 1, No. 1 (19 October 1891).

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The change in union tactics and immediate decline in shop organization of many of the unions do not fully explain the later inability of the unions to strengthen themselves internally when the members showed their dissatisfaction with the change in union interest away from the workers' job problems. Nor do they explain the weakening of shop organization and job concern in unions like the Amalgamated Engineering Union which initially took up political action only as a supplement to their regular work.

There were three developments, resulting from the unions' political action, which in time impaired their ability to maintain or reëstablish local job organization and moved the center of the union concern from the workers' immediate problems to broader political objectives. First, the rewards of political service to the officers turned the attention of the union leaders away from local problems. Second, the continued public prominence given to political aims and gains gradually created the presumption among workers, employers and the public at large that the political goal of securing distributive justice is the whole of union concern. Third, the injection of possible political consequences into any bargaining with union representatives induced a rigidity into bargaining relationships that almost precluded *union*-management negotiations at lower levels, though, as already noted, informal *worker*-management bargaining is still carried on.[17]

The experience of the New South Wales railways union demonstrates the first development. Ever since the union first took up political action in 1891, it has been losing its leaders to political and governmental offices. The union leaders have become members of parliament, cabinet ministers, commissioners of government bureaus, and arbitration officials as well as Labor-party job holders on both the state and federal levels.[18]

[17] For an analysis of a number of formal worker-management groups see E. White and L. F. Edmonds, "Management-Employee Committees in Australia", *Bulletin of Industrial Psychology and Personnel Practice*, vol. 9, No. 3 (September 1953), pp. 3-11.

[18] The rail and tramway employees have provided more federal parliamentary members than any other group of workers except those enrolled in the Australian Workers' Union. The AWU officers generally hold union and political office at the same time, however. See L. F. Crisp and S. P. Bennett, *Australian Labor Party—Federal Personnel, 1901-1954* (1954, mimeographed).

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From time to time as new men took over the union posts or when worker dissatisfaction with poor union services became acute, the leaders made attempts to return to "industrial action", to encourage local union activity, and to handle grievances through job representatives. The attempts were never successful, for the union officers would soon involve themselves in political work, and the reforms were neglected long before they were completed. The loss of trained personnel has been so severe in the railways union that twice within recent years the union has gone outside the union to choose a general secretary with a journalistic and, most surprising, an academic background.

The drain of leaders and their attention from the union to party and government affairs, illustrated in the railways union, has affected a major portion of all Australian unions. By far the largest share of party personnel on all levels is recruited from the unions. The unions have been the training and proving grounds for the party, and as Carter Goodrich wrote, "[There is] no question that the step so commonly taken from Union office to Parliamentarian is considered a promotion." Table I indicates the high proportion of union officers who have advanced from their union positions to seats in the federal parliament since 1901. A rough check of the Labor members in the state parliaments indicates the same or a slightly smaller proportion of union officers. In most cases when the union officer takes up his political duties he resigns his union duties.

TABLE I

TRADE-UNION BACKGROUNDS OF FEDERAL LABOR MEMBERS, 1901-54 *

Year	*Had Held Office or Post in Union* (%)	*Had Held Full-time Secretarial Office* (%)
1901-10	59	20
1910-17	55	18
1917-29	60	24
1929-31	56	22
1931-40	53	27
1940-49	49	23
1949-	50	22

* From L. F. Crisp and S. P. Bennett, *Australian Labor Party—Federal Personnel, 1901-54* (mimeographed).

The frequent turnover, the interruption of partially completed programs, and the inclination for ambitious men to

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view union office as but a steppingstone lessen the opportunity to build and maintain a strong internal organization. An officer who views his union rank as temporary and only a stopping place on the path to political honors tends to be less concerned with the unions' lower-level services and organization than he is in building up his political standing. The loss of leaders that the unions suffer is made even more serious, as we saw in the railways union, for there is little opportunity for training and testing at local levels the members from whom the future leaders must come.

A second development of political action which contributes to the unions' inability to maintain the vitality of their original internal policies and procedures is the preëmption by political goals of the unions' earlier aims. This preemption limits the scope of union interest, for political action can provide only a part of the worker benefits that unions usually secure through their nonpolitical, industrial activities.

The unions secured great benefits for the Australian worker through political action, and Australia led the world for many years in progressive labor legislation. Yet the various welfare measures and wages and hours regulations have served primarily to mitigate the inequalities of income and to insure just return from production through legislative action. The community has not allowed Labor or any other political party to interfere with private industry's management of the problems of the workers' job right, privileges and duties beyond the minimum provisions for health and safety. Political action as a result has particularly emphasized the problem of distributive justice.[19]

The legislative solutions have usually had to be general in application and relatively inflexible. Legislation and politics have not been able to provide the same benefits that local bargaining had secured. Appeals to parliament to right job injustices were neither as fast nor as useful as the grievance procedures at the work place. Individual grievances were lost in the political processes, and though the party watched the workers' interests in general, it could not watch them in

[19] Kenneth F. Walker, *Industrial Relations in Australia* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 10.

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particular. In time as the unions were identified, and identified themselves, with the goals of the Labor party, the widespread concept of a union as an organization which provides services for members grouped about the ballot box replaced the original concept of a union as a body protecting the rights and privileges of workmen as they are grouped about their jobs.

The Australian Workers' Union, the nation's largest union, demonstrates how a union deeply committed to political action tends to assume goal limits imposed by the political processes. The union and its leaders who took party and parliamentary offices were in the forefront of labor political activity. They helped to build a powerful political machine that long dominated the Australian Labor party. The union still dominates the party in Queensland, where Labor has been in power almost continuously since 1915, and in Western Australia. In other party and governmental offices in other states it has impressive influence. Whenever needed the union facilities are available for party purposes, and at all times union officials take party and government positions, ranging from cabinet minister and head of the Australian Labor party to hospital board commissioner and convention delegate.

As a consequence of its close identification with the Labor party, the union came to regard the member at his place of work as having no part to play in union affairs except as a payer of dues and as a voter. It developed what Mark Perlman calls "mail-order unionism".[20] The representatives at the place of work became less and less important to the union except as dues collectors.

In the first decade after the union took up political action there was considerable dissatisfaction among the shearers with the union's neglect of local job problems. The workers protested in hundreds of small strikes[21] and tried to gain

[20] "Approaches to Industrial Government in Australia" (unpublished thesis, 1950, Columbia University Library), p. 114. [In 1954 this was published in Australia under the title *Judges in Industry: A Study of Labour Arbitration in Australia.*]

[21] *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), vol. 3, p. 3491. Randolph Bedford in *A Story of Mateship* (Brisbane, 1936), p. 11, tends to confirm Mr. Spence's estimate. The first reliable statistics begin in 1913.

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themselves what the union was failing to secure. The leaders used and have continued to use their influence to persuade the members to content themselves with their politically secured gains. Eventually, the persuasion, backed by real benefits politically secured for the rural workers, and a paternalistic system of handling outstanding job grievances through the central union offices were able to quiet the migratory shearers. The politically secured benefits and the cumbersome methods of meeting job problems have increasingly failed, however, to satisfy the workers who find stable employment in large factories. The lack of immediate job protection has diminished for these workers the importance of the general benefits secured by the union's political action..

In recent years disgruntled workers in paper, sugar refining, oil refining, sandstone quarrying, and metalliferous mining firms have complained that the AWU did not give their grievances the attention they deserved. The union argued that the complaints were unjustified since it provided all the recognized union services and protection through its general activities and high-level negotiations for improved minimum wages and generally better working conditions.[22] How widespread the presumption is that the aims of unionism coincide exactly with those benefits that can be attained through political action may be understood by noting that both federal and state arbitration agencies agreed with the union and compelled the workers to withdraw from their own breakaway organization whose purpose was to provide more local union services.[23]

The third development of political action was the introduction of rigidities into union-management relationships which diminished the scope of effective worker participation, through the union, in the adjustment of job rights. When important general terms governing the re-

[22] For similar arguments by union leaders on other occasions, see *Official Report*, 36th Annual Convention, AWU, 1922, General Secretary E. Grayndler, p. 11; *Worker Souvenir*, General Secretary C. G. Fallon, p. 3; *The Australian Worker*, 2 February 1952, General Secretary T. Dougherty and N. S. W. Branch Secretary Oliver, p. 10.

[23] See 50 C.A.R. 62; 52 C.A.R. 650; 53 C.A.R. 474; 52 I.A.R. 563 (N.S.W.); 43 I.A.R. 76 (N.S.W.); 44 I.A.R. 312 (N.S.W.); and 48 I.A.R. 109 (N.S.W.).

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lationship of unions and employers are fixed by the representatives of the parties in the legislature and enacted, the enforcement of the provisions leads to strict interpretation by both parties and by the courts or tribunals of final appeal.

Grievances and disputes arising under the general laws and occasioned by anomalies of a local situation cannot be treated easily by mutual arrangement, for a departure from the strict word of the law could encourage illegal evasion and could set precedents which would change the intent of the law. Should the problem reach an official appeals tribunal, the settlement is apt to be governed, not by the special circumstances, but by a legalistic interpretation of the law. One party or the other may be tempted to generalize the specific incident into a matter of principle to which effective political appeal can be made. As the perceptive Australian historian, W. K. Hancock, has remarked, "[Many of the] details of the conditions of labour attain the dignity of a Public Question."

Both employer and union officer fear that the other will be tempted to use his political influence to sanction or generalize any gain made in any plant. A representative of the Metal Trades Employers' Association explained in an interview that employers are often reluctant to allow union settlement of a matter in dispute at the local level for fear of setting a troublesome precedent for the whole industry which may give the unions more than the political situation demands. Another employer representative explained that a plant manager would be reluctant to let shop officials settle local disputes or make concessions to the union representatives because they might unwittingly undermine a vital employer stand on more important issues. Since local adjustments and concessions to the union representatives can have wide repercussions, the final union-management decisions cannot be allowed to take place at the shop level. Similar statements were made by other employers who were interviewed by the writer.

The only union official interviewed who openly recognized a union weakness at the job level was a railway union organizer to whom worker grievances were brought at the head office. He explained that no one on the job is really free to make decisions which might affect wage rates or hours since

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such an issue is invariably appealed by one side or the other to the arbitration tribunals which have final authority to decide all matters of application. Likewise with the politically secured pension rights, vacation claims, and long-service leave, the matters are brought to the head office. The official stated further that many other minor grievances were passed up the line, too, since the foremen and union representatives did not feel free to make any decisions. Only a few hundred worker grievances reached union headquarters each year, but even those which the State Secretary has to settle are amazingly petty in themselves. He gave, as examples, complaints about the shift-work roster, tobacco allowance, washing facilities, provision for work clothes, which almost caused a walkout, and " bad coal ".

III

The effects of the unions' political action have been reinforced by the Australian arbitration system. There can be no doubt that the arbitration procedures have fostered high-level, industry-wide bargaining, given public prominence to the minimum-wage and maximum-hour standards enforced by the Arbitration Court, and encouraged a legalistic approach to problems of labor relations. There are good reasons to believe that arbitration is but a contributing factor to the deterioration of the unions' job organizations and policies, however, and that political action is the primary cause.

First, the internal weakening of Australian unions appeared only after they engaged in political action. The Australian Workers' Union first began to use arbitration after 1901, ten years after they first began direct political action. As already noted, union interest in local job problems had noticeably declined during this decade. The Railways Union in New South Wales did not secure an arbitration award until 1910,[24] nearly twenty years after it had become a strong supporter of the Labor party. The original job activities of the union had long since fallen away into a moribund condition. The Engineering Union accepted government arbitration services in 1907,[25] but between that

[24] Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24. [25] *AEU History*, p. 72.

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date and the early twenties when it became active in political affairs the union showed great interest in and development of shop organization, already mentioned.

Second, even in the areas of collective bargaining outside the arbitration system the unions have not shown any interest in job problems nor taken any initiative to develop the union at the job level since they became involved in political action. For many years before World War II, the Australian Workers' Union bargained privately and directly with firms in metalliferous mining, pulp and paper maunfacturing, and fertilizer production and did not seek an award to cover its members in the two latter industries until 1944 when war regulations forbade changes in wage rates by private agreements alone.[26] The agreements negotiated outside of the arbitration courts provide no more scope for local activity or workers' participation in grievance procedures than do arbitration awards. The metal trades firms also negotiate many agreements outside of the arbitration system,[27] but there is no evidence to suggest that any of them provide for more local grievance handling or steward recognition than do the arbitration awards themselves.

Third, the arbitration tribunals have always favored and encouraged more union concern with the workers' job problems and better union organization at the shop level.[28] Arbitration officials urge and usually request in every award that the union and employer try to settle their differences immediately at the local level. Since the early 1930's the Arbitration Court has granted upon union request a mandatory provision for employer recognition of shop stewards as representatives of their respective unions with the right to interview the employer during working hours on matters affecting union members. Few unions have pressed ahead

26 51 C.A.R. 968; 50 C.A.R. 56. See also 39 C.A.R. 418, 43 C.A.R. 844, 53 C.A.R. 590 and 597 for mining; 54 C.A.R. 836 for the fertilizer industry; and 51 C.A.R. 56 for the match industry.

27 See a statement made by A. R. Brown, President of the Metal Trades Employers' Association, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 December 1951.

28 H. B. Higgins, *A New Province for Law and Order*, pp. 105-110 and 157.

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with shop policies and procedures as far as the arbitration system would permit.

We conclude that, though the effects of the arbitration system may have contributed to the weakening of the Australian unions' internal organization and job interests, the more basic and pervading cause of the unions' deteriorated state is the requirements and demands of political action.

IV

The conclusions drawn from the Australian experience are only the first development of a broader generalization. Further testing of the conclusions should be made through case studies of the development of internal union policies in other countries. The present available data on shop-level practices in Great Britain suggest that the requirements of political action may well have fostered weak union organization at the job level and impaired the union services in the workshops of Britain. This impairment came, not through the misguiding leadership of "intellectuals" as Professor Selig Perlman seems to explain,[29] but rather, as in Australia, through the gradual imposition of political limits and requirements by means of the processes already discussed. The socialist aims of the political movement which labor adopted in both countries were incidental to the union program; the unions primarily sought to enlarge their job protection and to make local work rights firmer through political involvement.[30]

Before they took up political action around the turn of the century, the British unions, like the Australian, generally had well-developed local procedures for handling the members' job complaints and provided for union representatives on the job to safeguard workers' standards. In those unions where the branch local was becoming an inadequate instrument for meeting the members' job needs, the collectors or shop stewards began to expand their duties to grievance

[29] *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York, 1949), chapters 4, 7 and 8.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

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handling. In some industries elaborate local procedures had been set up to settle piece-rate disputes.[31]

As the unions increasingly turned toward political action around the turn of the century, concern with the immediate job problems of the members diminished. Alternatives to the inadequate branch local procedures were neglected and the growth of union workshop organization was inhibited. Even where the shop-steward position had been most fully advanced, as in the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the union accepted the enlarged rôle reluctantly and only after the workers themselves organized and strongly supported the shop-steward movement, around the time of the First World War.

It is the profound change in union concern, deep within the internal structure and policy of British unions, that deserves our attention. Even Professor Perlman noted that the socialist ideas, brought to the unions by the "intellectuals" through educational classes, research and guidance, little affected the bottom levels of the union.[32] The analysis of the Australian experience provides a guide to a better understanding of the lack of attention that most British unions give to their members' workshop needs.

A recent report on internal union practices,[33] which examined the rules of forty-eight unions, with a total membership of four and one-half millions, found that, of the forty-eight unions, 43 per cent have some form of organization such as the chapel in the printing trades, cater to craft specialists who do not work in groups, or are small unions confined to one locality; and 56 per cent have shop stewards or similar workshop representatives. But the authors of the report point out that actual job organization does not necessarily conform to the rules. "Organization on the job is often rudimentary or nonexistent. There may be provision for it in union rules without much being done about it in

[31] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *History of Trade Unionim* (1920 ed., London), pp. 466, fn. 1, 489, also pp. 289 and 453.

[32] *A Theory of the Labor Movement*, p. 143.

[33] PEP (Political and Economic Planning), *British Trade Unionism* (London, 1949).

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practice. . . ." [34] Even when the unions do maintain some job organization the stewards are seldom given any formal guidance.

In 1947 the Ministry of Labor sought to interest certain of the larger unions in a training program for shop stewards, but the unions showed no interest. In some trades, such as steel and engineering, grievance procedures are well defined, but in most industries there are no explicit procedures. The study suggests that the shop organizations of British unions are often weak or neglected and that job services are not usually the major activities or concerns of the unions.

A more recent study, *The Dock Worker*,[35] an analysis of union-member relationships in the port of Manchester, illuminates in detail the internal weakness of the dock workers' union and strongly suggests that political commitments and responsibilities of the union officers have moved the focus of union concern from job problems to broader political objectives. There is no immediate union organization on the job, and the officers are involved in governmental administrative positions which have broken the contact between the dock workers and the union leaders. Not only is there no way for the worker to participate in the union affairs or for the union to help the worker, but the union leaders seem unaware that the members' job problems are a union concern. They confine their interests primarily to wages and expect the members to be satisfied with that limited union work.[36]

Since the job-level organization and services in some unions are much better than in others,[37] it may be that the differences are a result of the degree of political involvement as is the case in Australia, but more evidence is required. A more complete examination of the internal development of British unions is needed in order to analyze fully the effects of political action upon the trade unions in

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[35] The University of Liverpool, Department of Social Science, 1954.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[37] See H. A. Clegg, *Labour Relations in London Transport* (New York, 1950).

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that country, but we believe that the evidence strongly suggests that the effects are debilitating.

There are enough indications in British union experience to indicate that the Australian development is not unique—a quirk of a distant corner of the earth. We believe that these foreign experiences have significance for the American scene even though there is no national labor party and no sign that one will be formed.

If the conclusions drawn from the Australian analysis are correct, the deleterious effects of political action are not simply a consequence of union support of a labor party. The effects are rather a consequence of the unions' deep involvement in political action and the use of the political influence thus gained to provide important general services that the unions formerly secured largely through their own internal strength. Thus, if unions came regularly to use political action to attain those worker gains capable of broad uniform application even through regular pressure-group activities [38] or through infiltration of one of the established parties, or through political action in cities or states, we could expect them gradually to impair their capacity to provide the vital particular job services at the shop level. The degree of impairment would correspond approximately to the degree of involvement in political action.

The conclusion, in so far as it is vaild, does not argue against political action in itself, for the government's influence and unions' social power are too persuasive in our community for unions to ignore the political processes. With a clearer understanding of the possible consequences of political requirements, unions may be able to avoid, or at least to lessen, the detrimental effects of political action. Aware of the impositions made by political activities, unions can better measure the benefits they receive against the offsetting losses in their strength, services or stability, and as they continue to expand their political activities they may be able to avoid sacrifices more valuable than the gains they attempt to secure.

In spite of some important common features of Australian and American history and government, there are such differ-

[38] This has been the kind of political action, in effect, of the Australian Engineering Union.

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ences, particularly in economic setting and size, that an analysis of Australian labor experience cannot by itself produce conclusive answers to the question of possible conflict between political and industrial activities of American unions. In fact, American unions that have engaged in a considerable amount of political action, as the United Auto Workers in Detroit and Michigan and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union and the Hatters, Cap and Millinery Union in New York, do not appear to have neglected their internal procedures or members' job problems.

Even if these unions have relied upon political action to the degree that most Australian and British unions have, which is doubtful, one would still not expect to find the same deterioration of shop organization. There have been strong, ever-present pressures forcing all American unions to maintain their shop strength and to respond to their members' job needs with which neither the Australian nor the British unions have had seriously to contend. Representational elections and rival unionism threaten any American union which loses contact with its members and fails to satisfy their job needs and demands.

If the merger of the CIO and the AFL greatly reduces the threat of union raiding, and employers become more reluctant to upset stable union-management relationships by questioning the representational rights of an established union, the tendency for political action to impair internal union policies and procedures may become more pronounced. Under the Taft-Hartley Act, though, the workers themselves have the right to petition for a representational election, which should provide a check upon union disregard of local problems important to the union members in the shop.

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THE BASIC DEMOCRAT: A VERSION OF TOCQUEVILLE

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE'S commentary on democracy has become a political classic consulted by American historians for every purpose but the simplest: as a key to the immediate subject of the work, Jacksonian America. In the view of sober history Tocqueville exists as a philosopher, as a (fallible) prophet, as a personage, and as a source of brilliant phrases. Evidently, the advantage would be great if one could restore to him the office of observer, interpreting the scene he visited between the spring of 1831 and the late winter of 1832. The return in data would be negligible; Tocqueville has wrung his text almost dry of discrete particulars. What might be found is just the resource most needed by the student of Jacksonian times: an integrative view of society and character, grounded in experience.[1]

The general neglect of Tocqueville for this limited historical use is not mysterious; indeed the author invited it in his introductory confession that "in America I saw more than America; I sought there the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its progress."[2] The approach is alternately hortatory, speculative, analytic, descriptive; the contents present a seeming chaos of latent and manifest, essential and accidental traits, of French and American experiences, of glacial movements of democracy over seven centuries and the events of a decade. Yet the difficulties in handling the *Democracy* as a historical source, real enough, are not so overwhelming as

[1] *Democracy in America,* edited by Phillips Bradley, 2 vols. (New York, 1948). All references in this article, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Bradley edition.

The *Democracy* consists primarily of judgments formed "upon the mass of evidence," as the Introduction states, and rarely preserves particulars in the text, I, 16.

[2] I, 14.

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the common avoidance of the task would suggest. One deals here with a clear mind and a lucid style.

Without attempting an elaborate defense of Tocqueville as historical guide, I shall briefly indicate the leading general objections and estimate their force. Tocqueville's interest in "more than America", in "the image of democracy itself," has encouraged a too simple assessment of the work as abstract, deductive, only incidentally related to the scene of his travels. In terms of the author's manifest intention, this is a one-sided interpretation: he maintains in the opening sentences of the Introduction that "the study of American society" shaped his conception of the great democratic revolution,[3] and repeatedly he specifies the link between America and democracy not as something casual but exactly as the relationship between the case and the class. America could reveal "the image of democracy" because there the social revolution "seems to have nearly reached its natural limits", and this "without having had the revolution itself."[4] "I have selected the nation . . . in which its development has been the most peaceful and the most complete, in order to discern its natural consequences. . . ."[5] Tocqueville's modest apology is entirely consistent, at least in principle, with the design of his work: "I do not know whether I have succeeded in making known what I saw in America, but I am certain that such has been my sincere desire, and that I have never, knowingly, moulded facts to ideas, instead of ideas to facts."[6]

At a more complex level, the objection—from the viewpoint of historical usefulness—to Tocqueville's generality and abstractness does raise serious problems of method. He is by no means an empirical reporter of the American scene; a scheme of democracy informs every part of his work. Indeed, Tocqueville accuses himself of attempting, on rhetorical considerations, "to carry all his ideas to their utmost theoretical conclusions, and often to the verge of what is false or impracticable"[7]—a comment on political reasoning which has some bearing on the method of social inquiry. This is not, however, to be taken as a crude confusion of

[3] I, 3. [4] I, 13. [5] I, 14. [6] I, 15.

[7] I, 16; also II, v-vi, where Tocqueville concedes more than is necessary to critics of his monistic thesis.

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logic and experience. The large conception of democracy is drawn from historical evidence, given theoretical elaboration and tried out upon the materials of observation. The question, in short, is not one of "abstraction" versus "reality" but of the value of Tocqueville's thesis in organizing and explaining American phenomena. Seldom is the careful reader left in doubt as to when the text is developing the logic of the type, when characterizing the American (or French) situation, when bringing the two things into single focus.

Tocqueville's conception of the "fatal circle" of human possibilities in democratic times—that is, his idea of democracy as a type of social system with necessary tendencies and limits—does not exclude the significance of accident and art in the determination of actual consequences. On the contrary, he insists upon the "wide verge" of the circle, within which history, place and rational invention exercise decisive influence. Thus with reference to the discussion of America, the basic democratic situation is the constant point of departure for an analysis always open to the play of contingent circumstance and reasoned choice.[8] Indeed, one may propose a novel criticism of the *Democracy:* that, beginning with a general conception of democracy, and then allowing for the unique varieties of American experience, it does not attempt a second integration of both elements. At most one finds a series of American themes, variously juxtaposed according to the subject of observation, all rather loosely related to a common point of departure in the framework theory.

Other familiar criticisms of Tocqueville as a guide to Jacksonian society are, I think, less serious. His manifest concern with French prospects in the midst of American life tends to sharpen, not confuse, the discussion, for he is led to distinguish American, French and universal-democratic elements in order to discover a prudent policy for France.[9] The further question of aristocratic bias has generally—and rightly—been resolved in Tocqueville's favor: beyond a rare capacity to enter sympathetically into another realm of values,

[8] II, 334; see also I, 319-322. A fuller discussion will be found *infra,* pp. 56-59.

[9] See, e.g., I, 323-330.

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he had the art of using deliberately the contrast between object and observer to reveal essential and determinative traits.[10] Finally, the rebuke to Tocqueville's gullibility—that he was taken in by tendentious conservative informants—has some truth and little consequence. The catalogue of Tocqueville's "errors"—some of which are far from obviously wrong—refers primarily to chapters in the first volume constituting a kind of manual of American government for foreigners; refers, that is, to sections of the work which now hold least interest and value for the historian. The discussion of the "customs of the people"—"a central point in the range of observation, and the common termination of all my inquiries"—has errors and omissions, of course; but no critic, to my knowledge, has traced these to a systematic American Whig bias.[11] It would be marvelous indeed to find Tocqueville's views flowing from informants who had given no sign of understanding them in the same way.

These preliminary remarks are not intended to absolve the *Democracy* of all faults, but simply to clear a way through certain general objections, toward a critical employment of an immensely valuable historical source. My object here shall be to take from Tocqueville a portrait of the democrat as American, beginning with a brief account of the basic democratic situation; then searching for the American-democratic synthesis as expressed in social character. I have called all of this a version of Tocqueville to emphasize the obvious fact that I have selected and re-ordered the contents of the *Democracy* to satisfy my own purpose.

The Democratic Situation

America is an illuminating case and not a realized blueprint of democratic development: a case uniquely valuable as the fully recorded experience of a nation born equal, tranquilly unfolding its original endowment, and now arrived at a measure of equality unknown to history. The great democratic revolution in the Western world, extending

[10] See, e.g., his candid airing of the problem, I, 252-253; II, 331-334.

[11] I, 322. Tocqueville defines "customs" to include "habits, opinions, usages, and beliefs", *ibid.* Or in a still broader formulation: "The moral and intellectual characteristics of men in society." I, 319 fn.

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over seven centuries, has thrown America into its advance guard to explore, within a special history and place, varieties upon a providential theme: equality. Tocqueville's general analysis of democracy represents an effort to define the common social situation created by equality, through which accident and choice must operate.

Every page of Tocqueville, beginning with the first sentence of the Introduction, is an argument that equality of condition "is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived"—at once the principle and the substance of the great seven-century social revolution.[12] Condition is, in this usage, the total social situation:

> Gradually the distinctions of rank are done away with; the barriers that once severed mankind are falling; property is divided, power is shared by many, the light of intelligence spreads, and the capacities of all classes tend towards equality. Society becomes democratic, and the empire of democracy is slowly and peaceably introduced into institutions and customs.[13]

The primary theoretical task for Tocqueville is to discover how equality, the primal active element, can constitute a social system, democracy.

In searching out the social design of democracy, Tocqueville confronts the possibility that equality does not create a community at all, but the negation of community. Radical equality is a solvent of bonds: of tradition, hierarchy, authority, and every joint articulating contemporaries and generations. Viewed strictly, from the elevation of an ideal aristocracy, democracy would seem a state of bedlam, a vast aberration, with system only in the mode of its departure from the norms of human association. Approaching democracy from above and behind, Tocqueville in America, one feels, could never quite put down a sense of shock at what he saw: not a black void but a viable human condition with remarkable powers of expansion and persistence. It is as if a man removed the main supports of a massive structure and felt its terrible weight in his own hands: then withdrew and saw it still standing. Here I think Tocqueville's aristocratic values served him wonderfully, at first to find the essential

[12] I, 3. [13] I, 9.

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contrast of the old and new condition; and then to force him to construct in theory a coherent order out of chaos.

In a dazzling passage Tocqueville sketches the primary response to leveled condition:

> Among democratic nations new families are constantly springing up, others are constantly falling away, and all that remain change their condition; the woof of time is every instant broken and the track of generations effaced. Those who went before are soon forgotten; of those who will come after, no one has any idea: the interest of man is confined to those in close propinquity to himself. As each class gradually approaches others and mingles with them, its members become undifferentiated and lose their class identity for each other. Aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king; democracy breaks that chain and severs every link of it. . . .
>
> Thus not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart.[14]

This is the original democratic chaos—"individualism"—from which Tocqueville derives the essential pattern of the new order. Men set apart upon a social plain confront their strength and then their weakness. To think and act alone breeds boundless independence. To doubt or fail in independence out of common human insufficiency compels submission to the only eminence equality permits, the equal brotherhood. The masterless of democratic times invent the only authority tolerable, even conceivable, in their condition: themselves *en masse*.[15] In the absence of countervailing influence extrinsic to the social structure, Tocqueville expects always to find democracy somewhere in the passage from an insupportable liberty-in-isolation toward an abject dependence on the majority. This logic of development cannot be reversed; at most its consequences can be modified, and then only by understanding the process, accepting its limits, and employing the peculiar means which it presents.[16] Thus the

[14] II, 99.

[15] I, 254-270; II, 8-12, 258-263, 316-321.

[16] I, 418; II, 287-296, 316-321.

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urgent call: "A new science of politics is needed for a new world." [17]

I do not wish to impose more rigor and completeness upon Tocqueville's ideal conception of the democratic situation than the author himself intended. The *Democracy* never pulls together a formal structure with all elements nicely integrated and all tendencies precisely specified. Perhaps it is misleading to apply the term "ideal type" to a broad characterization of a historical trend, used as a kind of wire master-key to understanding strange new things. At any rate my purpose here has been not to systematize Tocqueville's system—a major theoretical task in its own right—but to locate its central theme as an aid to recognition of the democrat as American.

American Departures

The *Democracy* is so full of paradox that the casual reader is moved to suspect the author either of a muddled head or of a willful eccentricity. Man in his pride, portrayed in burning primaries, gives way to man reduced to a gray mass; then reappears; then disappears again. There is no simple formula in Tocqueville for composing the antagonistic figures in a single frame; yet there are guides which bring the difference within the range of comprehension. The fundamental source of paradox lies in the double potentiality of the democratic situation: toward radical independence; toward submergence in the brotherhood. The most powerful and enduring tendency in "pure" democracy is the passage from the former toward the latter: toward a soft totalitarianism peopled by shapeless hollow men. If all the counterforces of accident and statecraft should converge, there could not be a second coming of the aristocratic virtues. Uniformity, conformity, mediocrity, and the rule of the felicific calculus are fixed returns of equalitarian society.[18]

And yet, within the democratic range, variety remains significant: the independence unloosed by killing off the gods of traditional society persists in varying degrees, in

[17] I, 7.

[18] I, 252-253; II, 332-334.

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different spheres of social action, according to the reinforcements brought by history, place and the creative use of political means available to democratic leaders. Thus the American of the *Democracy* is the compound product of the universal democratic situation and a unique national experience. If the fundamental fact of American history has been the quiet unfolding of an equalitarian society [19]—the basic democratic situation—there are lesser facts which, in aggregate, weigh heavily upon the outcome. A historical beginning in the modern era, under conditions of substantial equality and middle-class homogeneity, has meant in Tocqueville's view not only the quick and thorough elaboration of a democratic society, but a unique deliverance from social revolution and its special consequences—notably, class hatred and a strengthened state. The English-Puritan heritage transplanted to America carried the most advanced democratic elements of the old world, to shape the new exclusively along democratic lines; but, further, the heritage brought special gifts which altered importantly the course of democratic development: especially, the values of individual liberty, local freedom, and morality grounded in religious belief.[20] It is to me amazing that critics should suggest that Tocqueville neglected the English influence upon American life: "I think I see the destiny of America embodied in the first Puritan who landed on those shores. . . ." [21]

Historical influences count in giving American democracy a distinctive turn only as they are grounded in customs and institutions. Tocqueville credits America with several political inventions of critical importance for preserving its historical gifts: the most brilliant innovation, perhaps, the design of the dual federal system, with a wide distribution of administrative functions. The constitutional separation of church and state, the guarantee of private rights, and the assignment of important functions to the judiciary are further instances of a prudent statecraft, effecting the translation from historical possibility, through legal and institutional forms, into "habits of the heart" and mind which

19 I, 46-54.

20 I, 26-29, 30-35, 43-44, 62-67, 290-291; II, 6-7, 101, 243-244, 256, 247-299.

21 Bradley Introduction, p. xciv; I, 290.

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alter the consequences of the basic democratic situation.[22] And yet the greatest achievement of the American democracy in recasting its fate Tocqueville sees as an unintended process, a fortunate result of choices made with other ends in view. Returning to the fundamental analysis of the leveled society, contrasted with a model aristocracy, Tocqueville recalls the essential feature of nonarticulation, of shapelessness—" individualism " when expressed in terms of members' responses. Through local freedom, the broad extension of political rights, and a bold commitment to almost unlimited civil liberty, the Americans have fallen upon the chief expedient in democratic times for avoiding the new despotism: voluntary association. Ironically, the leading virtue of political democracy in America turns out to be the capacity to penetrate the citizen's isolation, join his self-interest to a wider group, and educate him in the decisive skills of organization; thus to fill the void between the weak individual and the overbearing mass with a buzzing congeries of private (" civil ") associations.[23]

So history and art intervene to give variety to providence, and the look of paradox to Tocqueville's pages. The accidents of geography have less autonomous influence: Tocqueville anticipates the recent critics of Turner by asking why comparable conditions in South America, Canada and the United States have yielded such different national careers; and finds the answers in decisive differences of law and above all custom, introduced by variant historical beginnings.[24] The gift of space, rich resources and unmenaced borders has meant a free field for the fulfillment of the democratic revolution: specifically, a full provision for material equality; a wide margin for error; and elbow room for liberty.[25] In Tocqueville's phrase: " Nature herself favors the cause of the people." [26] The sheer abundance of the natural endowment —" a field for human effort far more extensive than any sum of labor that can be applied to work it " [27]—preserves the recessive tendency in democracy, toward independence. In a

[22] I, 244-247, 271-272, 280, 299, 300-314, 324-325.

[23] I, 191-198, 241-244, 248-252; II, 102-120.

[24] I, 319-323; see also pp. 316-317.

[25] I, 288-298. [26] I, 291. [27] I, 297.

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sense, the American environment perpetuates the democratic state of nature—the world of liberated equal isolates—by promising fabulous rewards to brave spirits. Brave *economic* spirits, one should add, excited by the material rewards which loom so large in the city of equality—not independent minds and characters.

Venturous Conservative

American departures work selectively upon the basic democratic situation to give a mixed, even a paradoxical, aspect to American society in Tocqueville's wide perspective. Here one could close the analysis with the judgment that the double potentiality in democracy—toward independence, toward dependence—made possible a certain interesting and in some respects hopeful variety in American life, which Tocqueville rendered in alternating images of equalitarian freedom and servitude. To use this handy exit would, I think, cost us some of the most powerful historical insights in the *Democracy*. Primarily, it would miss Tocqueville's most ambitious and—I think—most fruitful effort toward a concrete synthesis of American character; that is, his recurrent attempt to identify a patterned response to the American situation, in both its typical democratic and its unique American features. The phrase, "venturous conservative", is mine, and the assembled argument for using it as a central expression for the antithetic elements in American character is mine again, derived from scattered interpretations in the text suggestive of a common theme.

"They love change", Tocqueville's provocative formula for the American democrat goes, "but they dread revolutions." [28] Thus:

> Two things are surprising in the United States: the mutability of the greater part of human actions, and the singular stability of certain principles. Men are in constant motion; the mind of man appears almost unmoved. . . . In the United States general principles in religion, philosophy, morality, and even politics do not vary, or at least are only modified by a hidden and often an imperceptible process; even the grossest prejudices are obliterated with incredible slowness amid the continual friction of men and things.[29]

[28] II, 255. [29] II, 257.

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In elucidating the distinction between change and revolution, in exploring the interplay of mutable actions and frozen principles, Tocqueville provides a brilliant lead for the understanding of Jacksonian Americans.

Speaking from his full elevation—the French aristocrat looking down upon a provincial soap opera—Tocqueville sometimes—rarely—dismisses his own problem with a noble yawn. What does all the shuffling of possessions, laws and notions amount to in the scale of dramatic high policy, philosophic heresy, great revolution?

> It is true that they [democracies] are subject to great and frequent vicissitudes, but as the same events of good or adverse fortune are continually recurring, only the name of the actors is changed, the piece is always the same. The aspect of American society is animated because men and things are always changing, but it is monotonous because all these changes are alike.[30]

But sympathy and curiosity force Tocqueville beyond pained boredom: the soap opera is man's fate, all of reality which can reasonably be expected to appear, and therefore a thing to be understood internally. Indeed, I would argue—and this is controversial—that Tocqueville often, in unguarded moments, forgot that he was conceding the world reluctantly to the providential dictum: the lesser good for the greatest number; and that he gaped and marveled at the American miracle—the continuous social explosion which contained itself, and prospered mightily.

The ultimate sources of American character are found in that radical equality of condition which makes men masterless and separate. Everything seems possible, nothing certain, and life short: the American "clutches everything, he holds nothing fast, but soon loosens his grasp to pursue fresh gratifications." [31] As traders the Americans overwhelm their rivals with the audacity of French Revolutionary generals;[32] as workers they are never "more attached to one line of operation than to another" and have "no rooted habits." [33] Commercial business is "like a vast lottery." [34]

[30] II, 228-229. [31] II, 136. [32] I, 422-425.

[33] I, 425. [34] II, 236.

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Turner's famous sketches of a Westering people are almost watery beside the restless image in the *Democracy,* of a "continuous removal of the human race" without parallel since "those irruptions which caused the fall of the Roman Empire." [35] Thus:

> It would be difficult to describe the avidity with which the American rushes forward to secure this immense booty that fortune offers. . . . Before him lies a boundless continent, and he urges onward as if time pressed and he was afraid of finding no room for his exertions. . . . They early broke the ties that bound them to their natal earth, and they have contracted no fresh ones on their way. Emigration was at first necessary to them; and it soon becomes a sort of game of chance, which they pursue for the emotions it excites as much as for the gain it procures.[36]

All this rootless, anxious, driving quality Tocqueville invests in a panoramic view of American careers:

> In the United States a man builds a house in which to spend his old age, and he sells it before the roof is on; he plants a garden and lets it just as the trees are coming into bearing; he brings a field into tillage and leaves other men to gather the crops; he embraces a profession and gives it up; he settles in a place, which he soon afterwards leaves to carry his changeable longings elsewhere. If his private affairs leave him any leisure, he instantly plunges into the vortex of politics; and if at the end of a year of unremitting labor he finds he has a few days' vacation, his eager curiosity whirls him over the vast extent of the United States, and he will travel fifteen hundred miles in a few days to shake off his happiness. Death at length overtakes him, but it is before he is weary of his bootless chase of that complete felicity which forever escapes him.[37]

So far the social basis of American character, equality of condition, has been treated in a generalized way, as the unstructured social environment playing into a rich and spacious physical environment, giving to American life the qualities of "a game of chance, a revolutionary crisis, or a battle," and shaping the American as "a man of singular warmth in his desires, enterprising, fond of adventure and,

[35] I, 293. [36] I, 294-295. [37] II, 136-137.

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above all, of novelty." [38] It is equally clear that restlessness, anxiety, insatiability are permanently embedded in an enterprising nature: Tocqueville's venturous American is no more the heroic Renaissance individual than he is a flexible Poor Richard, deriving his actions from his balance sheet. A grinding tension is inherent in that bold pursuit of a success which

> perpetually retires from before them, yet without hiding itself from their sight, and in retiring draws them on. At every moment they think they are about to grasp it; it escapes at every moment from their hold. They are near enough to see its charms, but too far off to enjoy them; and before they have fully tasted its delights, they die. . . .
>
> In democratic times enjoyments are more intense than in the ages of aristocracy, and the number of those who partake in them is vastly larger; but, on the other hand, it must be admitted that man's hopes and desires are oftener blasted, the soul is more stricken and perturbed, and care itself more keen.[39]

In America Tocqueville saw "the freest and most enlightened men placed in the happiest circumstances that the world affords; it seemed to me as if a cloud habitually hung upon their brow, and I thought them serious and almost sad, even in their pleasures." [40] Indeed, so central was this worried quality in American experience that Tocqueville suspected life "would have no relish for them if they were delivered from the anxieties which harass them." [41]

Perhaps it is already evident how Tocqueville will discover tameness in the marrow of the tiger. But the case will be clearer if first we trace the argument from condition to character along a more concrete line. All the previous references involve—what I have not stopped to specify—the pursuit of material success, the handling of material things. This is not, of course, accidental to Tocqueville's thesis. Most democratic energies, heightened by the extraordinary flux and freedom of American life, are channeled into one outlet: the direct pursuit of rank, privilege, honor, power,

[38] I, 426.

[39] II, 138-139.

[40] II, 136.

[41] II, 222.

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intellectual distinction has an aristocratic taint; money and goods alone are legitimate counters for the social competition of dissociated equals. The existence of competition is a given democratic fact: human energies must go somewhere in a society which does not prescribe fixed places and goals, which makes everything possible. But its intensity and direction are best understood from the conception of a social order in which men see first themselves and then a mass of almost-equals.[42]

In Tocqueville's penetrating analysis:

> Whatever efforts a people may make, they will never succeed in reducing all the conditions of society to a perfect level. . . . However democratic, then, the social state and the political constitution of a people may be, it is certain that every member of the community will always find out several points about him which overlook his own position; and we may foresee that his looks will be doggedly fixed in that direction. When inequality of conditions is the common law of society, the most marked inequalities do not strike the eye; when everything is nearly on the same level, the slightest are marked enough to hurt it. Hence the desire of equality always becomes more insatiable in proportion as equality is more complete.[43]

Thus the intensity of democratic-American striving. The direction, already partially explained, can now be given fuller definition. A major component of social equality in America is the narrowed spread of property differences, with a heavy concentration in the middle range: the typical figures are " eager and apprehensive men of small property." "As they are still almost within the reach of poverty, they see its privations near at hand and dread them; between poverty and themselves there is nothing but a scanty fortune, upon which they immediately fix their apprehensions and their hopes." [44] The case is very similar for the democratic rich and poor: " When . . . the distinctions of ranks are obliterated and privileges are destroyed, when hereditary property is subdivided and education and freedom are

[42] II, 128-130, 136-139, 154-157, 228-229, 244-247.

[43] II, 138.

[44] II, 253.

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widely diffused, the desire of acquiring the comforts of the world haunts the imagination of the poor, and the dread of losing them that of the rich." [45] In total effect, "The love of well-being has now become the predominant taste of the nation; the great current of human passions runs in that channel and sweeps everything along in its course." [46]

With the urgent, worried striving for indefinite material success Tocqueville finds a marked propensity toward industrial and commercial callings; that is, toward the most flexible pursuits which afford the quickest openings to large returns.[47] The seeming contradiction, in the heavy predominance of agricultural employment among Americans, Tocqueville resolves first by pointing to the rapid rate of growth in nonagricultural lines and, more effectively, by attaching a special meaning to American farming.

> Almost all the farmers of the United States combine some trade with agriculture; most of them make agriculture itself a trade. It seldom happens that an American farmer settles for good upon the land which he occupies; especially in the districts of the Far [i.e., Middle] West, he brings land into tillage in order to sell it again, and not to farm it: he builds a farmhouse on the speculation that, as the state of the country will soon be changed by the increase of population, a good price may be obtained for it. . . . Thus the Americans carry their businesslike qualities into agriculture, and their trading passions are displayed in that as in their other pursuits.[48]

Tocqueville does not hesitate to accept one of the sweeping consequences of his argument: that America is essentially a one-dimensional society, with a single basic life-style, a single character-type. Equality of condition, American-style, defines a common social situation and enforces a common pattern of response (along the lines sketched above). Examining the possibility of sectional variation, Tocqueville concludes that the American South alone has preserved a unique social universe, founded upon the glaring anomaly (within a democratic order) of negro slavery—and even this difference must collapse eventually. The West is partially distinct in nature and effects, yet basically within the unitary

[45] II, 129. [46] II, 130. [47] II, 154-157. [48] II, 157.

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pattern.[49] In a fascinating set of wilderness notes [50] (which some future editor of the *Democracy* ought to append to the text), Tocqueville wrote that he had indeed expected geography to count for more in America, and abandoned this among other "traveller's illusions" only in the face of strong evidence.

> In America, even more than in Europe, there is only one society. It may be either rich or poor, humble or brilliant, trading or agricultural; but it is composed everywhere of the same elements. The plane of a uniform civilization has passed over it. The man you left in New York you find again in almost impenetrable solitudes: same clothes, same attitude, same language, same habits, same pleasures. Nothing rustic, nothing naive, nothing which smells of the wilderness, nothing even resembling our [French] villages. . . . Those who inhabit these isolated places have arrived there since yesterday; they have come with the customs, the ideas, the needs of civilization. They only yield to savagery that which the imperious necessity of things exacts from them. . . .[51]

The most remarkable quality of the West, in short, is not its somewhat looser, rougher ways, but its capacity to reproduce almost from the moment of settlement the typical society and character of American democracy.[52]

At the center of this spinning turbulence Tocqueville exposes—what he scarcely expected his French readers to credit—the soul of an arch-conservative: the steady citizen, the meek thinker, the pillar of property and propriety. To deal convincingly with such a strange compound he calls upon all his explanatory resources in history, politics, sociology and psychology. His point is, not to distinguish differences and place them separately upon plausible grounds, but to reconstruct a dynamic whole, a venturous conservative.

The men of the middle, preponderant in democratic times

[49] I, 356-381, 392-395, 405.

[50] Quoted in George Pierson, *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (New York, 1938), pp. 231-284.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

[52] I, 290-292, 297, 316-317.

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and uniquely so in America, are unquiet souls, whipped into motion by acquisitive hunger and then arrested by possessive fears.[53] When Tocqueville portrays such as the "natural enemies of violent commotions,"[54] he has in mind no inert lump of a dozing bourgeois but a nervous striver whose apprehensions mount with his success. The democratic competitor, shifting his efforts fluidly toward the quick opening to relative economic success (as the key to all felicity), finds himself in the midst of a universal competition of equals. With all the parts of his universe (himself included) in erratic motion, with no fixed terminus and no secure resting place, the democrat develops an acute awareness of loss and failure. He is never the contented success; rarely the jealous miser; and typically the unrelenting acquisitor, casting a nervous backward glance at what he has already gained.[55] The economic radical—in terms of work-style—becomes in this sense the property-conservative: "between poverty and themselves there is nothing but a scanty fortune, upon which they immediately fix their apprehensions and their hopes."[56]

In the basic democratic situation, the strenuous pursuit of private welfare means the draining of vital concern from alternative engagements, notably with ideas and politics. There is simply a low minimum of attention available to revolutionary agitation.[57] This analysis has only a limited application to America, however, where free, democratic political institutions infuse the habits of freedom into almost the entire population:[58] "but if an American were condemned to confine his activity to his own affairs, he would be robbed of one half of his existence; he would feel an immense void in the life which he is accustomed to lead, and his wretchedness would be unbearable."[59] It is not, then,

[53] II, 252-253, 128-130. [54] II, 252.

[55] II, 154-157, 244-248, 228-229, 136-139.

[56] II, 253. Even failure is not a clean-cut, ultimate catastrophe leading to emotional rejection of the economic system. The bankrupt has fallen in an equal competition, has a standing offer of new chances in new places, and so responds normally by renewing the struggle, abnormally by escape into insanity, almost never by overt rebelliousness. II, 139, 236.

[57] II, 253-255, 260. [58] I, 249-252. [59] I, 250.

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political apathy which tames the American; instead he shapes the quality of his political participation to correspond to and conserve his private-welfare interests.

> An American attends to his private concerns as if he were alone in the world, and the next minute he gives himself up to the common welfare as if he had forgotten them. At one time he seems animated by the most selfish cupidity; at another, by the most lively patriotism. The human heart cannot be thus divided. The inhabitants of the United States alternately display so strong and so similar a passion for their own welfare and for their freedom that it may be supposed that these passions are united and mingled in some part of their character. And indeed the Americans believe their freedom to be the best instrument and surest safeguard of their welfare; they are attached to the one by the other. They by no means think that they are not called upon to take a part in public affairs; they believe, on the contrary, that their chief business is to secure for themselves a government which will allow them to acquire the things they covet and which will not debar them from the peaceful enjoyment of those possessions which they have already acquired.[60]

With such passionate devotion to the gains he has and seeks, the venturous American creates within himself a counterforce to his furious energies: "They love change but they dread revolutions." [61] Under a régime of almost unlimited political and civil liberty, the American democrat is perhaps the safest citizen in the world. Yet this it not the full measure of American conservatism: "amid the continual friction of men and things," Tocqueville observes, "the mind of man appears almost unmoved." [62] Here his classic analysis of equalitarian conformity, scarcely modified by anything unique to the American situation, records the suicide of individuality unbounded.[63] If elsewhere Tocqueville emphasizes the "wide verge" of the "fatal circle" defined by a democratic social condition, it now becomes clear that accident and choice are critically significant only in one direction: the avoidance of political despotism (the total domination of "an immense and tutelary power"), mainly by

[60] II, 142. [61] II, 255. [62] II, 257. [63] See *supra*, pp. 55-56.

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releasing and focusing vast stores of private energy for the nonpolitical accomplishment of social tasks. Against the natural tendency of democracy to press minds into a dead uniformity Tocqueville's " new science of politics " uncovers no deep-rooted, viable restraints.[64]

The leveling of society, especially when accomplished through a violent revolutionary episode, initially unhinges all authority-relations. But the shock of leveled liberty puts an insupportable strain upon the democrat: [65] "A principle of authority must then always occur, under all circumstances, in some part or other of the moral and intellectual world." [66] The location is determined by the basic democratic situation:

> When the inhabitant of a democratic country compares himself individually with all those about him, he feels with pride that he is the equal of any one of them; but when he comes to survey the totality of his fellows and to place himself in contrast with so huge a body, he is instantly overwhelmed by the sense of his own insignificance and weakness. The same equality that renders him independent of each of his fellow citizens, taken severally, exposes him alone and unprotected to the influence of the greater number. The public, therefore, among a democratic people, has a singular power, which aristocratic nations cannot conceive; for it does not persuade others to its beliefs, but it imposes them and makes them permeate the thinking of everyone by a sort of enormous pressure of the mind of all upon the individual intelligence.[67]

Thus democrats—and Americans—turn toward public opinion as their source of moral and intellectual authority.[68] That a pervasive public opinion should exist in democratic society, to assume the functions of authority, is understood by Tocqueville as a simple consequence of equality:

> Men who are equal in rights, in education, in fortune, or, to comprise all in one word, in their social condition, have necessarily wants, habits, and tastes that are hardly dissimilar. As they look at objects under the same aspect, their minds naturally tend to similar conclusions; and though each of them may deviate from his contemporaries and form

[64] II, 318, 332-333.

[65] II, 3-12. [66] II, 9. [67] II, 10. [68] I, 263-265.

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> opinions of his own, they will involuntarily and unconsciously concur in a certain number of received opinions. . . . The leading opinions of men become similar in proportion as their conditions assimilate: such appears to me to be the general and permanent law; the rest is casual and transient.[69]

The democratic heretic who seeks a public hearing must speak at once to all: he has a legal permit, but no special platform—no claim to the attention of a busily preoccupied crowd, no initial concession of confidence in private intellectual authority to build upon.[70] "He strains himself to rouse the indifferent and distracted multitude and finds at last that he is reduced to impotence, not because he is conquered, but because he is alone." [71]

In Summary [72]

The image of the democrat as American which I have assembled from Tocqueville's pages represents a most ambitious attempt to derive from the basic social situation of democracy (with local variations) a characteristic pattern of psychological response manifested broadly in the laws, customs, opinions, manners and life-style of Jacksonian Americans. Certainly the boldest, possibly the most revealing, feature of the portrait is the joining in dynamic tension of two major tendencies—toward independence, toward dependence. Tocqueville discovers the antithetic trends in the basic democratic situation, finds them in varying relations through every aspect of American life, and sees them exposed again in that duality of character which I have summed up in the phrase, "venturous conservative". Condensing drastically, I would suggest that Tocqueville sees the process shaping the venturous conservative in two related ways. A comprehensive social equality is the common point of departure. Along one line: a world of almost-equals creates

69 II, 258. See I, 303-307, II, 6, 10-11, 26-28, on the conservative reinforcement provided by religion, adapted to democratic circumstance and accepted "as a commonly received opinion."

70 II, 258-263. 71 II, 255.

72 For an interpretation of Jacksonian Democracy, developing the theme suggested below, see Marvin Meyers, "The Jacksonian Persuasion", *American Quarterly, V* (Spring 1953), 3-15.

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an anxious, urgent, flexible seeker of the next, most precious, most elusive increment of wealth and status; a seeker who, out of fear for his possessions and hope for his opportunities, becomes a firm property-conservative; and one who, from the depth of his material engagements, has little concern for radical revaluations of his moral universe. Along a second line: the masterless man, free to invent a fresh world, finds all the important value-answers—and many petty ones—given in familiar, comfortable form by his own self-image, magnified to authoritative dimensions—by the majority. In this direction little adventure survives; only a sort of surface confusion disguising a frozen mass of values.

Tocqueville's venturous conservative is a historical type, perceived in wide focus. The portrait is built out of Jacksonian materials, but composed primarily to elucidate the enduring family traits of the democrat, with special reference to the American branch. It would be foolish to expect from the *Democracy* a direct solution for detailed problems of Jacksonian history. As Tocqueville abstracted the democratic type from his Jacksonian observations, so I think one can profitably reverse the process, reviewing Jacksonian times in the light of Tocqueville's synthesis. One need not seek—what history so rarely yields—the neat confirmation of a rigorous hypothesis. It would be enough to gain some clues to the meaning of certain central actions and reactions.

Tocqueville does not himself make the connection between social situation, typical response, and the specific content of the Jacksonian political appeal. Yet it seems to me a highly plausible association. The American who was involved in the continuous re-creation of his social world, the continuous re-location of his place within it, became the anxious witness of his own audacity. The consequence, Tocqueville suggests, was the renewal of frenetic activity and, at the same time, a passionate attachment to property. A further response is evidenced, I would propose, by the effectiveness of the Jacksonian political appeal: to hard money, personal enterprise and credit, rural simplicity, and—broadly—to the pristine values of the Old Republic.

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BRITISH INTEREST-GROUP TACTICS: A CASE STUDY

MANY observers have noted the existence and activities of numerous organized interest groups—" pressure groups ", as some call them—in Great Britain.[1] Their number and range of expressed interests are as wide as man's imagination, in spite of the fact that few of the formal commentaries on British government note their existence, much less attempt to analyze their place in the British public decision-making process.

Because the tactics of many British groups apparently differ from those of their American counterparts, there has been a tendency among some observers to differentiate the two national patterns as different types of phenomena. Thus Professor Herman Finer states: " Party is too strongly in control of English politics for members to be liable to influence by lobbyists. . . . There is hardly a loophole between the constituencies and Parliament through which the lobbyist can slide to extort concessions." [2] It is my contention that the interest-group activity of the two nations is similar in more respects than it is dissimilar. What may vary are techniques: rules of the game which govern the attempt of organized interests to influence public decisions; and the location in the governmental process of decision-making powers which the groups seek to influence. What is basic in both nations is that organized interests, perhaps including among their supporters only minorities of the total public, compete with each other and with generalized and unorgan-

[1] The most extensive description and analysis is that of Samuel H. Beer, " Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain ", *The American Political Science Review,* vol. L (March 1956), pp. 1-23. See also: Beer, " The Future of British Politics ", *The Political Quarterly,* vol. XXVI (January-March 1955), pp. 33-43; Sir Ivor Jennings, *Parliament* (Cambridge, 1939), chap. vii; Herman Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government,* rev. ed. (New York, 1949), pp. 463-67; S. E. Finer, " The Federation of British Industries ", *Political Studies,* vol. IV (February 1956), pp. 61-84.

[2] Herman Finer, *op. cit.,* p. 463.

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ized interests (perhaps occasionally represented by parties) to obtain expressed ends through governmental decisions.

In an attempt to illuminate this hypothesis I have examined intensively the activities of the British Legion during its history as an organization.[3] This group was chosen as an example of a nonpartisan mass-membership organization. It is nonpartisan in that it has no formal or informal regularized relationships with any political party, although clearly its membership belongs to a variety of such organizations. In spite of the fact that its current President, Sir Ian Fraser, is a Member of Parliament and consequently a partisan (Conservative), the Legion as an organization has always attempted to prevent itself from being identified in a partisan fashion. Further, while making no attempt to maintain that the Legion is necessarily typical of all British interest groups, or of nonpartisan mass-membership groups, I see no reason to think that it is not representative of one common pattern of such activity. No one has claimed that its power or its activities are in any fashion unusual among groups active in making claims upon government.[4]

Specifically, this is a study of the techniques used by the British Legion during thirty-six years of attempts to influence public decisions. But these techniques cannot be understood if considered in isolation from each other; that is, "lobbying" activities in Commons as such are only a portion of the total techniques used and are always supplementary to other devices.

Since World War II the Legion has developed a well-coordinated three-phase attack: (1) the Legion continuously maintains and cultivates close associations with ranking civil servants and ministers in relevant ministries, particularly the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (formerly the Ministry of Pensions); (2) beginning in late autumn the Legion launches a public campaign on the subject of higher

[3] Unless otherwise noted, this study is based on the issues of the Annual Conference *Proceedings, Annual Report,* British Legion *Journal* (a monthly periodical for members), and interviews with ranking Legion officials.

[4] This judgment was borne out in interviews with M.P.'s, including several who have had ministerial connections with the Ministry of Pensions. See also Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Party System in Great Britain* (London, 1953), chap. xviii.

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and more liberal pensions for disabled ex-servicemen; (3) this develops into a campaign which, if successful, shows up in questions asked of ministers in Commons and then, if all goes well, actual debate on the floor of Commons. All are designed to climax about a month before the annual Budget Address, the focal point of the attack.

In part this coördinated effort is the result of trial and error. Some of the particular "public relations" aspects of the campaign are still being altered for better effect and may be assumed to be changed as various devices "work" while others do not. But the first phase of the activity, the attention given to the civil servants and ministers, has been the most consistent of the Legion's efforts since its formation in 1921.

Influence on the Executive

The Legion's first efforts in its formative years were attempts to gain prestige and personal relationships with the ranking civil servants of the Ministry of Pensions. The Legion's full-time salaried officials made themselves experts on the subject of ex-servicemen's pensions. The man who heads the Legion's unit which prepares material on pensions legislation and which counsels individual pensions claims has been in this position since the Legion's inception—indeed, since before the Legion's birth, as he did similar work for one of the Legion's predecessor organizations. Thus he has worked with the same men in the Ministry for thirty-five years and is often sought out by his friends there for advice. Talks with the civil servants and Legion officers involved make it clear that they hold each other in mutual respect.

Not only has the Legion cultivated the civil servants in these ways, but its representatives—usually consisting of these same individuals—sit on advisory departmental committees. Of particular importance in the 1920's was the Central Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Pensions. Here the major provisions of the pensions program for ex-servicemen of World War I were worked out—one might say, bargained for. Records of these committee sessions are not available, but it should be apparent that when representatives of the Ministry of the government of the day meet with

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representatives of the principal organizations concerned, something like bargaining takes place. During these years the Legion made insistent demands for altering the scope and method of pensions payments, and even attempted to obtain statutory changes in these areas. Not one of these demands was granted in an act of Parliament, but almost all of the requests were granted in whole or in major part by administrative rulings of the Ministry.

During the 1930's the Committee ceased to meet. The Legion's demands during this period were desultory and indicated that the leadership was satisfied with the accommodations worked out during the preceeding ten years. It is probable that such demands as they did have could now be taken up informally, since the relationships with the ranking civil servants were by now well established.

All during its existence the Legion's leadership has visited the Minister of Pensions, and sometimes the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister, in formal deputations. This follows standard procedures which appear to be used by all recognized interest groups. It should not, however, be assumed that these meetings are necessarily the real bargaining sessions between governments and groups. Normally they are the public announcements that contacts with the Ministries have already been made. Interestingly, the four organizations which consolidated to form the Legion in the first place utilized the formal deputation frequently—sometimes once a week during a period of intense activity. This probably indicates that these groups did not have well-established relations with the civil servants of the Ministry of Pensions—both the groups and the Ministry were quite new. Now anything more than an annual deputation shortly before budget time is most unusual. As one official of the Legion put it, "We don't see the Minister until we're ready to agree or disagree." One should hasten to add that in most instances, particularly those concerning the budget, the ministers cannot give commitments in these meetings.

The concentration upon a ministry and minister should not be taken to mean that the Legion, or groups like it which use similar tactics, cannot influence Members of Parliament. It is more likely that the groups know instinctively where real power lies in British decision-making.

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Professor S. E. Finer has noted the same phenomena in his study of the Federation of British Industries, although he conceals the point with his terminology. He stresses "how rarely the Federation is arguing policy and how overwhelmingly it is concerned with detail, technique, and administration." [5] The point is that "technique and administration" are also "policy". They are policy decisions made where the group has the best means of access to decision-making. And it should be noted that the great majority of governmental decisions are those made by regulations and orders, not by legislation. If government is thought of as a continual process of decision-making, or, as Luther Gulick has phrased it, "a seamless web of discretion and action," then artificial categories become meaningless.[6] For example, in the 1920's the Legion wanted the scope of pensions for disabled ex-servicemen and their widows to be broadened, and it asked for legislation for that purpose. But it appeared satisfied when concessions were granted, over a period of several years, by administrative regulations.

The Legion's attitude on the merger of the Ministry of Pensions and the Ministry of National Insurance in 1953 underscores the importance which it gives to this means of access. By 1953 the Legion's main concern was budgetary, as it desired higher pensions for disabled ex-servicemen. Its specific demands were for a doubling of pensions rates, and it considered that its best means was the "mediation" of its own Minister of Pensions with the Chancellor. It is not difficult to imagine that the civil servants of the Ministry were the first intermediaries in their dealings with the civil servants of the Treasury.

Thus when the government proposed to merge the Ministries of Pensions and National Insurance, the Legion announced its opposition because the merger would group ex-servicemen's pensions with the claims of others and would take away from its own minister direct access to cabinet

[5] S. E. Finer, *loc. cit.*, p. 67.

[6] Luther Gulick, "Politics, Administration, and the New Deal", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 169 (September 1933), pp. 55-66, 61. See also Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York, 1948), chap. 7.

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meetings. The permanent under-secretary for pensions would thus be lowered one rung in the administrative hierarchy, a step symbolic of loss of status and an actual loss of influence. It is significant that this measure provided the only time in Commons when the Legion's President voted against his own government's three-line whip and urged his own party colleagues to do likewise. It is highly probable that the loss of access was not the only reason for Sir Ian Fraser's actions, as he was also expressing displeasure about the allegedly low figure of pensions, but his explanation of his vote sheds light on the question of group techniques:

> When we had our own Minister, he was something of an advocate for us with the Government, in the Cabinet Committees and even in the Cabinet itself. Even though that Minister was not a Member of the Cabinet, nevertheless, he had access to Cabinet Members and was an advocate for us. It is, of course, true that, once Government policy is established, all Ministers, under the doctrine of collective responsibility, become individually and collectively responsible for the Government's policy, but, during the months that precede decision, during the formative period, the Minister of Pensions is an advocate. I have often felt that successive Ministers of Pensions whom I have been to see and whom I have known personally—though they never gave themselves away to me—have been doing all they possibly could with the Chancellor of the Exchequer with the single-minded purpose of getting what we were asking them to do for us. . . .
>
> We are to replace our advocate by this new Minister who is trammelled by responsibility for vast numbers of other people who are not ex-Service people. His single-minded advocacy can no longer be at our disposal. We have been robbed of our own advocate within the Government. . . . if we are continuing to fight, as we are, for the full recognition of our pensions claims, it handicaps us in that there is no separate Ministry or Minister who will take our line against the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
>
> . . . the fact is that you are now going to make it more difficult for us to win that battle [for higher pensions], which is the principal reason why I am opposed to this merger. . . .[7]

[7] *H. C. Deb.*, 5th ser., vol. 517, cols. 287-88, June 1953.

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Influence on the Public and the Legislature

Emphasizing as this does the influence on the executive side of the governmental process, one of the major purposes of attempts to influence the legislative side appears to be that of an additional influence aimed at the government as such. That is well exemplified by the highly coördinated campaign already summarized above.

The public portion of the Legion's activities begins in the autumn and is designed to reach a peak about a month before the annual Budget Address. Since budget decisions are clearly made by the government, the campaign cannot be designed to obtain legislative decisions; if activity results in the House of Commons, however, this is an additional spur to the ministers and perhaps an indication of popular support. The Legion uses pamphlets, broadsides and speakers at rallies and to any organized group willing to take them. A full-time "public relations director" coördinates a national publicity campaign. Usually, it is assumed, this is sufficient to fill the mail bags of the M.P.'s.

If this campaign is successful, the Legion hopes for additional activity in the House itself. But this is not left to chance. All interested M.P.'s are members of a "British Legion House of Commons Branch" (assuming their eligibility for Legion membership), a kind of all-party grouping —again, a device used by numerous interest groups. The "branch" meets at the most two or three times a year and serves as a device for bringing Legion issues to the Members' attention. The branch was formed in 1921, but rarely in its history has it attempted to obtain Members' votes on specific issues. At no time since World War II has it ever, as an organization, requested M.P.'s to vote against their whips. It does contribute questions and asks M.P.'s to raise them at question time, and this is regularly done.

As budget time nears, the questions increase, and normally either Sir Ian Fraser or a recognized Legion spokesman in the House attempts to raise the Legion's current demands in a Debate on Adjournment. If M.P.'s are sufficently aroused, they might raise such issues at meetings of the parties' respective parliamentary organizations, or, at the very least, speak informally of the matter to the interested ministers.

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In the early years of the Legion's history, its leadership made extensive attempts to get branches to interrogate candidates for the House of Commons with extensive questionnaires. By the mid-1930's these were scarcely used at all. Since the Second World War the Legion has provided its branches with brief questionnaires to be sent prospective candidates, but has generally ignored the results. According to Legion officials, the answers are usually the same for most members of the same party, indicating that the answers were drafted in party headquarters and supplied to candidates. Individual branches do consult with candidates and try to obtain pledges of friendship and sympathy for the Legion from them. One M.P. told the writer that these interviews could be difficult for an inexperienced candidate (this M.P. happened to have one of the Legion's most active branches in his constituency). But by and large the Legion does not concern itself with this type of activity. Even if it could be effective, it probably is not necessary. The Legion has always had at least one top ranking officer in the House of Commons, and almost a hundred M.P.'s at the present time are members of the Legion. Of that number, several—probably for reasons of personal concern and not necessarily just electoral purposes—are interested and devoted members. Both Speakers since the recent war have been Legion members and have served as Honorary Presidents of the House of Commons Branch, presiding over its meetings.[8]

It is interesting to note that the present Legion President, who is a Conservative party backbencher, was not selected as president in order to obtain official parliamentary representation for the Legion. He already was in Commons when selected as Legion President, and already was considered the Legion's ranking spokesman in that body. Conference *Proceedings* for 1947 indicate that he was selected president against the expressed wishes of the Legion's leadership of that time, primarily because he was known to the rank-and-file Conference delegate as an active Legion member and worker, while his opponent was unknown to them and had

[8] Mr. Attlee questioned the propriety of this arrangement and was told by the Speaker that he merely kept order and parliamentary procedures during these meetings, in no way identifying himself with the demands being discussed. *H. C. Deb.*, 5th ser., vol. 496, cols. 235-37, February 20, 1952.

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never before been active in Legion work. Previous presidents had been military notables who did little for the Legion save lend prestige. (The exception, of course, was the founder, Field Marshal the Lord Haig.)

One of the obvious differences in interest-group techniques from the better-known American experience is the fact that the paid group bureaucrats spend very little or no time attempting to influence M.P.'s. They do, of course, testify at hearings conducted by Royal Commissions and departmental committees. But, since there are no legislative committee hearings similar to those of the American Congress, this type of activity does not occur. Further, the paid group officials do not "lobby" in the sense of spending time trying to influence individual M.P.'s. But the M.P.'s who are active members of the group do. It is difficult to see that anything other than a difference in the institutional arrangements of decision-making is involved in these differing group techniques.

Several times during the past ten years the Legion has requested its branches to arrange meetings with their individual M.P.'s to put the Legion case. Occasionally these have been coördinated to take place on the same date, called a "Day of Demand" by the Legion. These "Days of Demand" are the closest approach to "lobbying" by outsiders which the Legion makes.

The Times within the last two years noted: "Mass lobbying is increasing annually the demands it makes on members' time." It cited numerous groups, ranging from the British Peace Committee to persons dressed in hunting pink who opposed a proposed ban on blood sports, which have descended on Parliament in groups ranging up to 2,000 in number.[9] Whether mass lobbying has in fact increased in recent years would be difficult to determine without considerable study, but even if this were known it would not necessarily indicate increased group activity.

The Legion's uses of mass lobbying suggest several hypotheses concerning this type of activity. The first is that the well-organized group with established ministerial relationships will be very sparing in its use of mass lobbying. In-

[9] *The Times*, November 30, 1955.

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deed, the Legion normally asks its branches to see M.P.'s in their home constituencies rather than at the House of Commons. This prevents the Legion's being accused of causing a public demonstration.[10] Mass lobbying may also backfire and hurt the cause being advocated. That it is frowned upon by M.P.'s and organizations can be shown by the immediate denial of such activity by the British Limbless Ex-Service Men's Association after it had been mentioned for mass lobbying by *The Times*. Said the General Secretary in his letter to *The Times*:

> Accepting the advice of their many friends in Parliament, BLESMA have never undertaken mass lobbying. It is true that our members visited the House in strength in November, 1951, and again in November, 1955, on both occasions by invitation to attend specially convened meetings of M.P.s, and not for the purpose of lobbying.[11]

Thus "lobbying" is an evil—especially when it takes the form of a mass demonstration. But lobbying is not lobbying when done in a slightly different fashion.

The second hypothesis is a corollary of the first: a number of groups which frequently utilize mass lobbying do not have such established relationships as those exhibited by the Legion, and may indeed have no hope whatsoever of obtaining their goals in the immediate future—or at any time in the forseeable future. Certainly the suffragettes, who utilized the public demonstration as well as any group, did not have normal and regularized ministerial relations (save, perhaps, for those who were wives of ministers). The British Peace Committee, which has advocated banning the atom bomb and on other occasions requested sweeping changes in foreign policy, is another excellent example of this type of group.

Another explanation of mass lobbying may be that it rallies the group's rank and file behind the leadership and helps make the group attractive to additional membership.

[10] At most Legion Conferences a few zealous members urge the use of public demonstrations. One man wished to have the disabled march down Whitehall displaying their artificial limbs in an attempt to obtain public sympathy.

[11] *The Times*, January 3, 1956.

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It is difficult to dramatize the workings of a departmental committee or quiet talks with a junior minister or a ranking civil servant. In fact, these cannot be publicized at all. Legion Conferences annually spend a major portion of their time urging the leadership to greater efforts; one common resolution would "censure" the House of Commons Branch for lack of diligence. And it is notable that Sir Ian Fraser spends some of his time on the House floor, talking not to his colleagues there but to the rank-and-file British Legion member who will read a copy of the speech in the next issue of the Legion *Journal*. Sir Ian has on several occasions explained to the House the workings of party discipline, the nature of a partisan vote of censure, and similar points of order which one might assume his immediate listeners well understood. But that is not his purpose; he must think of the Legion followers who will learn of his activities. Thus the House debate is an outward sign of the inner negotiations which are the real seat of activity.

Finally, as implied above, lobbying is designed to convince ministers that the group's claims are desired by large segments of the electorate. It certainly behooves any organized group to demonstrate that its interests are those of far more than its mere dues-paying membership. The Legion has never claimed to represent, in terms of actual members, more than 10 to 15 per cent of the total ex-servicemen of England and Wales. If it can, therefore, appear to have the support of many other persons, it may aid its cause.

One special device which a few groups use on occasion in order to attempt to demonstrate support which is numerically greater than its paid-up membership is the petition. This is utilized rarely these days, but when it is used, there are normally many signatures affixed.[12] The Legion tried this just once, and will not do so again if the present leadership has anything to say about the matter. Although 824,000 signatures were obtained, the Legion considered the tactic a failure. The signatures were indeed more than the claimed Legion membership at the time—in 1925—but not nearly enough more, considering the time and effort put into ob-

[12] Colin Leys, "Petitioning in the 19th and 20th Centuries", *Political Studies*, vol. III (February 1955), pp. 45-63.

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taining them. The difficulty was that the Minister of Pensions was well aware of the vast efforts and organization established just to obtain these signatures, and thought that the results demonstrated the opposite of what the Legion had hoped: they proved there was no great demand on the part of 5,000,000 ex-servicemen and their families for new legislation.[13]

Thus British organized interests tend to concentrate their efforts where the greatest decision-making power is held. This certainly should not be surprising. But low visibility of these actions to the public eye should not be taken as evidence that such activity is not taking place or that it is significantly different from that which happens in the United States. This is not to attempt to answer the question of the degree of success of particular organized groups, or the degree to which these groups, when in opposition to particular parties or governments, may be successful. It is a tautology to say that the groups which are most powerful are likely to be most successful. The determinants of success should be a fascinating subject of study.

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[13] See the Minister's blunt statement to this effect. *H. C. Deb.*, 5th ser., vol. 192, col. 458, February 23, 1926.

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MALAYAN RUBBER POLICY

I

UNDER the Colombo Plan and other schemes, such as the United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare Scheme, large sums are spent on government investment in Malaya, as in other countries of South-east Asia. At the same time, new planting of rubber, by both estates and smallholdings, is practically banned in Malaya (as it has been for more than twenty-five years) by the official refusal to make land available for the purpose. This rules out a most important form of agricultural investment, which in economic terms is very productive, and which is also desirable on wide social and political grounds.[1] This paper discusses the principal implications of this paradoxical policy which stems from a combination of political and economic forces, administrative influences and chance circumstances.

The issues raised by this policy are both practically important and intellectually interesting. Their practical significance derives from their effects on the economy of Malaya and on the social and political stability of a country which has both economic and strategic importance. The intellectual interest of the question is rather different. No rational political or economic argument has been advanced in support of a policy which greatly harms the economy and undermines the social stability of the country. In these circumstances it is naturally tempting to assume that this policy is designed to promote sectional economic interests, especially those of European estates. While this purpose was a contributory factor to its introduction over twenty-five years ago, it plays no part in it today; and the policy has been openly criticized by spokesmen of the European estates.

The principal influence behind it today seems to be an unwillingness to face the disastrous implications of a policy

[1] This is not the only paradox of economic policy in Malaya. In that country, as in many other British colonies, there is substantial government capital expenditure on communications while at the same time the establishment of transport enterprises is subject to restrictive licensing. This particular paradox does not, however, bear on the argument of this paper.

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pursued over a long period; political scientists and students of international affairs may find it a notable example of the self-perpetuation of measures of policy when the circumstances which gave rise to them have long passed. A brief review of the policy, including its background and implications, also reveals the inadequacy of a few general notions, combined perhaps with a survey based on easily accessible reports and rather obvious statistics, as bases for assessing the situation; and the inadequacy also of the familiar broad-brush technique of contemporary economic surveys, such as those of the international agencies, to illuminate the scene. In this important example, as in many others, knowledge of the historical background, and even more notably of some quasi-technical matters, is necessary for an understanding of the situation. This would be even clearer from a fuller survey than is possible here, but it should emerge even from this comparatively brief study.

Although Malaya is a small country with an area of only about 50,000 square miles and a population of about 7 million, it is of considerable economic importance.[2] The aggregate value of its foreign trade, including entrepôt trade, is at present about £1,000 million annually, which is far greater than that of any other single British colony. Malayan rubber is much the most valuable export crop of the British colonies, as well as an essential raw material and an important source of foreign exchange. The country has risen to this position of economic importance only in the course of the last fifty or sixty years, a period during which the rise and growth of the rubber industry, and to a lesser extent of the tin industry, have transformed a sparsely populated region of Malay hamlets and fishing villages into a populous, thriving and busy country. Malaya is an outstanding example of a country which, although nonindustrialized and poor by Western standards, has nevertheless experienced very rapid economic growth since it was caught up in the

[2] The term British Mayala includes the Federation of Malaya (the mainland) and the Island of Singapore, which is a separate political and administrative unit. In this article Malaya covers both the Federation and Singapore; almost all the rubber is produced on the mainland.

Malaya is also of great strategic importance. This does not bear directly on this article, although it should be remembered that policies affecting the internal stability of the country may have far-reaching repercussions.

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stream of material progress toward the end of the nineteenth century.

In spite of the severe restrictions on production and planting throughout the inter-war period, the rubber industry has been the principal instrument of this economic growth. At present, rubber is the mainstay of the economy of Malaya, where it is the largest source of cash income and of government revenue. The annual output of Malayan rubber is approximately 600,000 tons, worth about £150 million at current (1956) prices. The estates produce about three fifths of the total output and smallholdings about two fifths. The former tend to be large properties of a hundred acres or more, owned mostly by European companies; the smallholdings, on the other hand, are chiefly very small properties of a few acres each, owned by Asians, predominantly Malays and Chinese.

In spite of this rapid economic growth, three quarters of the area of Malaya is still unplanted, and almost all of this is uncultivated, but cultivable, jungle. The title to this unplanted land is vested in the government (formally in the Crown or in the Malay rulers), and the process by which such land is made available for cultivation by individuals is known as alienation. When land is alienated, the use to which it can be put is specified—that is, the crop to be cultivated is specified. The authorities charge a capital sum (alienation premium), and a stipulated annual payment (quit rent) which is generally fixed for long periods ahead. Both the alienation premium and the quit rent vary solely with the crop cultivated, and are charged irrespective of location and fertility. Quite clearly the quit rents are a form of land tax, and are not agricultural rents in the accepted sense of the term, since such rents vary with location and fertility. The quit rent on land under rubber is at present at the annual rate of six Straits dollars (about two United States dollars) per acre, a substantial figure for rural land in a thinly populated underdeveloped area; a figure, moreover, which is the same on low-yielding or outlying properties as on better lands. In 1939 and 1940 when a very small amount of land was alienated for rubber planting, the premium was at the high figure of about 50 Straits dollars per acre. The large uncultivated area is the result partly of these heavy

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charges, but chiefly of the various official restrictions on planting and land alienation; it is not the result of inaccessibility or infertility of the land.

With negligible exceptions (in 1939 and 1940) which were, moreover, confined to larger properties, no land has been alienated for rubber planting in Malaya since 1930, and this policy is still in force. This means that new planting of rubber is very largely barred, even though it is not formally prohibited. Only those cultivators can plant who in the past have had land alienated to them on which they could have planted rubber, but which they have not used for this purpose. There is practically no such land in Malaya, for the obvious reason that people who had such land have generally used it for this purpose, if it was suitable for rubber cultivation. But, while new planting is effectively banned, replanting—that is, the uprooting of an existing stand of trees and their replacement on the same area with better-yielding trees—is encouraged, both by official propaganda and by pressure, and, more effectively, by fiscal measures. Expenditure on replanting is an expense allowable against income and profits tax; beyond this there are certain export duties, the proceeds of which are used to subsidize replanting.

II

New planting of rubber has been officially banned or severely restricted in Malaya since the early 1920's. From 1922 to 1928—the currency of the Stevenson Rubber Restriction Scheme, a restriction scheme which operated in Malaya and Ceylon only—new planting was not formally prohibited, but it was discouraged, and little land was alienated for rubber planting. From 1928 to 1930, alienation of land for rubber planting was not banned officially, but it was restricted, partly by high alienation premiums, and partly by administrative discouragement of alienation to smallholders. From 1930 to 1934, no land was alienated for rubber planting at all, either to estates or to smallholders. In 1934 the International Rubber Regulation Scheme was introduced. Under this scheme new planting was prohibited (with insignificant exceptions in 1939 and 1940 which did not substantially affect the Malayan smallholders). The prohibition of

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new planting was not repealed in Malaya until 1947, and since then practically no land has been alienated for rubber planting. In short, very little land has been made available for rubber planting since 1922, and for a large part of the period new planting was completely prohibited.

Most of these restrictions applied to Malaya only, and they were thus unilateral restrictions on the extension of capacity. From 1934 to 1941 new planting was formally barred also in the other producing territories, but this prohibition was not policed effectively in a number of other territories, especially Indonesia and Thailand. These restrictive policies, including the unilateral restriction of production during the Stevenson Scheme, have been a major factor in the decline of the Malayan rubber industry relative to its competitors. At the beginning of the Stevenson Scheme, Malaya produced about two thirds of the world's natural rubber; by now her share is not quite one third. At that time Malaya produced more than twice as much rubber as any other country, but by now the Indonesian output exceeds that of Malaya by a quarter or a third annually, in spite of the disorganization in Indonesia and the deterioration of the estates. Since the mid-1920's, the acreage under rubber in Malaya has increased by about two fifths, while in Indonesia it has at least trebled. Moreover, the age composition of the Malayan acreage is much less favorable, and a far larger proportion of the Malayan acreage is older than is that of the other major producing countries. For instance, over one half of the Malayan area is over thirty years of age, while in Indonesia the proportion is under one third. Thirty years is often regarded as a normal economic age limit for rubber plantation, because of losses from disease, decline in yields with the aging of the trees, and the obsolescence of the trees with the development of high-yielding types. The fact that three quarters of Malaya is unplanted while many people are anxious to plant shows that the relative decline cannot be ascribed to shortage of land, but has been the result largely of restrictive official policies.

III

While new planting has been practically banned, replanting has been encouraged over the last twenty years. During

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rubber restriction new planting was banned, but replanting was permitted and was indeed favored in various ways. As already stated, replanting expenditure is an allowable expense against income and profits taxation, and in some instances it is also subsidized out of the proceeds of export duties. But while replanting is often genuinely economic in individual cases, for various reasons it cannot serve as a substitute for new planting as a general policy for expanding capacity at economic cost. First, a ban on new planting excludes newcomers, both estates and smallholders, who may be low-cost producers, and who would bring new capital into the industry. Second, a replanted area is by definition tied to the soil on which the plantation was originally established, which for many reasons may be far less suitable than would be a different and as yet unplanted area. In Malaya both estates and smallholders have often been established on exhausted or infertile soil, or on steep land which is liable to soil erosion, or where operations are costly. Replanting is wasteful on such areas. Third, replanting involves a loss of output from the uprooted area. These factors are often obscured by the fiscal subsidization of replanting which may make it profitable for the individual estate to replant, even though the procedure is wasteful in terms of real resources.

These considerations apply to both estates and smallholdings. Beyond these, there is a further fundamental reason why replanting cannot serve the same purpose as new planting. This is the general difficulty, or even impossibility, of efficient and economic replanting on the great majority of smallholdings. In the absence of heavy subsidies, smallholders hardly ever replant. There are several reasons for this: inability or unwillingness to face six or seven years' loss of income from the felled stand until the maturity of the replanted area; the technical difficulties of replanting part of a very small holding in view of the root competition from near-by mature trees and the retardation of the growth of young trees from the shading by the older trees; an understandable reluctance to uproot and replant a cultivated area when there are large unplanted areas near by; as well as other sound technical and economic reasons. There are thus good grounds for the smallholders' unwillingness to replant. Even when replanting is subsidized, the smallholders,

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especially the owners of small peasant holdings, are reluctant to replant. When they do replant, this is expensive, and for the reasons stated it is rarely successful. The absence of replanting by smallholders cannot be ascribed to their short-sightedness and inability to take a long view. The very fact that they have rubber smallholdings which yield only six years after planting is conclusive evidence that they are quite capable of taking a long view.

The absence of replanting by smallholders has been well known since the 1930's; it was a frequent theme of administration reports and other official documents before the war. A memorandum widely circulated in 1940 by the secretariat of the International Rubber Regulation Committee showed that the absence of replanting and the ban on new planting gravely endangered the position of the smallholders whose output would decline with the aging of their holdings, while no new capacity was established because of the prohibition of new planting. On the assumption of that memorandum, Malayan smallholders' output would almost disappear by about 1960. In common with most of the discussion at the time, this document understated the physical capacity of the smallholdings, and exaggerated the prospective decline in yields with the aging of smallholdings. But it did not overstate the danger of smallholdings implicit in the prohibition of new planting, combined with the encouragement of replanting, which enabled, and indeed encouraged, estates to maintain or expand their capacity by replanting with high-yielding material, while preventing the maintenance of the capacity of smallholdings. Even though much of the estate replanting was often wasteful, because it was expensive or took place on unsuitable soil, the superiority of high-yielding material over unselected seedling trees planted thirty years earlier was already so great by 1940, that replanting of an appreciable part of the estate area could be expected to increase the capacity of estates, while this was prevented on smallholdings by the ban on new planting and the difficulties of economic replanting. Rubber restriction is no longer in force, but in Malaya the ban on the alienation of land for rubber planting affects the position and prospects of the smallholdings (and indeed the prospects of the industry as a whole) in much the same way as would an outright

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prohibition of new planting such as was in force under restriction.

IV

The ban on the alienation of land for rubber planting, and the consequent barrier to new planting, bear especially harshly on the smallholders, many of whom are low-cost producers. Rubber production is one of the very few industries in which European estates and Asian smallholders are in direct competition. The rubber industry in the East was largely pioneered by the estates but from its early days it was taken up by smallholders who have played an increasing rôle in this industry. By now over one half of total world output of natural rubber comes from smallholdings. In Malaya the proportion is only two fifths, but in Indonesia it is well over one half, while production in Thailand and Sarawak is entirely on smallholdings. An important aspect of the two major restriction schemes of the inter-war period, the Stevenson Scheme and the International Scheme, was the protection of the estates from the competition of smallholdings; this indeed was a principal purpose and result of these schemes. In their absence the price of rubber would have been lower, which would have affected estates and smallholdings alike, but the smallholders' share in total production would be much larger than it is today. The schemes froze the industry, thus retarding or even preventing the progress of the smallholders, who were making rapid headway against the estates before the schemes were introduced. Moreover, their operation discriminated strongly against smallholders, in such matters as the allocation of quotas, the provisions governing planting, and the like. In the absence of these and other policies unfavorable to smallholders, such as the ban on land alienation in Malaya and the direction of research by the officially financed research organizations, the progress of the smallholders would have been much greater.

There are various technical and economic reasons for the competitive strength of the smallholders, only the most important of which can be listed here. Perhaps most significant is the comparative ease of rubber production, the principal phases of which are very simple processes from the planting of the seeds to the smoking of the sheets. More-

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over, these processes have not lent themselves as yet to mechanization; even on the most up-to-date American-owned plantations in the Far East the principal phases of rubber production are carried on with hand labor, attempts at mechanization having failed. These factors make it possible to dispense with elaborate methods and expensive personnel.

So easy is rubber cultivation on Asian smallholdings that the smallholders often simply add rubber to the cultivation of food crops. Even those smallholders who rely largely on rubber for their income rarely use hired labor with a fixed wage, and never use expensive European personnel which the estates seem to find necessary. Rubber production is also largely nonseasonal. Thus there is absent the major reason for peasant indebtedness, the need to tide over the cultivator until the harvest is brought in. Rubber cultivation does not require a draught animal or plough or manures, and this further reduces the cash requirement of cultivation. Moreover, the product is highly standardized, easily marketable, and the buying competition for it is generally keen. Thus there are solid economic reasons for the suitability of rubber cultivation by smallholders, and for the competitive strength of these producers.

The suitability of rubber as a cash crop for Asian smallholders in Malaya also has important political implications. There is a familiar dilemma which often confronts colonial administrators: the choice between efficient but alien methods of production, supported by outside capital, and local methods which may, however, be primitive and inefficient. In rubber production this dilemma does not arise, since the smallholders are efficient producers. In Malaya they have held their own against the estates, while in Indonesia they have made considerable progress; in Sarawak and Siam, rubber is entirely a smallholders' crop. Without the two restriction schemes, and the severe restriction on land alienation for rubber planting, the smallholders would have gained much more ground in Malaya. Indeed, this is an industry where, apart from official restrictions, the small man can start on his own and make a decent and independent living. The ban on the alienation of land for rubber denies access to this source of income to tens of thousands of people, Malays, Chinese and Indians, many of whom are landless, and

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who are anxious to open up land for rubber cultivation; one need not be an agricultural sentimentalist to suggest that such an extension of individual ownership would be conducive to political and social stability, as well as to economic development.

Rubber smallholdings are a valuable asset yielding appreciable cash incomes to hundreds of thousands of Asians who thereby have an important stake in the country. Moreover, the fact that smallholders do not rely on large alien labor forces is an obvious and important social and political advantage. Rubber cultivation on smallholdings also avoids the housing and health problems which often arise from the agglomeration of large labor forces.

The substance of these arguments is not affected by the decline of smallholding output with the aging of the holdings, and by the danger to their prospects in the absence of new planting. There are very large accessible unplanted areas suitable for rubber cultivation in Malaya (and unlimited areas in relation to the population in Sumatra and Borneo), so that the use of new land to offset the declining output of existing holdings would involve little or no real economic cost in terms of the use of scarce resources. Moreover, rubber cultivation on smallholdings takes little or nothing out of the soil, so that when a holding is abandoned it simply reverts to secondary jungle, with rubber seedlings predominant, and it is again perfectly suitable for opening up for the cultivation of rubber or other crops, including food crops (indeed, for various technical reasons secondary jungle of rubber seedlings is often more suitable for this purpose than other types of secondary jungle). What limits the use of land for this crop in Malaya is not a scarcity of resources, but the official restrictions on the alienation of land.

V

In 1953 the Malayan government appointed a Rubber Industry Enquiry Mission, to examine the prospects of the industry and the factors influencing its future output and competitive strength. The Mission's report was published in October 1954. The terms of reference of the Mission did not include new planting, that is, the establishment of new capacity. Yet it is plainly impossible to examine meaning-

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fully the prospective output and the competitive position of an industry without considering in detail the establishment of new capacity; and for reasons already stated, this obvious consideration applies with special force to the Malayan rubber industry. Omission of this crucial issue from the terms of reference has resulted in a serious misplacing of emphasis in the Mission's report. The discussion is very largely restricted to replanting of established plantations. New planting by estates is not discussed at all, while possible future new planting by smallholders is mentioned briefly in a few paragraphs within a chapter on replanting. Yet quite clearly as a general policy replanting cannot be discussed seriously except by comparing its merits and costs with new planting.

Certain passages in the report suggest that the Mission was aware of the importance of new planting by smallholders as a measure to increase productive capacity, to reduce the number of landless laborers, and to attract fresh capital to the industry. For instance:

> . . . as a means of bringing about investment of fresh capital in the rubber industry, the alienation of land for new planting to rubber by smallholders will probably be more effective than any other policy. Many smallholders' families are apparently prepared to invest their labour and cash reserves in creating new holdings. . . . [paragraph 84] Indeed it is evident that the basic demand for land from smallholders is very high, reflecting in some localities what is in fact severe land-hunger. [paragraph 87]

The report states clearly that ample land is available but its use is restricted by the refusal to alienate it for rubber planting. The report also refers briefly to the principal advantages of new planting, and examines the ground for the official refusal to alienate land for rubber planting; in every instance the official argument is met by a counterargument. But unfortunately the substantive discussion, and the recommendations, are entirely in terms of the replanting of existing holdings.

In April 1955 the Malayan government published a statement on its long-term policy for the rubber industry; it is entitled *Replanting and Taxation in the Rubber Industry*, thus again omitting new planting. In this document of 41 pages the key issues of new planting and the alienation of

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land for rubber planting, that is, the essence of the problem, are discussed in one brief paragraph only. This states that new planting on any substantial scale cannot be a substitute for replanting, since it would entail the abandonment of much of the present acreage. But in fact the great bulk of the existing acreage would remain under rubber, and would continue to be cultivated either by the present owners, or by others to whom the owners would sell if they wanted to plant elsewhere and would not want to attend to their existing holdings. Some of the area might be turned to other products. But even if part of the present areas were abandoned, this would not necessarily be undesirable, as it would represent simply a different and more efficient use of available resources. Not only are there vast uncultivated (but cultivable) areas in Malaya, but, for reasons already stated, rubber cultivation, especially on smallholdings, takes next to nothing out of the soil, so that an abandoned area is quite suitable for other cultivation. For all these reasons (and there are others as well) it is a misconception to think of new planting as entailing the abandonment of the present acreage and representing a cost which the economy cannot afford. In fact, it would represent an extension of productive capacity, often of very low-cost capacity; and it would therefore represent an addition to the real resources of the country. Similarly, for these reasons alienation of land for rubber planting would not increase Malaya's dependence on imported food, even if this were thought undesirable. Of course a ban on the alienation of land for rubber does not in any way assure increased output of food.

VI

The discrimination against the smallholders under the restriction schemes and the present paradoxical policy should not be ascribed simply to "colonialism" in the sense of the exploitation of the dependence of a colony to promote metropolitan economic interests. The great political influence of the estates (partly in London, but especially in Malaya) was a major factor both in the establishment of the rubber restriction schemes and in their methods of operation and administration, especially in the discrimination against the smallholders in the allocation of quotas and the provisions

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governing planting. But even here the issues were not quite clear-cut. For instance, at first the underassessment of the smallholdings under the International Rubber Regulation Scheme was not at all widely realized. Shortly before the introduction of that scheme, a committee of estate representatives had proposed a method of calculating the quotas under which the smallholders would have enjoyed more favorable treatment than they did under the scheme actually adopted. But subsequently the severe underassessment of the smallholdings became quite obvious, and was openly discussed in the press (for example, in the *Straits Times*), as well as in United States consular literature. Similarly, when first introduced, the planting provisions of rubber restriction (that is, the prohibition of new planting coupled with the permission to replant) were not a Machiavellian device to destroy the smallholdings. They were adopted as an apparently reasonable way to reserve to established producers any increase in capacity. But within a few years the very serious effects of these provisions on the position and prospects of the smallholders were widely known. It was the result, at least partly, of the political power of the estates that the provisions were not modified. The restrictions on the alienation of land for rubber planting were probably motivated in the 1920's by a desire to raise the price of rubber, first as a supplement to the Stevenson Restriction Scheme and subsequently as a partial substitute for it. Such a unilateral endeavor at restriction was obviously hopeless.

But even before 1940 the influence of the estates was not the only factor behind these policies; there were various other factors which operated against the smallholders. The tidiness complex of the modern administrator disposes him unfavorably to the smallholder section of the industry, which comprises a very large number of producing units, thus making it more difficult to control than the estate side of the industry. Moreover, the untidy appearance of these properties is also apt to convey the false impression that these producers represent an undesirable and inefficient form of production, though the latter factor (even if it did apply, which it does not) would not justify either a restriction on the activities of smallholders, or official discrimination against them. Indeed, if the smallholders were inefficient,

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they would in any case be forced out of production. There was also a confused notion that cultivation of cash crops by smallholders was undesirable, and that they should be confined to subsistence production. In fact, of course, production of cash crops is a principal means of economic progress at the early stages of development.

Unfamiliarity with the significance of smallholder production and with the methods of smallholders also played a part. The industry was widely identified with the estates. Neither the quantitative importance nor the economic efficiency of the smallholders was appreciated, nor was a cleavage of interest between estates and smallholders realized. This explains partly the introduction of measures which were suitable to the circumstances and methods of the estates, but were unsuitable to those of the smallholders. It is certain that many of the civil servants administering these measures did not appreciate their effects and implications. For instance, in the 1930's the senior administrative posts in the two Malay states with the largest area of rubber smallholdings were held by two British officers who were men of unquestioned integrity, with a real affection for the Malays and a deep concern for their welfare. Yet it was with their authority that the planting provisions of rubber restriction were enacted and enforced which endangered the economic future and livelihood of smallholders and particularly of Malays.

The present policy, notably the continued ban on the alienation of land, is largely a legacy of the inter-war arrangements. It is an important example of the self-perpetuating tendency of such measures: those responsible seem unable to rethink the matter, to reconsider a policy which has been pursued so long, and the implications of which are so serious. For familiar reasons, colonial administrators are even more reluctant to admit to mistakes than are their colleagues elsewhere. No substantial arguments are being presented in support of this policy, since the casual remarks in official documents are obviously only retrospective rationalizations and not serious arguments.

The influence of the Forestry Department in Malaya may be one of the factors behind the continued ban on land alienation for rubber. Government employees entrusted

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with the formulation and the implementation of conservation policies tend to have a vested interest in the long life of the assets in their care. It is at times suggested in Malaya that without a ban on the alienation of land for rubber planting the long-term supply of firewood, or the future supply of rainfall, would be imperiled. But these are hardly serious arguments for withholding from economic production large areas of land (and especially for replacing jungle by other tree crops) in a country three quarters of which is still under primary or secondary jungle.

At present the continuation of the policy cannot be attributed to the influence of the estates. A ban on the alienation of land for rubber planting in Malaya is not an effective restrictive device because it cannot affect appreciably the market price of rubber in view of the large synthetic capacity, and the importance of unrestricted supplies of natural rubber from other sources, which in the aggregate much exceed the Malayan output. In a recent (April 1956) presidential address the chairman of the Rubber Growers' Association has publicly criticized the restriction on the alienation of land in Malaya which he regarded as one of the factors responsible for the growing interest of Malayan plantation companies in establishing themselves in Africa. His remarks make it quite plain that the estates are not responsible for this policy.

VII

The question naturally arises how far the restrictive policy is likely to continue under the locally elected governments which have taken office following the constitutional changes in Malaya. It is quite probable that the policy will be substantially continued. The issues involved are very imperfectly understood by politicians, and the policy is likely to be shaped by the permanent civil servants who may want to continue the policy which they framed and have administered for so long. Experience in other British colonies suggests that even far-reaching constitutional and political changes do not bring about corresponding changes in policies, the adverse effects of which bear chiefly on the inarticulate and unorganized rural population. This is so for various reasons: the much greater political power and effec-

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tiveness of the urban population; the continued power of the permanent civil servants; the imperfect understanding of some of the economic issues by the local population, especially by the rural population; and the widespread disregard of the merits and efficiency of the production of cash crops as an instrument of economic development. All these apply in Malaya. There is the further point that the policy is welcome to those influential Asians who own largish rubber properties and whose position is strengthened in various ways by the exclusion of newcomers, even though at present this cannot materially affect the price of rubber.

Whatever the motives, the general results of the policy are quite plain. A most important category of investment is officially barred. This aspect of the matter is often overlooked because in contemporary discussions of capital formation the establishment, extension and improvement of agricultural properties by the local population are almost invariably neglected as a form of investment. Further, the policy affects adversely the future output of Malayan rubber and raises its cost, thereby undermining the competitive position of the Malayan industry. It is in effect a unilateral restriction on the establishment of new capacity by a country which produces rather less than one third of the total world supply of natural rubber, and barely more than one fifth of the total production of rubber (including synthetic); in these circumstances it cannot even appreciably raise the price of rubber for any length of time. The policy gravely endangers the prospects of the smallholders. It bars the access of tens of thousands of people to a most suitable source of cash income and to the acquisition of individual agricultural property. This particular result of the policy is reinforced by the rapid population growth in Malaya. Even if a man has a rubber smallholding, his children will, with the exception of one son, generally have to go without this key source of cash income if no new land is alienated for planting. This is obviously important and relevant to policy.[3] Further, this restrictive policy also retards economic development generally, and industrialization in particular, by obstructing the further spread of the money economy, the

[3] I owe this point to Professor Karl Pelzer, of Yale University, who kindly commented on the manuscript of this paper.

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growth of which assists industrialization in various ways, especially by generating money incomes which create a market for the products of industry; by familiarizing people with the habitual use of money; and by presenting members of the local population with economic opportunities and experience.

The recent establishment of estates in several African territories, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, French West Africa, and the Belgian Congo, underlines these considerations. The establishment of rubber estates in Africa rather than in the Far East stems largely from the political dangers in Southeast Asia. But the tendency has certainly been accentuated by the restrictive policy in the alienation of land as is clear from the fact that applications for alienation are being refused. Moreover, the restrictive measures themselves have contributed to the political difficulties in Malaya. While in a sense the extension of the industry in Africa is welcome as promoting economic development there, the loss of Malaya exceeds the gain of Africa. The enforced transfer is likely to be wasteful through a duplication of facilities and the establishment of less economic units. It also represents a weakening of the Malayan economy at a critical juncture. The possibility of migrating to Africa is, of course, not open to the majority of the companies or to the smallholders.

A reconsideration of this policy is important and urgent. To the scholar the interest of the policy is unaffected by the prospects of its revision, whatever they are. Close study and analysis of its history, operation and implications show it to reflect many features, forces and tendencies of the contemporary scene which are important but often overlooked: neglect of the importance and efficiency of small-scale agriculture and of capital formation there; the importance of self-perpetuation in administrative measures, and the possible cleavage of interest between administrators and the rest of the community; the inadequacy of a few general notions and of casual surveys as guides to the situation. All these are exemplified here, and they apply very widely. In the words of Sir Lewis Namier: "In a drop of dew can be seen the colours of the sun."

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WESLEY MITCHELL'S THEORY OF PLANNING *

Introduction

FOR three decades Wesley C. Mitchell was one of the foremost advocates of national planning among academic social scientists in the United States. He believed that planning was a necessary ingredient of orderly human relations and that it was of central interest to the social sciences. He foresaw a major growth of social planning, felt that it could be placed on a firm rational basis, and conceived that social inquiry should be oriented in terms of its potential contribution to intelligent planning.[1] His theoretical treatment of this subject is of renewed significance today with the growing attention being given to the need and possibilities of planning in such interrelated areas as foreign policy, national defense, and economic development.

Planning is increasingly regarded as a systematic way of posing and analyzing fundamental problems and of taking concerted action to meet them on a long-range basis. Mitchell's broad conception of the rôle of planning in human affairs has helped shape this general view and offers further aid in clarifying and developing a planning function appropriate for American society. His conception, as well as his strong suport of it, was based upon his wide experience in public service, his over-all philosophical orientation, and his theoretical analysis of social and economic organization.

Mitchell's government service as researcher, consultant and planning official was unusually varied and challenging. His

* The author is indebted to Professors Joseph Dorfman and Carter Goodrich of Columbia University for their helpful suggestions.

1 Mitchell discussed his conception of planning in many places, particularly the following papers reprinted in *The Backward Art of Spending Money and Other Essays* (New York, 1937; hereafter cited as *Backward Art*): "Statistics and Government", pp. 42-57; "The Social Sciences and National Planning", pp. 83-102; and "Intelligence and the Guidance of Economic Evolution", pp. 103-136. Attention is given to Mitchell's theory of planning in Allan G. Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought: The American Contribution* (New York, 1947), chap. iv, "The Quantitative Economics of Wesley C. Mitchell", pp. 247-333.

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periodic work in these different capacities extended through nearly five decades, commencing in 1899 when he worked for a year in the Census Office. In 1914-1915 he prepared a highly useful monograph on *The Making and Use of Index Numbers* for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. During World War I he was chief of the Price Section in the War Industry Board's Division of Planning and Statistics. To preserve valuable economic data of this war period, he edited the *History of Prices During the War.*[2] At this time began his sympathetic interest in economic planning which continued in the 1920's and matured in the ensuing depression and New Deal period. In his presidential address to the American Statistical Association in December 1918, Mitchell urged that the government improve its statistical and planning organization, so that policy could be guided by quantitative knowledge. On the basis of the war experience, he recommended that a permanent Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics be established to provide the "planning statistics" required by legislators and administrators in shaping intelligent policy.[3]

At the request of Secretary of Commerce Hoover and a committee of President Harding's Conference on Unemployment, Mitchell in 1923 directed the preparation of a report by the National Bureau of Economic Research on *Business Cycles and Unemployment.*[4] By request of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes of the President's Conference on Unemployment, Mitchell directed under National Bureau auspices a study of *Recent Economic Changes in the United States.*[5] In 1929 President Hoover appointed Mitchell chairman of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, which produced a voluminous report on *Recent Social Trends in the United States.*[6] This committee's pro-

2 U. S. War Industries Board, *Price Bulletins,* Nos. 1-57 (Washington, 1919-1920).

3 "Statistics and Government", *Backward Art,* pp. 42-57.

4 New York, 1923.

5 New York, 1929.

6 Two volumes (New York, 1933).

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posal that a National Advisory Council be set up facilitated the development of national planning agencies subsequent to 1933. In that year the National Planning Board of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works was created, with Frederic A. Delano, Charles E. Merriam and Mitchell as members. This board devoted special attention to the planning of public works and a national program. Following its report in 1934 recommending the creation of a permanent planning agency, President Roosevelt established the National Resources Board upon which Mitchell served in 1934 and 1935.[7]

During this period Mitchell delivered numerous lectures and papers on the subject of national planning; he actively participated in what he termed "campaigns of education" to gain public understanding and acceptance of a systematic planning program as an integral part of government. He also continued to serve the government periodically in an advisory capacity. In 1937 he acted as a special adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Then in 1944 he was chairman of the technical committee selected by the President's Committee on the Cost of Living to prepare a report on the accuracy of official cost-of-living index numbers. During his long career Mitchell's public service was also manifested in numerous other ways. For twenty-five years he was director of research for the National Bureau of Economic Research, which produced many detailed factual studies of business cycles and other major economic problems. For many years he took active leadership in the affairs of the Social Science Research Council, the New School for Social Research, and the Bureau of Educational Experiments. At the same time, he was an officer in several professional societies.[8]

[7] The National Resources Board was followed in 1935 by the National Resources Committee, which later became the National Resources Planning Board. For discussion of these early planning agencies, see Allan G. Gruchy, "The Economics of the National Resources Committee", *American Economic Review*, vol. 29 (March 1939), pp. 60-73; and Charles E. Merriam, "Planning Agencies in America", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 29 (April 1935), pp. 197-211.

[8] Mitchell was elected president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Economic Association, the American Statistical Association, the Econometric Society, and the Academy of Political

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Mitchell's varied public service both complemented and sharpened his theoretical conception of the planning process. His intellectual bases for this conception are of particular interest, for he considered planning to be essential to the rational, orderly control and adaptation of social behavior. It was a deliberate process of social guidance based upon tested knowledge of group behavior. Intelligent planning became possible to the extent that objective understanding and guidance of social activity could be achieved. It required a scientific, factual basis; and the advance of the social sciences in the objective analysis of actual behavior paved the way for this scientific understanding and control of human affairs.

In Mitchell's view, the social sciences could successfully employ the scientific method to develop verified knowledge about observed behavior. The method of hypothesizing, observing and testing could be used to derive the understanding required for rational policy formulation. The effects of policy decisions and other conditioning factors could be observed, analyzed and predicted. In this way policies could be formulated, tested and revised in terms of their desired, expected and achieved results. Consequently, the scientific method provided the basis for rational understanding and planning of social affairs. Welfare judgments could be objectively made and institutional adaptation intelligently directed when social planning was patterned on the scientific method of analyzing and evaluating observed behavior.

Planning was tantamount to a process of rational guidance of social change, in Mitchell's conception. It became an instrument of social reform or reconstruction. It was a pragmatic, experimental procedure of institutional adjustment based upon empirically tested understanding of social institutions, their evolution and their functioning. As a rational and even scientific process of social reconstruction, planning required that the social sciences develop comprehensive, empirically grounded theories of human behavior, institutional change and social welfare. Mitchell's theory of planning

Science. For a fuller treatment of Mitchell's professional career, see Arthur F. Burns, editor, *Wesley Clair Mitchell: The Economic Scientist* (New York, 1952); and Lucy Sprague Mitchell, *Two Lives: The Story of Wesley Clair Mitchell and Myself* (New York, 1953).

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may thus be examined in terms of its theoretical foundation, its treatment of social institutions, the process it envisioned, and the welfare analysis it required.

Theoretical Framework

Mitchell's conception of economic planning was an integral part of his economic theory. Although his main concern was with economic planning, he was quite interested in social planning in its broadest sense. He paid attention to the interdisciplinary aspects of economics as well as the common problems of all the social sciences. He felt that these disciplines should coöperate closely in the study of human behavior. They should be both more "social" and more "scientific": they should strive to establish practical knowledge about socially significant problems by means of objective inquiry and empirical verification. Their double task was to develop knowledge that was both useful, or ethically oriented, and scientific, or factually tested. In other words, their common purpose was to produce the valid understanding required for intelligent social guidance.[9]

In his conception of scientific social inquiry and rational planning, Mitchell was greatly influenced by two notable teachers, John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen. His theoretical framework incorporated the pragmatic philosophy of the former and the institutional economics of the latter. He accepted Dewey's pragmatic view of theorizing and reform, along with a behavioristic approach to analysis of the social order. He likewise shared Veblen's emphasis on institutions, psychological forces and historical perspective in the study of economic behavior. These teachers stimulated Mitchell to read extensively in philosophy, psychology and history and to incorporate the insights of these disciplines in his conception of the nature and purpose of economic science. He developed a pragmatic, behavioristic approach to the analysis of economic activity and the use of this knowledge in eco-

[9] Burns, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31, 68-69; Lucy S. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 346, 349-350, 357 *et seq.*, 523. Mitchell indicated his theoretical orientation in several of the essays in *Backward Art*. In addition to those already cited, see "Institutes for Research in the Social Sciences", pp. 58-71; "Research in the Social Sciences", pp. 72-82; and "The Prospects of Economics", pp. 342-385. See this writer's article, "Wesley Mitchell's Type of Economic Theory", Western Economic Association, *Proceedings*, 1954, pp. 74-78.

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nomic guidance or reform. He continually emphasized the contribution that economics as an empirical science of behavior could make to social inquiry and reconstruction of the social order.[10]

The scope of analysis in the social sciences included all observable behavior. Human behavior could be analyzed to determine its regularities and to throw light upon the play of motives and institutions. These motives and institutions were to be studied in their psychological and historical context to reveal their past development, present operation and future trends. In this way, the cumulative change of behavior patterns could be understood and taken into account in policy-making. Through systematic observation and verification, the analysis of behavior records would permit the making of rational judgments about social goals and welfare. Social inquiry was thus comprehensive in scope, encompassing the empirical analysis of all significant processes of social change, and thereby providing the basis for evaluating and guiding this change.

Economics as one of the sciences of observed behavior shared the purposes and orientation of social inquiry. This discipline was concerned with the material aspects of social welfare and social change. Its subject matter centered in the development and functioning of economic institutions and their relation to motives, goals and social welfare. The basic processes of economic activity had to be explored and understood. Of particular interest were the pecuniary process of making and spending money, the industrial process of making goods, the commercial process of distributing goods, and the larger community process of attaining material welfare. These activities took place within the confines of the money economy or business-enterprise system, which had to be examined in terms of its historical and psychological setting. The analysis of economic behavior thus required special emphasis on the part played by social institutions and human nature in shaping economic behavior. This analysis permitted the framing and testing of judgments about eco-

[10] Mitchell acknowledged the influence of Dewey and Veblen in "Research in the Social Sciences" and "Thorstein Veblen" (*Backward Art*, pp. 279-312). *Cf.* Burns, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-92, 95, 126, 157-158, 197-198; Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought*, pp. 247-252; and Lucy S. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-89, 176-178.

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nomic goals and welfare, as well as the formulating of policies or plans for guiding economic change.[11]

Mitchell conceived that the basic aproach of social inquiry must be in accord with the scientific method, since reliable objective understanding of human behavior was sought. Actual behavior had to be observed and analyzed through a scientific process of posing, testing and revising hypotheses. The procedure for achieving valid knowledge required empirical verification of theories on the basis of systematic observation of mass behavior. This process called for the accumulation and interpretation of objective records of group behavior. These records were to be collected through historical and statistical investigation of past behavior and through detailed observation of current activities. Observed regularities could be empirically determined, revealing basic processes and relationships of a cause-effect or interdependent character. This type of inquiry Mitchell termed "descriptive analysis" to emphasize its empirical nature and its concern with observable interrelations and regularities.

The method of "analytic description" was particularly appropriate in economics, in view of the highly quantitative character of economic activity. The price system and the use of money permitted the measuring of economic processes as a means of exact, systematic observation. Descriptive analysis of economic behavior assumed the form of quantitative theorizing and was subject to factual test. The actual quantitative importance of many relationships and causal factors could be determined. Since this verified knowledge would be detailed and reliable, it marked a great advance over the plausible results of speculative theorizing from a few sweeping assumptions. The latter method of "qualitative" theorizing yielded plausible but untested conclusions from simplified and often unrealistic premises. The problems and hypotheses posed by this method needed to be restated to permit empirical analysis and factual testing. Qualitative

[11] For Mitchell's conception of the purposes and subject matter of economic science, see the following essays in *Backward Art:* "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory", pp. 20-36; "The Role of Money in Economic Theory", pp. 149-176; "The Prospects of Economics"; and "Economics, 1904-1929", pp. 386-415; as well as "The Role of Money in Economic History", *Journal of Economic History*, Supplement IV (December 1944), pp. 61-67.

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and quantitative methods and elements must be combined in this factually grounded theorizing. Basic postulates could be empirically founded, and the logical conclusions drawn from them could be tested for conformity with observed experience. The resulting analytic description of observable relationships would yield the valid knowledge required to analyze and guide economic change.[12]

Mitchell's method of descriptive analysis was designed to make extensive use of statistical and historical data. He stressed the great development in recent decades of statistical records and techniques. The needs of modern business and government increasingly required the collection and analysis of quantitative data. As statistical sources, techniques and materials increased, the possibilities of employing them in the comprehensive study of observed behavior became quite promising. Theorizing could be based on careful observation of a statistical nature. The results of business or government policies could be systematically observed, recorded and interpreted. As decisions came to be based more and more on this analysis of recorded experience, decision-making could progressively take on a more experimental character.

Policies and their application could be regarded, in effect, as limited experiments and then analyzed accordingly. Policy-making could be subjected to controlled observation and even treated to some degree as controlled experiment. Observation had become the primary method for valid theorizing and testing of hypotheses, but it also facilitated an experimental approach to theory and policy. Consequently, experimentation promised to become a useful method for improving theoretical understanding and employing it in

[12] Mitchell's views on economic methodology are set forth in his essays cited in footnote 11 and the methodological portions of his works on business cycles cited in footnote 25. In addition, see Burns, *op. cit.;* John Maurice Clark, "Wesley C. Mitchell's Contribution to the Theory of Business Cycles", in Stuart A. Rice, editor, *Methods in Social Science* (Chicago, 1931), pp. 662-680 (reprinted in Burns, *op. cit.*); Joseph Dorfman, *The Economic Mind in American Civilization,* vol. III (New York, 1949), "Wesley C. Mitchell: Scholar of Business Cycles", pp. 455-473; Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought,* pp. 264-273; and Paul T. Homan, *Contemporary Economic Thought* (New York, 1928), pp. 377-436 (reprinted in Burns, *op. cit.*). Mitchell spoke very tentatively and cautiously about method; he took the tolerant, experimental attitude that all methods commonly employed in economics had a place, as long as their results were empirically testable.

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systematic policy formation. Mitchell regarded social experimenting as a feasible way of developing and applying tested theory in the social sciences, and he hoped they would soon advance their theoretical analysis and established knowledge far enough for this ideal to be realized.[13]

Institutional and Psychological Analysis

To develop the valid explanation of human behavior required in rational social guidance, the social sciences had to center their theoretical analysis on the way institutions and human nature shaped behavior. Psychological forces and institutional patterns had to be understood and reckoned with if social change was to be intelligently directed. They were subject to cumulative change through time, and they exhibited observable regularities in this change and in their character at any given time. They had to be analyzed with respect to their evolutionary development, current operation and future potentialities. Their study required the objective empirical analysis described above, with its systematic observation of actual behavior and testing of theoretical conclusions against accumulated behavior records.[14]

In Mitchell's view, economics was as greatly concerned with the study of institutions and human nature as were the other social sciences. It sought to understand standardized behavior patterns and to determine the nature and significance of wants, motives and welfare results. To a large extent, these analytical problems were interdisciplinary, and a joint or coöperative approach of several disciplines was often required. Economics as a separate science had to borrow the accumulated findings of other sciences, incorporate them in its basic assumptions, and use them as hypotheses for further research. It thus stood to benefit from achievements in other disciplines, and in turn to add its own theoretical findings to the accumulated knowledge of human behavior.[15]

Economic institutions required comprehensive study on

[13] On several occasions Mitchell emphasized the possibilities of social experimentation for advancing both theory and policy. *Cf. Backward Art*, pp. 27-28, 31-33, 61-62, 96-98.

[14] *Cf.* Lucy S. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 562-567.

[15] See Mitchell's essays on "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory", *Backward Art;* "Human Behavior and Economics: A Survey of Recent Litera-

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the part of economic scientists, who therefore had to use historical and sociological knowledge and approaches. As standardized rules of conduct, institutions produced orderly patterns of economic behavior which were subject to descriptive analysis and even quantitative treatment. Their controlling effect could be studied in the past and present and could be projected into the future. Economic welfare was dependent upon the way these institutions functioned, and economic change was basically a matter of their adaptation through time. Consequently, economic reform and the guidance of economic change involved the adjustment or reconstruction of these institutions on the basis of tested knowledge about their operation and evolution. Institutional analysis thus became the crux of economic science and a major prerequisite for economic planning.[16]

Study of the rôle of economic institutions likewise entailed psychological analysis in a significant respect. Human nature manifested itself within the pattern of prevailing institutions which controlled economic behavior. The effects of human nature, however, were somewhat secondary or indirect in contrast to the regulating function of institutions. Basic psychological traits were perhaps of an unchanging character, whereas observable motives, wants and other psychological forces were largely molded by existing institutions. The play of these forces depended on the way institutions functioned and changed. To study human nature as it affected economic behavior necessarily involved the analysis of institutional performance and evolution in terms of their effect on economic wants and incentives.

In Mitchell's opinion, human nature should be investigated in economics, not merely postulated in crude, simple terms. Psychological assumptions were essential, but they should be in accord with current psychological theory and

ture", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 19 (November 1914), pp. 1-47; and "The Rationality of Economic Activity", *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 18 (February and March 1910), pp. 97-113, 197-216. *Cf.* Lucy S. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-346.

16 The study of institutions, always advocated by Mitchell, was emphasized in his essays cited in footnote 15 as well as in "The Role of Money in Economic Theory" and "The Role of Money in Economic History" (cited in footnote 11).

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should be continually tested against accumulated behavior records and knowledge of the way economic institutions functioned. The study of economic motives, for instance, required explanation of the manner in which business rationality and the quest for profits were conditioned by the pecuniary logic and technical exigencies of the money economy in its modern business-enterprise form. This psychological and institutional inquiry into economic rationality and the pecuniary calculus helped provide the basis for objective understanding and intelligent control of economic behavior.[17]

The Planning Process

Mitchell regarded planning as a rational way of taking thought and action on problems of social organization. Planning was to social behavior and public policy what thinking was to individual action—a pragmatic, orderly procedure for analyzing and solving complex problems of modern life.[18] This process consisted of several consecutive steps of a logical, analytical character. Social analysts and policy-makers had to define their problems in terms of relevant goals, resources and circumstances. This analysis of ends and means required extensive study to determine their basic regularities and causal relationships. Once achieved and verified, this understanding could be purposefully used to state and analyze problems as well as to compare alternative lines of action. The results of various policies could be predicted and evaluated in terms of the stated goals. Comprehensive knowledge of social processes and relationships was required to assess the consequences of different policies, for these effects might be both immediate and long-range, direct

[17] For Mitchell's views on psychological analysis, see footnotes 14-16. Mitchell never attempted to make a detailed empirical study of economic motives, and the implications of his views about the study of human nature by economists are not very clear. In his work on business cycles, the study of motives seemed to coincide with the analysis of the logic and workings of pecuniary institutions. *Cf.* Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 671-672, 679-680; Homan, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-402, 416-423; A. B. Wolfe, "Views on the Scope and Method of Economics", in Burns, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-218; and Allyn A. Young, "The Trend of Economics, as Seen by Some American Economists", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 39 (February 1925), pp. 176-178.

[18] See *Backward Art*, pp. 100-102, 128-129.

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and indirect, specific and diffused, economic and noneconomic, quantitative and qualitative, intended and unintended, desirable and undesirable.[19]

To analyze and frame policies for dealing with major problems constituted, in effect, a pragmatic or experimental process resting upon scientific analysis of observed relationships. This study of and choice among alternative policies in terms of their expected results comprised a type of intellectual experiment based on tested knowledge of cause-effect relationships involved in the problems under study. Policies could be applied in the same experimental fashion, with ensuing results checked against predictions. In this way, policies in their actual application became limited experiments. They could be evaluated and revised in terms of the degree of agreement between anticipated and actual results. From accumulated experience with policy-making and assessment of this kind, much could be learned about social processes. This resulting knowledge could then be used to improve still further the analysis and evaluation of policies.[20]

Mitchell was well aware that the study and particularly the framing and execution of policies had not proceeded very far along these scientific, experimental lines. Rational planning was a realistic hope, not an actual accomplishment. In the past, planning had been largely of a spasmodic, piecemeal character in this country. As a rule, and as his own experience revealed, there had been planning of a significant kind only during emergency situations such as war or depression. The partial planning which had evolved in these times of crisis had not become a deliberate or continuing process, nor had it been based upon the systematic analysis and tested knowledge that were essential. It had been neither adequately understood nor comprehensive and long-range in scope. At the same time, this piecemeal planning had been marked by political bias, wishful thinking, inspirational reform schemes, and the pressures of special interests.[21]

[19] *Backward Art,* pp. 100-102, 129-131, 135; Lucy S. Mitchell, *op. cit.,* p. 565.

[20] Mitchell was firmly convinced that theory and policy would advance together. *Cf. Backward Art,* pp. 31-32, 61, 174-176.

[21] *Backward Art,* pp. 128-131; Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought,* pp. 309-312.

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To be freed from these defects, planning and its requisite basic research and theoretical inquiry must be placed on a permanent, fully understood basis. Rational planning was essential in complex modern society with its many growing problems and its high rate of change. Planning therefore required a mobilization of social intelligence for the continuous analysis and adjustment of social processes and problems.[22] Planning, research and theorizing had to proceed hand in hand. Systematic policy-making or social guidance necessitated detailed observation of human behavior and social change, verification of the theoretical explanations obtained, and experimental application of the policy measures selected. Continual prediction and reassessment were required at every stage of policy-making. Empirically valid theory was essential to all this work, requiring the development and use of what Mitchell called "social statistics".[23] Careful measurement and analysis of causal forces, governing relationships, and achieved results would assure the joint advancement of theoretical inquiry and intelligent planning.

In economic analysis and planning, the use of statistics was particularly significant. Economic behavior could be most thoroughly recorded and interpreted through statistical procedures. Quantitative theorizing could then yield the tested knowledge of economic processes required in comprehensive planning.[24] Statistics became the handmaiden of

[22] Mitchell believed that social intelligence could best be mobilized through the instrumentality of a national planning board, or national socio-economic council. This organization would carry on comprehensive, long-range research and would make policy recommendations in a purely advisory capacity. *Cf. Backward Art,* pp. 100-102, 129-135; Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought,* pp. 313-314; and Alvin H. Hansen, "Social Scientist and Social Counselor", in Burns, *op. cit.,* pp. 312-315. Hansen notes (p. 315), no doubt too unqualifiedly, the resemblance of Mitchell's proposed national planning board to the President's Council of Economic Advisers created by the Employment Act of 1946. Mitchell was a strong advocate of organized research, by both government and private agencies. He helped found the National Bureau of Economic Research and was its research director for twenty-five years. He also helped found and guide the Social Science Research Council and the New School for Social Research.

[23] *Backward Art,* pp. 51-53, and *passim;* Lucy S. Mitchell, *op. cit.,* p. 363.

[24] Mitchell's insistence upon tested factual knowledge as a prerequisite for policy-making has been called visionary and impractical if not unreasonable, and he has been criticized for carrying on basic factual research unrelated to

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economic planning by facilitating the analytic description needed in the making and execution of policies. As a necessary adjunct of its operation, planning demanded the collection of additional statistical data through controlled observation. This further quantitative knowledge became available for evaluating planning measures and their results as well as for testing and extending the theoretical knowledge on which planning was based.

Mitchell's major theoretical and empirical work in economics dealt with the quantitative analysis of business cycles. He designed his analytic description of business cycles to produce detailed, tested knowledge of typical cyclical behavior, its regularities and processes, and the quantitative importance of its various factors and relationships. He visualized that this exact knowledge would increase the understanding of how economic institutions actually operate, thus permitting better prediction and control of economic activity. The knowledge to be gained from business-cycle analysis would improve decision-making by business and government and in turn would enable these decisions to be shaped and evaluated in terms of desired and achieved results for material welfare.[25]

The rational and scientific aspects of the planning process interested Mitchell much more than its political and ideological aspects. In reality, he was concerned with the latter only in so far as they merged with the former.[26] Although

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the immediate study of policy questions. *Cf.* Adolf A. Berle, Jr., review of *Wesley Clair Mitchell: The Economic Scientist,* in *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* vol. 48 (June 1953), p. 174; Hansen, *op. cit.,* pp. 308-320; Abba P. Lerner, review of *Measuring Business Cycles,* in *Journal of Economic History,* vol. 7 (November 1947), pp. 224-225; Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton, 1939), pp. 119-123, 144-145; and Lucy S. Mitchell, *op. cit.,* pp. 550-568.

[25] Mitchell's major works in this field are *Business Cycles* (Berkeley, 1913), Part III republished as *Business Cycles and Their Causes* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1941); *Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting* (New York, 1927); *Measuring Business Cycles,* with Arthur F. Burns (New York, 1946); and *What Happens During Business Cycles* (New York, 1951). General evaluations of his business-cycle analysis are found in works (cited above) by Burns, Clark, Dorfman, Gruchy, and Homan.

[26] By contrast, Rexford G. Tugwell, in "The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Laissez Faire", *American Economic Review,* vol. 22 (March 1932, Supplement), pp. 93-104, emphasized the fundamental institutional

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he gave little attention to the political processes and questions that would be involved in national planning, he felt that it could be democratic and responsible in nature. It had first to be rational and systematic. Planning as he viewed it was a necessary process of thinking and acting intelligently and consistently. In this sense, planning was logical and desirable if not inevitable in a society seeking to employ reason, and it could be as democratic as was society itself. The acceptance of planning did not commit society to any particular values or goals; it merely offered a way of analyzing or thinking about ends and welfare. In effect, Mitchell's theory of planning was procedural; it was a means of systematic social inquiry and action. However, it permitted and even required rational treatment of ethical or normative factors; consequently, welfare analysis had a significant place in Mitchell's theory of planning, or what he sometimes described as a "plan for making plans".[27]

Welfare Analysis

To formulate policies or plans necessitated the making of value judgments. These decisions affected human behavior and had to take account of human motives, values and institutions. Since planning was for social betterment, it was forced to employ welfare goals and measures of welfare re-

changes which could be expected to accompany national planning. He argued that planning would spell the end of laissez faire and would call for extensive governmental and industrial reorganization, and he challenged the efficacy of a purely advisory national economic council. Charles E. Merriam, who served on the National Planning Board and the National Resources Board with Mitchell, insisted that national planning would have to be far broader than just "economic"; and he devoted considerable attention to the political conditions, administrative requirements, and social objectives of national planning. Like Mitchell, however, he felt that a national planning body should have only fact-finding, advisory, and policy-coördinating functions, though these would be quite comprehensive in scope. See Merriam, *op. cit.; The Role of Politics in Social Change* (New York, 1936), pp. 123-146; *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (New York, 1939), pp. 145-180; *On the Agenda of Democracy* (Cambridge, 1941), pp. 73-97. The general views of Mitchell and other institutional economists toward social planning are evaluated by Gruchy in works cited above, as well as in his "The Concept of National Planning in Institutional Economics", *Southern Economic Journal*, vol. 6 (October 1939), pp. 121-144.

[27] *Cf. Backward Art*, pp. 100-102, 129-135; Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought*, pp. 309, 313-314; and Lucy S. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

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sults. To permit analysis of ends and means and their interrelations, the ends themselves must be explored and clarified. Goals had to be made sufficiently concrete and precise to secure analysis of their relationship to various means. In this way, the expected results of various policies could be estimated, and the extent to which specific goals might be achieved could be determined. Analysis of the ends of economic activity was thus required in order for planning to be attempted at all. Plans had to be made with respect to designated ends and in terms of the exact, verified relation of these ends to available means. Ends must be consistent with relevant means, and planning should proceed on the basis of established knowledge about the nature and extent of this consistency. On the basis of his own experience as government planning official, Mitchell stressed the primal importance of securing understanding and agreement upon the goals of planning.

Mitchell essentially felt that planning required not only the statement of goals and clarification of their ends-means relations with policies, but also the evaluation of goals. Each particular goal must be reasonably consistent with other objectives, and it had to be achievable in terms of existing conditions and available policies. In these respects, at least, ends could be objectively evaluated on the basis of tested knowledge. In particular cases these objectives might need to be modified in order to be realistically achievable. As policy-making proceeded, the stated ends might have to be revised still further. Comparison of the actual results of policies with their intended effects permitted this "testing" or assessing not only of these policies but also of the immediate goals of planning.[28]

Particularly in the sphere of material welfare, Mitchell felt that welfare norms could be objectively established. As the scientific disciplines advanced, specific propositions about

[28] Concerning this analysis of goals and welfare, see Mitchell's essays in *Backward Art:* "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory", "The Role of Money in Economic Theory", "The Prospects of Economics", and "Making Goods and Making Money" (pp. 137-148). See also Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought,* pp. 314-319, and Rutledge Vining, "Economic Theory and Quantitative Research: A Broad Interpretation of the Mitchell Position", *American Economic Review,* vol. 41 (May 1951), pp. 106-118.

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welfare could be empirically verified. Objective criteria and indexes of welfare could be constructed, and these in turn would permit measurement or estimation of the welfare effects expected and later resulting from different policies. Objective benefits and costs of various alternatives could be measured to secure the knowledge needed in selecting individual policies and evaluating their results. With the development of these welfare norms and measures, planning could become more rational and systematic. Welfare economics would come to the aid of planning, thus permitting normative factors as well as straight factual relationships to be handled in an objective and to some degree quantitative manner.[29]

Mitchell visualized that his theory of planning combined "social statistics", analytic description and welfare analysis. Planning became a rational way of thinking about ends as well as means and their relationships. Welfare judgments were to be subject to test, measurement and experiment in the same way as any other empirical propositions about human behavior. Welfare economics presumably could be as scientific and objective as price analysis or other parts of economics. Welfare norms and results could be objectified and quantified as far as empirical analysis and verification allowed. Economic science would in this way take on a highly purposeful, yet rational, rôle in the intelligent control of economic behavior. Through such use of the scientific method, economics could promote the systematic guidance or planning of economic change and of efforts to increase material welfare. In a similar but more inclusive way, the social sciences could facilitate rational control of human behavior and planned guidance of social change.

The theory of welfare held by Mitchell enabled him to extend his theory of planning to deal with normative problems that inevitably faced comprehensive planning. Through objective, empirical analysis, goals could be clarified, judged and used as norms for planning. Welfare implications of the operation of personal motives, social institutions and industrial processes were to be determined and

[29] For Mitchell's views regarding objective welfare norms and measures, see *Backward Art*, pp. 30-31, 140-141, 174-176, 381.

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assessed. On this basis, there could be planning not only of immediate policies, but of long-range institutional change. Mitchell, however, did no empirical work to frame or test norms and measures of welfare. As a result, he has been criticized for failing to investigate the basic character of goals and motives.[30] He was concerned with the procedure for studying these problems; he wanted normative questions analyzed through the same scientific procedures used to establish empirical knowledge in any area of objective behavior. His theory of welfare was in no sense an absolute or ideal notion of welfare, but rather a theory of how to analyze welfare questions and develop tested knowledge for pragmatically improving welfare. Likewise, his theory of planning was not a blueprint for an ideal society based on some particular ideology, but a procedure for taking rational thought and action in public affairs.

Conclusion

Wesley Mitchell developed a comprehensive theory of planning which holds great significance for theoretical inquiry in the social sciences and for policy formulation of a systematic or planful sort. He conceived of planning as a rational, pragmatic function which would orient and employ social inquiry to secure intelligent understanding and control of human behavior. It was a reasoned procedure for developing the requisite tested knowledge and welfare judgments for the deliberate guidance of social change. Institutional change or social reconstruction could be planned on the basis of verified theories of actual behavior. The scientific method provided the means of accumulating the valid understanding, shaping the objectives, and selecting the policies required for intelligent planning.

Conceived as a process of rational inquiry and action, planning demanded the integration of theorizing, empirical research, welfare analysis, and policy-making. These interrelated operations constituted a purposeful, unified approach to the problems of understanding and dealing with social behavior with its many issues and complexities. All think-

[30] See Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought*, pp. 260-261; Homan, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-402, 416-421, 425, 431-432; and Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-230.

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ing, research and decision-making directed toward the guidance of institutional change could be organized and evaluated within the framework of this comprehensive planning process. Mitchell's theory of planning was essentially a theory of how to plan rationally, or how to make decisions and evaluate actions in the light of relevant goals, circumstances and results. His welfare theory was a procedure for predicting, measuring and judging welfare effects for the purpose of planning or intelligent action.

Mitchell wanted his theory of planning to be used experimentally—to be tested, implemented and improved through continued use. This theory has much promise as a systematic procedure for carrying on theoretical inquiry and policy formulation. It should serve as a guide to orient basic research and rational decision-making and to integrate them in a meaningful theoretical framework. This theory of planning ought to be employed on its own merits, with its accomplishments judged by its own procedures and criteria. Should it prove to be self-validating through its successful use, then Mitchell's hope may be realized that intelligence can be mobilized to guide social change. If his theory of planning is found to have the potential constructive value he attributed to it, the social sciences can help make national planning the responsible, intelligent process he visualized.

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REVIEWS

Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History. By WALTER MILLIS. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956.—382 pp. $5.75.

Walter Millis has spent much of his adult life in a persistent study of war—its making, its waging and the elimination of it. In this, the latest of his writings, he surveys the whole of American military history with a weather eye for the significant turns in its course which have had a permanent effect on our national development. On the whole, the book is a remarkable example of synthesis and readability.

The thinness of the bibliography Millis is able to cite is a tribute, in a sense, to the difficulty under which he has had to labor in handling this subject. It is also a revealing commentary on past American neglect of the matter. War and its concomitant "military policy" have, for most Americans, been only an aberration in an otherwise orderly history. Indeed, the impression is unavoidable that we have often prepared for war as if we were embarking on a joy ride, and we have prepared for peace with the same abandon. In between these two states of affairs, we have acted as if politics, both domestic and foreign, had been adjourned and that the post-war era will in fact be a resumption of where we left off. It goes without saying that Millis demonstrates convincingly the illusory character of the public's impression. But the illusion has had a long history and it will take more than one book—even an excellent one like this—to dispel it.

As we grapple with the facts of our military future we shall need the kind of wisdom Millis offers. Concerned with the central question of the relationship between the power to wage war and the necessities of a democratic existence, he provides a statement of our past military policies that is detailed and sound. Among the shibboleths he disposes of is the long-cherished belief that civilian prescience has invariably saved us from military stupidity, or worse.

Millis takes the more tenable view that military policy, like any other policy in a closely knit society, reflects the society itself. Thus, as he notes, first Bull Run might have had a different outcome if twenty thousand more men had been avail-

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able; but was it the failure of "the military" alone that was responsible for the lack? In Millis' conception, "war, war preparations, military tactics and strategy, military manpower questions, military economics, are not problems arising only suddenly and sporadically in moments of international 'emergency'; they are continuous factors within the fabric of our society."

Since this is the case, what formerly went under the rubric of military-strategy-for-national-security now has become defense-for-survival. It is on the story of the abrupt transition from the one to the other that Millis is best. More speculative because more tentative here, he sees no answer to our needs, appropriate to all our international commitments. He concentrates on the dilemma that finds us, on one hand, with nuclear weapons we dare not use and, on the other, with a "public opinion" that will not countenance another Korea.

Millis does not blink at the cruelty of the dilemma; but he is concerned over the implications of the fact that war has become impossible today. War was the means by which Wilson thought to make the world "safe for democracy" and by which Roosevelt attempted to defend the nation. But now that war has married itself to science at last, it is no longer a practicable instrument of policy. Hopefully, Millis' last words are: "It may be that for final sanctions in our human affairs we shall have to look toward other factors."

If the conclusion Millis reaches is small reward for following him through the maze of our military affairs, it is the least important part of the book. What he is saying is that we must now learn the history of our military policies after having shunned it so long—alas not for reassurance, but for enlightenment.

HENRY F. GRAFF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Course of American Democratic Thought. 2d Edition. By RALPH HENRY GABRIEL. New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1956.—xiv, 508 pp. $6.00.

Since 1940, when Professor Gabriel published the original version of his history of American thought, the book has been so frequently cited as to merit this revised edition. Just as he found room for optimism even in the dark days of the fall of France, so he retains in this atomic world a stanch faith in the survival of the American doctrine of a fundamental law as against totalitarianism. His central thesis is best stated by him-

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self: "The Doctrines of the American Democratic Faith examined and set against the social and intellectual background of the Middle Period." He then pursues this inquiry into the later periods until the immediate present.

Professor Gabriel finds three beliefs to be characteristically and persistently American: first, the idea of the dignity of the human personality with all that this implies; secondly, the belief that principles of universal validity underlie the common life of men in society and make possible freedom and dignity; thirdly, the belief that the nation is a corporate entity to further the peace and security of its citizens and to aid the cause of freedom and human living abroad.

The strength of this book lies in the remarkable skill that the author shows in testing the continued existence of the fundamental moral law with its implications for an enlightened individualism despite apparent contradictions. One may easily agree with the embodiment of the fundamental law of the free individual in Melville, Emerson and Whitman, but it is much less convincing in Calhoun and William Graham Sumner. He points out that, while Europeans developed their doctrines of class struggle, Americans were attracted by a religion of humanity and a new rationalism which retained the assumptions of a fundamental moral law determining the affairs of the universe.

The latest chapters contain a distinctly fresh note. He explores the various recesses of thought into which scientific relativism has penetrated during the twentieth century and particularly in the middle of this century. The brilliant forays of the legal realists from Holmes to Thurman Arnold and Jerome Frank seemed to have replaced the certainties of the older generation with skeptical disregard. Functional anthropology, continuing the relativistic ideas of Sumner's *Folkways*, found truth but a relative matter of time, place and circumstance or a mere expression of a culture—anything but universal. Very distressing was the rise of political realists like Nicholas Spykman who found that the power struggle alone was the ultimate reality. Total war, he had predicted, was the result of a long historical process. This cumulative power struggle tended to wipe out the historic distinction between peace and war because it went on without pause.

Yet Gabriel finds a light ahead despite war, the Red scare, the persistence of relativistic faiths, and other deviations from the pure faith of fundamental law and individual freedom. The war awakened many relativists like the anthropologist Malinowski to the realization that they lacked a sound democratic faith from which to denounce Hitlerism and later Stalin-

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ism. Despite the bigotry of the Red scare, Gabriel says that Americans were learning how to preserve freedom in the midst of danger. In the name of the twentieth-century symbols of Lincoln, Jefferson, and the Constitution, Americans were making gains in securing the rights of minority peoples. The legal realists were freely conceding that the goal of law was justice, not the mere arbitrary will of judges. And those who urged the overriding reality of power politics, he might have added, tend today to place it in a context of moral law, even if they eschew such language. This would certainly be true of George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau who obviously avoid the extremism of Nicholas Spykman.

To pick up his pen after a delay of over fifteen years and to retain in his narrative and analysis such a high degree of continuity is no little achievement for the author. One will naturally remember that Gabriel is actually describing the thought of the American élite, not popular ideas and attitudes. Otherwise the conclusions might be much less heartening. The millions who joined the Klan in the twenties, the persecution of minorities, the social ideas of the Fundamentalists, and other facets of King Mob show another picture better suggested by Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the Masses* a generation ago. The urban mind is of course not the rural mind, and the various strata of our population show as many variations of thought and opinion. But all this is another problem which has attracted less attention from intellectual historians. The specific problem selected by Professor Gabriel, namely, the examination of the persistent thread of fundamental-law thinking among leading American writers, has been admirably dealt with and presented in attractive literary form.

HARVEY WISH

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law. By ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON. New York, The Viking Press, 1956.—xiii, 914 pp. $8.75.

The objective which Professor Mason set himself in this volume was to produce not only a biography of Harlan Fiske Stone but a detailed history of the Supreme Court of the United States between 1925 and 1941. His first purpose he has achieved with zest and sympathy. The lovable and admirable qualities, the intelligent moderation and stalwart industry of Stone are sympathetically revealed. If there is an occasional excess of devo-

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tion, it is not the first instance in which a biographer has been reluctant to admit that his subject's mind and character were not always allied in the disinterested pursuit of truth. The substantial virtues of Stone made it easy for his biographer to overlook some of the evidence which suggests that a desire to please and a somewhat jealous ambition qualified what Professor Mason describes as Stone's "implacable integrity and independence". Yet the biographer has, on the whole, drawn an honest and vivid portrait of his subject.

Despite this very real success, Professor Mason has, in my judgment, failed to achieve his second, and perhaps more important, purpose. He has not, I think, given us either a balanced or a thoroughly reliable account of the critical period of the Court's history with which he is concerned. The reason for this failure seems to me to be clear. As biographer, Professor Mason is so loyal to his subject that all Stone's associates on the Court whose political convictions and constitutional principles differ in their important tendencies from Stone's are seen as essentially petty and short-sighted men. By such journalistic devices as characterizing the Court's "conservatives" as "the Four Horsemen" and its "liberals" as "the Three Musketeers", and in particular by looking with deep suspicion on the motives of Hughes and the integrity of Roberts, Professor Mason has oversimplified the characters of his cast of players and given, I think, a distorted account of the drama in which they were involved.

The nature of my discontent will become clearer, perhaps, if I point out that Professor Mason is either unpardonably silent or grudgingly suspicious concerning the cases in which Mr. Justice Sutherland showed a vigorously progressive instinct (e.g., *Funk v. United States*), uncommunicative about others in which Mr. Justice Roberts went farther than Stone was willing to go in protecting civil liberties (e.g., *Snyder v. Commonwealth*), and complacent about decisions in which there are very great difficulties in reconciling opinions of his hero (e.g., *South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell* and *Southern Pacific v. Arizona*). This failure, as I see it, of Professor Mason adequately to fulfill his responsibilities as historian of the Court has the possibly unfair consequence of leading one to suppose that the biographer, by these silences and by these oversimplifications, is accurately reflecting the mood and attitude of Stone. Though Professor Mason presents considerable evidence indicating that Stone developed an almost bitter antagonism to Mr. Chief Justice Hughes (a bitterness that was hardly creditable), it is, to say the least, regrettable that Professor Mason allows his own scorn

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for Hughes to infect his entire treatment of institutional history during the period of his Chief-Justiceship. With the resignation of Hughes, Professor Mason seems to feel a compulsion to find one or more associates of Stone to fill, as best they can, the shoes of the departed villain. With some pushing and squeezing he is able to do so, and by this endeavor leaves the impression that his hero, the new Chief Justice, was nagged to a point approaching distraction by the petty bickering of small yet ambitious prima donnas.

Beyond the question of Professor Mason's success as biographer and failing as historian lies a more important issue. In preparing his volume he had access to a considerable body of memoranda and other written materials relating to the work of the Court. One does not merely raise a question of taste when asking whether documents which were, at the time of their writing, manifestly confidential should lose that character as quickly as Professor Mason evidently believes they should. Perhaps no damage to the present or future working of the Court is to be anticipated from the publication of documents in which the Justices speak with perfect frankness of and to each other. Disregarding the problem of taste and judgment which the early use of such materials presents, one may still feel that there is some impropriety in putting them to an essentially partisan use. As biographer, Professor Mason is not, I think, to be criticized for his loyalty to Stone. As historian, however, I think that he is to be blamed for a failure to recognize that the most accurate view of the inner chambers of the Court is not to be obtained by putting an eye to one keyhole. There can be no doubt that exceedingly important and significant aspects of the Court's functioning are to be found in the confidential communications between its members. If the historian is to use a selection of these materials, he should do so, I think, with a historian's neutrality rather than a biographer's partisanship. Although Professor Mason fully realizes that other documents to which he did not have access may provide a very different perspective for understanding than that which is provided by the Stone papers, he writes with such a deep commitment to the memory of Stone that he leaves the impression that *this,* and this alone, is the authentic story of the Court during the period of his hero's incumbency.

In the last analysis, perhaps, my criticism is directed at the decision of a devoted biographer to base his work on confidential, though official, papers which deeply involve the interests of others who are necessarily disabled to speak of the same matters.

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Such a work as Professor Mason's, in other words, might more suitably appear after a longer interval of time has passed than has intervened since Stone's death. Had publication been postponed, it is likely that the biographer not only would have had a fuller record on which to base his interpretations of history, but would have seen the period of his concern with a less passionate and partisan spirit than that which Professor Mason has shown in his present work.

MARK DEWOLFE HOWE

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph. By FRANK FREIDEL. Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1956.—433 pp. $6.00.

The leading political figures of the twentieth century have fared badly at the hands of their biographers. Men like Bryan, Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, regarded as giants in their own day, have been pictured by latter-day historians as men with feet of clay. Ironically, after a lifetime of defending themselves against the shafts of the conservatives for their attacks on property, these political leaders have, since their death, been harshly criticized for the fundamental conservatism which underlay their efforts at reform. This is not all a new development; even at the height of their power, they were occasionally pilloried as fakers—Roosevelt had his John Jay Chapman, Bryan his Jack Reed, Wilson his young Lippmann—but, on the whole, this assessment of the political greats of this century has taken the form of a generational war. Revered by the historians who came to maturity in the Progressive era, they have been ridiculed by the younger historians of the depression generation.

Thus far, Franklin Delano Roosevelt has met a similar fate. Treated with respect and admiration by men like Henry Steele Commager, Allan Nevins and Gerald Johnson, he has been painted with especial attention to the warts by younger historians like Richard Hofstadter and James Burns. Once again, the chief criticism has come from the "left"; although Roosevelt was regarded in his years in the White House as a covert Bolshevik by members of the Liberty League, the younger historians have taken delight in pointing out his essential conservatism—his devotion to the balanced budget, his hostility to the Wagner Act, his reliance on men like Donald Richberg.

Of all the assessments of Roosevelt, the most influential one in the long run will be that of Frank Freidel. Professor Freidel

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has been engaged for some years in writing a multi-volume biography of Roosevelt which promises to be the one "definitive" biography of the man in this generation. In his first two volumes, it was not clear what final judgment Freidel would give us of Roosevelt. In *The Triumph,* the third volume of the series, Freidel casts a solid vote for the Sage of Hyde Park. One has the sense that, although this did not limit either the excellence or the objectivity of his earlier work, Freidel was irritated by the bombastic young imperialist of his first volume, mildly bored with the moralizing politician and Wall Street plunger of his second volume, though not unmoved by his courageous fight against paralysis. With the present volume, concerned largely with Roosevelt's administration of the governorship, Freidel opens up to the charm of the man and is outspoken in his admiration for both Roosevelt's administrative ability and his political sagacity.

Noting that Roosevelt's blithe manner toward politics had caused many to "misgauge him as a gubernatorial lightweight", Freidel protests that the Roosevelt governorship was actually distinguished not merely by a happy willingness to improvise but by "a real brilliance in formulating and executing complex political programs of action." Roosevelt, he observes, had "the background and attitudes and the aspirations, to point him toward greatness." After surveying the years of the governorship, Freidel concludes that it was a "superb administration", and in the last sentence in the book he prepares us for his final verdict, to be spelled out in later volumes—that Roosevelt will be a "great President".

With this final verdict, this reviewer has no quarrel, but, with respect to Freidel's contention that Roosevelt's governorship was nothing less than "superb", it is difficult to return any verdict but "Not Proven". The greater part of Freidel's new volume is devoted to a skillful description of the problems Roosevelt faced as governor, the remainder to an equally deft analysis of the presidential campaign of 1932. From Freidel's own evidence, and often from his astute commentary, Roosevelt comes out of all this as a good but not remarkable governor, as a good but unoriginal presidential candidate. Freidel explains how Roosevelt was slower than Hoover to take the depression seriously; how he scolded Hoover for a high-wage policy and for advocacy of public works; how he met the depression with an outmoded set of economic ideas; how he temporized on bank reform and on reform on Tammany Hall; and how he waged a presidential campaign little distinguished from that of Herbert

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Hoover. Certainly Roosevelt proved himself an adroit politician in these years and, in some areas such as relief and public power, he was a national leader, but much the same, and possibly more, might have been said of other governors like Gifford Pinchot and John Winant.

Professor Freidel, who has written two excellent volumes on Roosevelt, has written a still better one in *The Triumph*. By setting Roosevelt's policy statements in their proper political context, he has helped place the governorship in a more favorable light, but he has not succeeded in seriously modifying William Allen White's judgment that Roosevelt was no more than "a good two-legged Governor of a type that used to flourish in the first decade of the century. . . . We had a lot of them but they weren't presidential size." The growth of this remarkable man from his unexceptional tenure in Albany and his temporizing campaign of 1932 to the greatness of the spring of 1933 remains, and probably always will remain, one of the inexplicable mysteries of American politics.

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950. By NORMAN A. GRAEBNER. New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1956.—ix, 289 pp. $4.00.

Professor Graebner has presented in this book an absorbing and at times brilliant analysis of the evolution of American foreign policy since 1950. His primary concern is not the official record—the factual account of intervention in Korea, the development of NATO, the foreign assistance program, the Summit Conference—but the frame of reference within which such policies have operated. Drawing his material largely from congressional debates, contemporary books and magazine articles, the public statements of both administration spokesmen and administration critics, he emphasizes above all else the political factors which have circumscribed the policy-making of the Eisenhower Administration through its repeated surrender to the pressures exerted by Right-wing elements within the President's own party.

Professor Graebner is thus dealing with what he calls—and uses as the title of his book—"the new isolationism". This is in some ways a curious semantic twist to an old phrase. For, while the group of politicians he calls isolationists, or neo-isolationists, believe that the first necessity of American policy is to maintain strength at home, tend almost wholly to disregard our European

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allies, and resist every move toward an accommodation with Soviet Russia, they have by no means turned their backs on a world rôle for the United States. Nor have they abjured foreign commitments as such. Rather they reflect in their ideas upon what sort of obligations the United States should assume, the historic dichotomy which has caused conservative Republicans so generally to compensate for their opposition to involvement in European affairs by urging ever more aggressive intervention in the affairs of Asia. Professor Graebner calls attention to this paradox, yet it is not fully explained by labeling the Nixons, the Knowlands, the Jenners, the McCarthys *et al.* as isolationists.

More important than this semantic issue, however, are the two points that Professor Graebner stresses most strongly—and in the opinion of this reviewer rightly—in his discussion of the new isolationism. They are the dangers of the irresponsible partisanship that such politicians have shown in their approach to foreign policy, and the even greater risks that we would run in accepting the isolationist conception of the omnipotence of the United States in world affairs. The two phenomena are closely interrelated. If the United States can do whatever it wants—if it could have prevented, for example, the overthrow of Nationalist China—then any failure in American policy may be logically attributed to either bungling ineptitude or a shameful betrayal of the national interest on the part of the State Department. The way is clearly open for all-out attacks on either a Republican or Democratic administration, and a consequent loss of public confidence in any foreign policy.

A great part of this book relates to such attacks by the neo-isolationists and administration efforts to appease political foes at home at the cost of national respect abroad. Professor Graebner is most critical of Secretary Dulles, as might well be expected, for repeated statements that seem to accept the neo-isolationist faith in American invincibility—liberation, agonizing reappraisal, massive retaliation—with almost complete disregard of the attitude of our European partners. Yet he does recognize that appeasement of the political Right-wingers has never gone so far as wholly to meet their demands. The actions of the Eisenhower Administration, that is, have been far more realistic than the policy pronouncements of the Secretary of State. There has often appeared to be, indeed, a sharp contradiction between what Mr. Dulles says and President Eisenhower finally decides.

Professor Graebner is particularly concerned with Far Eastern policy, and carefully brings out the crosscurrents, confusions and

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contradictions affecting our relations with the Asiatic countries. For, in this part of the world there does lie a very real possibility that the neo-isolationist attitude, in refusing to recognize the powerful thrust of nationalism, will win such popular support that no administration can hope to develop a positive, affirmative policy which will effectively meet the challenge of both Soviet Russia and China.

Professor Graebner's book, in short, is an important and timely warning, based on the record of the past ten years, that irresponsible partisanship and false ideas of omnipotence can dangerously undermine America's position of leadership in the free world.

FOSTER RHEA DULLES

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Second International, 1889-1914. Parts I and II. By G. D. H. COLE. London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd; New York, St Martin's Press, 1956.—2 vols. xvii, 1043 pp. $16.00.

These two volumes comprise the third section of Professor Cole's *A History of Socialist Thought.* In the first section, *The Forerunners, 1789-1850,* published in 1953, he surveyed the theories of the pre-Marxist socialist thinkers, and in the second section, *Marxism and Anarchism, 1850-1890,* published in 1954, he outlined Marx's doctrines, the various anarchist theories, and the story of the struggle between Marxism and anarchism. He now continues his account of the development of socialist thought and action from 1889, the year in which the Second International was founded, to August 1914, when the outbreak of war in Europe shattered the international socialist movement. He hopes to conclude his history with a fourth section dealing with the events and ideas of the period between the two wars.

The first hundred pages of Volume one are devoted to an account of the formation of the Second International and a summary of the debates that took place at its various Congresses. Although Professor Cole deals with the major issues that were discussed—especially Millerandism, Revisionism, imperialism, antimilitarism, war and the general strike, and the relationships between socialist parties and trade unions—his account is necessarily much less detailed than that given by James Joll in his recent book on the Second International. The remainder of Cole's first volume is devoted to a survey of the labor and socialist movements within each of the major European countries —Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia and Poland—while the second volume contains briefer discussions of developments in

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the other nations of Europe and in the United States, Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, China and Japan. The final chapter is an essay on "Reform and Revolution". An annotated bibliography of thirty-two pages and an index of names, as well as a subject index, are appended.

This work will be a useful reference tool for students of the labor and socialist movements during the thirty-five years that preceded the First World War. In his account of each country, Cole recounts the development of the trade-union movement, important strikes that took place, the struggle for a wider suffrage as well as for social and economic reforms, and the growth of the coöperative movement, together with the rise of labor and socialist parties. Certain consequences inevitably follow from his attempt to deal with all these varied aspects of the labor movement and to mention the men who played important rôles as leaders and organizers. First, the work becomes primarily a history of party and union organization in each of the countries discussed rather than a history of socialist thought. Second, the country-by-country treatment, made necessary by the concentration on organizations and movements, often obscures the general line of development of socialist theory in Western Europe. Finally, the reader is likely to succumb to tedium when he confronts a chapter that is little more than a listing of names, dates and organizations. Volume two contains a number of chapters of this kind, since, as the author himself frequently notes, the country in question produced no significant socialist theorist.

The period which Professor Cole is discussing is not as rich or significant in socialist theory as were the years from 1848 to 1890. The great work of Marx and Engels was completed, and for the most part orthodox Marxists simply paraphrased or vulgarized the master's doctrines. Nevertheless, the Continental Revisionists, the Fabians, Lenin and Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding, and the Syndicalists, such as Sorel, made important additions to or modifications of Marxist theory. Cole treats in detail and with considerable insight the contributions of the Fabians and of the Guild Socialist movement, in which he played so significant a part, and his brief portraits of the leaders of the Labor party—Hardie, MacDonald, Snowden and Henderson—are extremely revealing. His discussion of the German movement is, understandably perhaps, less successful, and he does not adequately explain the relationship between reformist tendencies within the German Social Democratic party and the Revisionist theory of Bernstein. The doctrines of Lenin and Trotsky do not receive full and systematic analysis, the discussion

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of Sorel is limited to only four pages, and Hilferding's important work, *Finanz Kapital*, is dismissed in a single sentence. The analysis of Rosa Luxemburg's contributions to socialist thought, although more detailed, is placed in the chapter on Poland, the last chapter of Volume one; as a result the connections between her views and those of the German socialists, who were her closest associates, are not as clearly presented as they might be.

In this reviewer's opinion the final chapter of the book, the essay on "Reform and Revolution", is the most successful section. Here Professor Cole, having cut loose from the rigid organization in terms of individual countries, writes perceptively about the major issues that divided reformist from revolutionary socialists and the differences in doctrine and attitude that appeared within each of these groups. He notes that the failure of Marx's prediction that the proletariat would soon include a large majority of the population, sinking into ever greater misery, led to the real socialist dilemma of the years before 1914. If the socialists wished to retain their strong commitment to democracy, they had to dilute their programs in order to gain the support of enough of the peasants and the growing group of salaried employees to win a majority. This dilution and the transformation of Marxist socialism into a reformist movement toward the welfare state could be avoided and doctrinal purity maintained only by renouncing the socialist commitment to democracy and espousing the theory of the dictatorship of the vanguard of the proletariat.

HERBERT A. DEANE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: A Biography. By GEORGE WOODCOCK. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1956.—292 pp. $5.75.

This first full biography of Proudhon in English is an excellent work: informative, intelligent, well written, and admirably balanced. Professor Woodcock does justice alike to Proudhon's chequered family life, his career, the development of his thought, and the intellectual and local influences which shaped it.

Proudhon inherited his social idealism from a father whose tavern failed because he cared more about the quality than about the price of his beer. The son's hatred of existing authority, like Lenin's, awoke when that authority drove a beloved brother to his death. Yet Professor Woodcock shows that the first avowed anarchist remained strangely conservative, favored the death penalty, conscription, and a patriarchal attitude toward

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women, and complained that his daughter had "no clear idea of the duty of obedience." This revolutionary leader hated violence, dreamed of a successful career in business, yearned "to be master in my turn, even if it is only of a savage's hut", and gloated when one of his less-distinguished essays won a prize from a Swiss canton: "M. Proudhon crowned for a work of political economy by the State council of a sovereign state! This moment will one day be notable in the history of the Revolution!" (p. 231).

Like so many of the utopians, he hoped to manipulate men in power for revolutionary ends. Robert Owen too turned to organizing workers' associations only after a reactionary government had disappointed him; but Proudhon transferred his illusions from Louis Philippe to the Bonapartes and even to the Tsar. He disapproved at first of both the 1848 Paris risings; the revolution was always taking him, like Bakunin, by surprise. Yet he was often clearer-sighted than his contemporaries. He saw that universal suffrage could be a reactionary weapon, predicted that the strong presidency would destroy the Second Republic, perceived the long-run dangers of Italian and Polish nationalism, to which other liberals and radicals were blind, and was scathing about the faults and follies of his fellow-revolutionaries—though never entering the personal feuds in which Marx reveled, and retaining to the end his wide circle of friends.

Proudhon was more effective in criticism than in construction, and his insights usually concerned the dangers of centralizing institutions and movements. Professor Woodcock acquits Proudhon of ignorance of modern industrialism, pointing out that he modified his early views after, in his thirties, he came in contact with the factory workers of Lyons. But like so many Frenchmen of different political views, Proudhon was more familiar with and more sympathetic to peasant problems than to factory problems. The author shows him at heart a radical artisan, and observes that his curious blend of traditionalism and apocalyptic change "reflects the oscillation between conservative living patterns and the anarchic passions of Jacquerie which is a recurrent phenomenon of peasant societies" (p. 271). Professor Woodcock traces Proudhon's influence in the anarchism and syndicalism which were once so powerful in peasant regions, and which he plainly prefers to the Marxist tradition. Indeed one of Proudhon's most remarkable warnings is his last letter to Marx (who never replied): "... for God's sake, after having demolished all the *a priori* dogmatisms, do not let us in our turn dream of indoctrinating the people ... let us not, because

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we are at the head of a movement, make ourselves the leaders of a new intolerance . . . . On that condition, I will gladly enter into your association. Otherwise—no!" (pp. 92-93).

But Professor Woodcock does not point out that, as Professor Lorwin has recently remarked, undiscriminating opposition to all politics left the anarchists and their sympathizers unable to tell democrats from authoritarians. Proudhon's dealings with the Second Empire showed this in his own day; and now, ironically, communism dominates the labor movement most firmly in the countries where the syndicalists and anarchists once held sway. And in Proudhon's own territory of the Jura, an anarchist stronghold in the last century, the peasants and artisans today vote massively for that archetypal parliamentary politician, M. Edgar Faure. Proudhon's strand of rugged individualism is no longer found in revolutionary socialist thinking. This book is a fine reminder that we have lost by its passing.

P. M. WILLIAMS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

From Vienna to Versailles. By L. C. B. SEAMAN. New York, Coward-McCann, Inc., 1956.—viii, 216 pp. $3.50.

To the vast and often ponderous literature that concerns itself with the functioning of Europe as a community of states during the nineteenth century, this is a welcome contribution, for it is primarily concerned with reëxamining many of the clichés that are found in the history books. The book is brief and its approach iconoclastic, the author's interest lying in challenging existing interpretations; it may also be taken as an illustration of the process of revaluation of German history that has been taking place among English-writing historians.

There are inevitable limitations in such a treatment. One would often like to know more about the bases and sources of Seaman's own interpretations; the brief bibliography is of little assistance in this respect. The brevity of the book and its sharpness of statement result at times in oversimplification and in at least seeming inconsistency. Thus, Bismarck, who only "used the army when it became impossible to achieve his diplomatic purposes without it" (p. 98), embarked upon the Franco-Prussian War for "criminally irrational" reasons (p. 114).

But these are minor strictures. Allowing for oversimplification and dogmatism, the freshness of outlook is both attractive and rewarding. The basic importance of the French Revolution is stressed for having introduced into the operation of politics the

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eighteenth-century principle of the perfectibility of man, an essentially anti-Christian concept. Despite the precedent of that revolution itself, Metternich's view was sound that feared war as the most likely source of revolution; but Palmerston's understanding was also correct which "saw that the kind of society Metternich wished to maintain in Europe was an insult to the intelligence and an affront to the talents of millions of capable people" (p. 42). Cavour and Bismarck are special targets of Seaman's "debunking": neither wanted the unity for which he has received so much credit. Doubtless both were highly practical men, content with the pursuit of the immediately attainable; but they were also masters of the art of seizing opportunity and *were* in fact the artisans of unity.

The fact of German unity dominates the whole story of Europe after the Franco-Prussian War, a period analyzed with brilliancy. The rôle of power is aptly understood. At the center of the story lie three basic facts: the decline of French power, the later one of British, and the simultaneous rise of the German. This last was the great difficulty, for Bismarck had created a marvelously effective tool without adequate restraining devices. The incompetent personalities of William II and his Chancellors, while the Reichstag continued impotent, eventually had the effect of leaving the army as the only organized and effective force in the state. Britain was inevitably driven into the association of the Triple Entente, but her effectiveness was hampered by the nature of her own domestic structure in which the influence of public opinion made for a policy of seeming tortuousness. The American intervention in the First World War injected into the peace the further confusion of Wilsonian demagoguery. Versailles was not in itself a bad peace, but the Germans had some reason to feel that they had been misled, while the Americans and the British, failing to realize that the victorious Powers in union could alone maintain the peace, left France to bear the impossible burden of the organization of Europe.

One final caution should be entered. In the words of the author himself, his book is "designed as a work of elucidation and interpretation, it is addressed mainly to those who already have some acquaintance with the main events and personalities of the period" (p. vii). Granted this prerequistite, the book is at once provocative and useful.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

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The Red Army: The Red Army—1918 to 1945, The Soviet Army—1946 to the Present. Edited by B. H. LIDDELL HART. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956.—xiv, 480 pp. $6.00.

One can scarcely help wondering what this book would have been like if written by, say, one-twelfth the number of authors, that is, by two men and some research assistants. Of course there would have been less repetition. The influence of Trotsky and the great purge of the late 1930's would have been pigeonholed in chapters and left there, instead, as is the case, of being permitted to reappear again and again throughout the book. Perhaps some sixty pages would have been eliminated entirely. Captain Liddell Hart's editorship has suffered the usual embarrassments which accrue to those who invite the collaboration of such distinguished gentlemen as General of the Army Maxime Weygand, and General Gunther Blumentritt. Part of the book, in other words, is more interesting from the point of view of who says nothing rather than who says what.

Presumably also two men could have come to some basic agreement on such old bugbears as "national character". Disagreements as to whether the Russians are possessed of "mystical character" (p. 134), or are driven by a deep-seated inferiority complex (pp. 454 *et seq.*), would be argued down into a consensus before page one was rolled into a typewriter.

But then, had the book been written by two men only, much that is most arresting about it would have been lost. Although there might have been less confusion, there would also have been less conviction. When two such different men as Colonel Louis B. Ely, USA, and Captain N. Galay, once of the White Army, agree that the lack of initiative of Soviet field grade officers (Majors, Lt. Colonels, and Colonels) would make it difficult for the Red Army to fight a war on an atomic battlefield (pp. 322, 210, 410), the coincidence of judgment would seem extraordinarily important.

There is also a certain wry stimulation in ruminating over the book which the practitioners of war—roughly half the authors have spent their lives in the military profession—would have written by themselves. Judging from their contributions to *The Red Army* their book would have been largely autobiographical. Experience would have been liberally substituted for reflection. Battle history would doubtless have increased from the hundred odd pages given it to twice the number, the very satisfactory section on weapons and equipment would not have been expanded but certainly the Generals would not have left

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out, as *The Red Army* does, the use of amphibious forces as an extension of flank operations, and the Soviet conception of the rôle of tactical air support for ground operations. Although judging from the secretiveness covering Soviet development in airborne infantry operations (p. 376) there may simply be no more information than is to be found herein, possibly more details on "Atomic Warfare" could have been presented than appear in the chapter by Colonel G. C. Reinhart, USA. Another subject in which the many German officer contributors might have been interested, and again one which is not discussed here, is that of the success, or lack of it, of Soviet training missions.

Scholar-soldiers, Captains Liddell Hart and Galay, the Swiss Colonel Lederrey, and others, a diplomat, a scientist, an engineer and a quartet of unhyphenated scholars make up the rest of the authorship. If these were to have written the book without the professional soldier contingent, little of what is newest and brightest in it would have been lost. Raymond Garthoff's fine chapter on "The High Command and General Staff"—his chapters here are far neater and more convincing than those in his own book on *Soviet Military Doctrine*—should have been extended. The fascinating chapter by Captain Galay on partisan warfare and the work of J. M. Mackintosh on the conditions of service in the Soviet Army could have been further expanded as well. At least the scholars should have insisted on a bibliography—which is obtrusively lacking.

All this is to say the book is valuable, and not just because any book on the subject has been so badly needed. It is interesting too—if the reader has a discerning eye and a happy willingness to skip about a bit.

EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. By WALTER Z. LAQUEUR. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. —xi, 362 pp. $6.50.

The predominant feeling of the reader of this book cannot but be one of regret for a lost opportunity. Mr. Laqueur had the material for an excellent study on a hitherto unexplored subject, but unfortunately he did not put it to proper use.

This material is embodied in pages 31 to 217, which give a straightforward account of the Communist movements in Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine and Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, Iraq and Turkey. In writing this narrative, Mr. Laqueur was

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handicapped by inadequate knowledge of Arabic and, apparently, Turkish; this is revealed by numerous errors of grammar and of transliteration of names—for example, four on page 36, two on page 305 and six on page 306. On the other hand, the author's familiarity with Russian and other European languages has enabled him to make good use of Western sources. This has been supplemented by personal contacts with Communists or ex-Communists (p. 34) and by access to what must be a very extensive collection of clandestine Communist literature in Arabic, Hebrew and Turkish. As a result, there are relatively few errors of fact; some inaccuracies may, however, be pointed out. The description of Henri Curiel as "the owner of a Cairo bookshop" (p. 42) though correct omits the more important fact that he is the son of one of Egypt's richest bankers and landowners. George Mansur was not the pseudonym (p. 183) but the real name of a Palestine refugee in Iraq. And, in discussing Russian Middle Eastern policy (p. 261), no mention is made of the Palestine problem and the very active support given to partition—surely Russia's most important move between 1946 and 1955. But these and other slips do not diminish the value of the narrative part of the book.

The same cannot, however, be said of the analytical sections, the main arguments of which are the following. Islam is not a sufficient bulwark against communism (p. 5); the chances for democracy are poor (pp. 18-20), except in Turkey and Israel which are "variants from the Middle East norm" (pp. 23-24 and throughout the book); that leaves only two possible defenses—"military socialism" and nationalism. But, in the author's opinion, judging from the Egyptian experience, military socialism deteriorates rapidly (pp. 12 and 20-22). As for Arab nationalism, it is Mr. Laqueur's *bête noire;* it seems incapable of existing in any but an extreme form—indeed, "extreme" and "nationalism" are in this book as inseparable as Tristan and Iseult; moreover, "Nationalism in the Middle East is not a force opposed to Communism" (p. 275). Hence, one is not surprised at the conclusion that "The Arab countries are now more likely than most others in the world to provide a favorable breeding-ground for Communism" (p. 6)—a statement worked out at length in Chapter Twenty.

In support of his argument, Mr. Laqueur presents a dark picture of economic stagnation. During and immediately after the war, population outstripped agricultural output (p. 25)—but the annual rate of increase in agricultural production since 1948 has been estimated by the Food and Agriculture Organization at over 3 per cent, the highest for any region of the world. "Mod-

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ern fertilizers are not in common use . . . except for Israel" (p. 25)—but Egypt uses more per acre than any country in the world, and utilization is rapidly increasing in Lebanon and Syria. In Lebanon and Syria, "industry developed rapidly during World War II, but output decreased in most fields thereafter" (p. 40); in fact it has about doubled. The Egyptian agrarian reform, which has been very carefully planned and executed, is described as "fragmentary and amateurish" (p. 21). Nothing is said of the large-scale development works being carried out by Iraq.

Nor, according to Mr. Laqueur, are social trends more hopeful. Egypt "used to have the highest academic unemployment figures in the world" (p. 14); "The majority of the leaders of the Communist parties in Syria and Lebanon are graduates of the American University of Beirut" (p. 15); and, in that University, "The Communists, together with their sympathizers, would appear to be strongest" (p. 16)—all three statements being completely erroneous.

The fact is that great economic, social and political changes are taking place in the Arab countries, and such changes inevitably bring about stresses and disruptions. But, provided the West and the Middle East show a minimum of good sense in their relations, the situation is by no means as hopeless as Mr. Laqueur would make it. Throughout Asia today, there are only two great forces, nationalism and communism, and nationalism is by far the more powerful. Asian nationalism may often be anti-Western but, intrinsically, it is at least as anti-Soviet. It is only if nationalism is so frustrated that it makes common cause with communism that the disaster Mr. Laqueur fears will come about.

CHARLES ISSAWI

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Story of the Integration of the Indian States. By V. P. MENON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1956.—v, 511 pp. $7.00.

The term "Indian States" was a technical expression used for the territories of the native princes in India during the days of British rule. The Indian States covered two fifths of the entire area of the sub-continent and presented a most complex pattern not only on the map, but also in the varying relationships which they maintained with the paramount power. This was further reflected in the variety of internal jurisdictions which the States enjoyed within their own territories. The reason for this variety was that different princes were brought within the aegis of the

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British under different circumstances and at different times. Besides, the position of all the native princes was not similar when they accepted British protection. Some of them were practically independent rulers before they entered into a treaty relationship with the East India Company, others were petty local chieftains who had inherited or established, in the period of anarchy following the decline of the Mughul Empire, some authority over a small area. The stature and authority of these princes can be compared to a landscape which would appear if a stormy sea were petrified suddenly so that all the waves, big and small, were turned into stone, forming ridges of various heights and strengths.

The Indian States had one common characteristic—their complete *de facto* subordination to British authority which could impose any conditions it liked at any time. The legal basis for this unrestricted power was provided by the doctrine of paramountcy; the British interpretation of its implications was not accepted by all of the princes, but, then, they had no means of questioning it except through representations and petitions to the paramount power itself. One of the princes who did not accept the British contentions in this regard was the Nizam of Hyderabad, who argued that his relationship with the British was based upon a treaty signed between him and the East India Company on a basis of equality. The British tried to mollify him by conferring upon him the title of "His Exalted Highness" and treating him somewhat differently from the other princes.

India inherited this complex pattern of jurisdictions and rights; it has now succeeded in integrating the Indian States into its governmental system in various ways. Hyderabad, for instance, was a unit by itself; many other states have been organized into "unions" for administrative purposes. This was by no means an easy task and the credit goes mainly to the first Indian deputy prime minister, the late Vallabhbhai Patel, who had a reputation for being the strong man of the Indian National Congress and, subsequently, of the Indian cabinet. A most prominent rôle was played by the author of the book in this work as the permanent civil service head of the ministry responsible for the relations of the central government with the Indian States. [Hyderabad has recently been broken up and integrated into neighboring states.]

For a variety of reasons the British had not been too keen on integrating the Indian States completely into the areas directly administered by British officials. A too rapid policy of annexation had added to the discontent which resulted in the Mutiny of 1857. Since then the Indian States had come to be looked

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upon by the British as safety valves against the frustration caused among the Indians by the British policy of denying to the Indians all employment which carried any prestige, authority or high emoluments. It was in the Indian States that Indian men of talent could find suitable avenues of distinguishing themselves. Later the Indian princes came to rely so much upon the paramount power that to safeguard their own interests, they became ardent supporters of British rule. They also lagged behind in building up institutions of representative government and tried to prolong the traditions of despotism. As a result, most of them had become unpopular by the time the British handed over the reins of the government. The book illustrates the fact amply that India was not able to bring about integration by persuasion alone; the mailed fist was not always hidden under a velvet glove. The main factor in Indian success, however, was the sentiment of the people, who were no longer enamored of despotic rule. The sections whose interests were adversely affected were sullen and unhappy, but they were in a minority. Where Indian policy has gone against the wishes of the people, India is still faced with difficulties. For instance, India is able to occupy Kashmir only because of her armed might.

Mr. Menon's book provides a good record from the point of view of the government of India; no attempt has been made to see the point of view of any opponent. The reader will find plenty of useful information, but he will have to be vigilant and remember at various places that this may not be the whole truth. For instance, he will have to remind himself that Hyderabad is no longer in a position to put forward its case and that the disputes regarding the occupation of Junagadh and Kashmir are still before the United Nations. The Pakistani side of the case hardly finds a mention, much less fair treatment.

I. H. QURESHI

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain. By B. C. ROBERTS. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956.—viii, 570 pp. $6.00.

This book, which is based on the examination of the constitutions of 130 unions affiliated with the Trades Union Congress, is the first scholarly analysis of unions' constitutions and the way unions work, since the Webbs published their *Industrial Democracy* in 1897. Since that time the membership figures of the British unions increased by 600 per cent, members are no longer

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"unlettered men" as the Webbs called them; unions have become an economic and political power. But the struggle "to solve the problem of how to combine administrative efficiency with popular control" is still going on.

Mr. Roberts, in an introduction, gives a brief survey of the development of union government and its growing complexities because of increased size and changes in the balance of power. Thus "primitive democracy" changed into representative government. The first part of the book presents the legal regulations of union government from the repeal of the Combination Acts of 1924 to the present, discussing the attempts of the courts to protect the rights of union members, especially against the far-reaching powers of some unions to expel members. In the following part the author points to the labor movement's aim of 100 per cent organization and consolidation of membership in a small number of organizations to be achieved by a variety of methods: agreement with employers, powerful pressure of the union, in the case of the dockworkers compulsory registration with the National Dock Labor Board, on which there is a strong union representation. Other parts of the book deal with the main structure of union government, the organization of the place of work, of branches and districts; the electoral processes; paid officials and administrative services such as research, press, education, finance; federal organization, and the Trades Union Congress. The author criticizes the small amount of research done by unions in the field of labor legislation, a field in which American unions do much more.

The most striking feature of British unions, according to Mr. Roberts' presentation, is the great diversity in government, administration and policy of the different unions, in short their individual character. Interesting is his prediction that in the long run the unions' ties with the Labor party may be weakened because the position the unions now occupy in the state compels them to coöperate with whatever government is in power. The reluctance of the Trades Union Congress to back further nationalization and the unions' coöperation with management in increasing productivity are interpreted by Mr. Roberts as a strengthening of their business character, their development in the direction of American unions.

The book deals with many problems that unions in all highly industrialized free countries have to solve. There is, for instance, the problem of union democracy such as direct election of union officers or indirect election through the convention. Should the convention or a small court of appeal act if members or unions feel wronged? Roberts shows that the theory of the

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convention being the final instance of democratic control is not entirely translated into practice, with great variations between the unions. For the engineers it is more a source of authority than for many other unions. The author proves that the unions have sacrificed democratic control for administrative efficiency, yet their policies are oriented toward the demands of the membership. The apathy of union members (as described in F. Goldstein's *Government of British Trade Unions*) is, according to Roberts, a general feature of all voluntary organizations. "The fact that the majority prefer to leave responsibility to the minority is not of itself a serious evil, but it gives rise to dangers" (p. 459).

Also connected with the question of democracy is that of effective communication, either up or down the structure of a large union, without impairing forthright leadership. "The centralization of authority in the hands of general secretaries has been an inevitable part of the creation of large-scale unionism" (p. 463); checks on executive power work reasonably well, but "in the last resort it is the character of union officials which is most important." The author points to the danger of human values being lost in the mechanics of the institutional machine. He rightly emphasizes the fact that the activities of the Communist party make it very difficult to investigate the causes of the existing conflicts, and thus the genuine opposition is faced with the dilemma either to back the Communists or to accept a policy they disapprove of. Quite a number of Communist stewards in the engineering industries are used by their party for its own objectives.

Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain, following in its painstaking research and brilliant emphasis on essential problems the classical lines of the Webbs, will not stir up as much sensation as their *Industrial Democracy* did. But, like the latter, it will help thinking men and women inside and outside the labor movement to clarify their experience and ideas.

FRIEDA WUNDERLICH

THE NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

An International Economy: Problems and Prospects. By GUNNAR MYRDAL. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956.—xi, 381 pp. $6.50.

This major work, by one of the most distinguished social scientists and public servants of our time, is an economic analysis, a political assessment, and above all a challenge to the con-

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science of the world. Myrdal's subject broadly is the international economic disorder of this century, but his particular concern is the wide, widening and ominous disparity between the advanced and the underdeveloped nations. He takes into account the other great cleavage, between the Western and the Soviet blocs, but sets it mostly outside his present discussion. His pages ring with the fervor of one who in the past devoted himself to social reform in the advanced countries and now, with that battle going well, turns to international equalization as the present great cause and vocation.

The theme of his book is integration, to resolve the disparities in the non-Soviet world, but Myrdal intends something much more than is commonly meant by advocates of "integration". Indeed, this ideal of organization has become one of the shibboleths of our disorganized age, and is invoked for activities ranging from the "liberalization of trade" and other steps toward "re-establishing free markets", through partial systemic integration such as the Benelux customs union and the European Coal and Steel Community, all the way to demands for a world government. None of these satisfies Myrdal, who finds that in various ways they fail to go deep enough, they are content with organizing the end-products, they neglect to organize the factors of production, and finally they shrink from establishing in the broadest sense *equality of opportunity*. He appeals to the advanced nations—which in his view have been perfecting their own internal integration, at the expense of the international economy—to proceed now with positive sacrifices: to make an international redistribution of their wealth and income (comparable to the redistribution which is already well advanced within their own borders as a result of education and training, relative scarcity of labor, progressive taxation, governmental services, collective bargaining, and so on). He accepts "the impossibility of a democratic world government". What he advocates amounts to a voluntary extension to the whole world of the principle of the welfare state.

In support of this stand, Myrdal does not attempt much new research or analysis. Instead, he makes extensive and skillful use of the available technical literature, to which he has himself contributed, and from which he draws interpretations that are distinguished for breadth and wisdom. His specific recommendations are a stimulating blend of unorthodox devices with many traditional objectives and with gradualist (nonrevolutionary) procedure. Thus he insists that *developing* countries must regulate their foreign trade (for several reasons of internal inte-

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gration, lying much deeper than the mere "protection of infant industries"), while liberalization of foreign trade is the proper duty of the *advanced* countries (which must stand ready to adjust their own industrial structures accordingly). Again, he urges huge capital transfers from the advanced to the underdeveloped countries, but recommends that as much as possible of this transfer be handled by business-like loans and investments, including the reconstruction of an international capital market; this market to be supplemented, and indeed supported, by intergovernmental grants made suitably multilateral (so as to reduce foreign dependence upon the United States).

But why should the already advanced countries willingly reduce their current enjoyments in order to uplift remote millions? Myrdal mentions some of the possible material gains, but he does not attempt to make much of them. It becomes clear that his primary interest is not material but spiritual: he is setting forth an ideal, and proposing a crusade. As in other spiritual crusades, to save our souls, we must give away our goods (or at least a certain portion thereof).

In so fervent a cause, it would be surprising not to find some extremes of zeal. Myrdal takes a very pessimistic view of the present trend: following upon the sharp international disintegration after World War I and especially during the 1930's, he sees continuing disintegration in the years since World War II; in effect, he minimizes such actual post-war measures as the Marshall Plan, developmental grants, technical assistance, the International Bank, liberalization of trade quotas, the European Coal and Steel Community, as well as maintenance of high levels of demand by industrial countries, and the rapid rise in the quantum of world trade. Indeed he treats the modern monetary and fiscal methods of sustaining full employment in a lump with the "beggar-my-neighbor" policies of the 1930's, thereby blurring the contrast between prosperous conditions which favor international adjustments, and depressed conditions which push toward autarchy. On the other hand, Myrdal's dissatisfaction with the partial and limited steps so far taken toward integration, in Europe and in United States aid policy, seems ill-suited to his own insistence on gradual rather than heroic measures. If the crusade is not to seek major conversions, it must fall back upon practical men and their shrewd but cautious pursuit of self-interest.

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Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade. By RICHARD N. GARDNER. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.—xxiv, 423 pp. 42*s.*; $6.75.

This book is a history of the wartime and immediately post-war rise and fall of Anglo-American collaboration for freer and less discriminatory trade and payments. Unlike the "inside stories" of the Anglo-American negotiations in Professor R. F. Harrod's *The Life of John Maynard Keynes,* E. F. Penrose's *Economic Planning for the Peace,* or Professor R. S. Sayers' *History of the Second World War: Financial Policy, 1939-45,* Mr. Gardner's study rests largely on official documents and other published works; these are, however, supplemented by certain unpublished material, particularly the papers of Harry Dexter White and Will Clayton, as well as by personal interviews. The author himself describes his book as "a study in international economic diplomacy"—about the making of international economic policy and the shaping of institutions to implement that policy, with continuing regard to the interaction between official policy and public opinion. As a lawyer and an economist, who began this study while a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford, he was well suited for writing a book on the border line of international relations, political science, history, and economics.

Mr. Gardner's story, which is carried through 1947, has an unhappy ending, since everything in his narrative leads up to what he calls the end of Bretton Woods, the débâcle of the Anglo-American loan, and the day of reckoning when the visions of a Charter for an International Trade Organization have faded. The narrative is grim, and deals with clashing viewpoints and ideas in each of the countries in turn, contemporary comments being, like the modern Furies of conscience, interjected into the drama acted by the main protagonists. This, together with what I think can best be sensed as fate bearing on the destiny of the two nations, reminds the reader of a Greek tragedy or perhaps of verses like these in one of its modern imitations (from T. S. Eliot's *Family Reunion*):

> . . . because everything is irrevocable,
> Because the past is irremediable,
> Because the future can only be built
> Upon the real past.

How unreal was the foundation on which the blueprints for post-war trade and payments were based emerges clearly from Mr. Gardner's analysis. To be sure, the reconstruction of multi-

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lateral and nondiscriminatory trade and payments, after a profound upheaval in production, trade and payments, and amid deep political and social changes, would have been difficult even under the most enlightened and farsighted British and American policies; but the difficulties were all the greater because of three basic errors. The first the author calls, for want of a better name, the error of Economism; it might also be called economic materialism as professed by idealists. This was the idea that bilateralism, in the form of British Empire preferences as well as of the "Schachtian" exchange controls, was an expression of imperialism and, as such, was the "greatest" danger that would confront the world after the war; mutilateral trading was thus blown up into the very foundation of peace. The second was the error of Universalism—the idea that alliances or any special arrangements between nations, such as between the United Kingdom and the United States, would impair world peace and prosperity; this disregarded the unique rôle of Britain in the world economy and the critical importance of the Anglo-American coöperation. The third error was that of Legalism—the tendency to draft detailed codes of formal principles and rules, like much of the Bretton Woods Agreements, the Anglo-American Loan Agreement, and the Charter for International Trade; the rules were so rigid that they were not adaptable to future contingencies or, in some cases, had to be arbitrarily reinterpreted.

Furthermore, the setting within which these blueprints for the post-war trade and payments were to be implemented was very different from what had been expected. Not only was the damage inflicted by the war on the previous pattern of trade and payments grossly underestimated, but also insufficient allowance was made for the changes in debtor-creditor relations, including the liquidation of foreign assets and the accumulation of new indebtedness abroad. Even more important, the main danger for international equilibrium was taken to be an economic depression spreading from the United States throughout the rest of the world; there was little recognition of the effects of other countries' out-inflating the United States, and of the ensuing cost and price differentials, on the balances of payments.

Perhaps the main criticism that can be made of Mr. Gardner's work is that it is a little too gloomy. The author closes his account in 1947 but, as he points out himself, the effort still goes on. Much has been done since then; sterling is much freer today, and the importing of goods into the sterling area far less discriminatory, than ten years ago. There is also a much better understanding of the relationships between a country's domestic

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conditions and policies, and its balance of payments. To be sure, much still remains to be done, but much also has been learned from past mistakes. To my mind, the most encouraging lesson, and one that can be substantiated by the evidence gathered in Mr. Gardner's history of Anglo-American economic diplomacy, is that the past misfortunes were not reckless consequences of inherently wrong views and objectives regarding the advantages of multilateral trading, but, rather, errors of judgment concerning ways and means, and the speed, of reëstablishing the network of world trade. Another encouraging lesson is that Britain and the United States have, in a divided world, remained close together despite misgivings as to particular views and policies—"friendship and exasperation [to use Keynes' words] advancing hand by hand." The need is for a sober recognition of the problems ahead.

M. A. Kriz

New York, N. Y.

Capital Formation and Economic Growth. A Conference of the Universities—National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. Edited by Moses Abramovitz. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955.—xiii, 677 pp. $12.00.

An understanding of economic growth and development is one of the most challenging problems facing economic theorists today. Increased understanding will have such practical applications as influencing the rate at which the American standard of living continues to rise and freeing vast portions of the world's population from the degradation of poverty.

The two most important factors on which economic growth is based are the discovery and exploitation of new ideas and capital formation. The twelve papers contained in the National Bureau's recent book are focused on the second factor and bring together the accumulated wisdom of economics, sociology and history. Unfortunately, however, the innate difficulty of the problems involved has ensured the careful student of the subject against receipt of many fresh insights from this book. Indeed, little is presented which could not be obtained more succinctly and pleasantly from John Stuart Mill (*Principles of Political Economy*, Ashley edition, Book I, Ch. XIII, Section 1) and, more recently, from Professor Moses Abramovitz' brilliant essay in *A Survey of Contemporary Economics*, Vol. II.

It seemed to this reviewer that the most theoretical papers were the least helpful. For example, in his paper on "Financial Structure and Economic Growth in Advanced Countries", Dr.

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Raymond Goldsmith makes a heroic effort to apply his new conceptual tools to the relationship of financial institutions and credit practices to economic growth. But after a prolonged and incredibly complicated discussion of his new tool, the "financial interrelations ratio", which is never clearly defined, Dr. Goldsmith admits that his paper "has not shed much light on the influence of financial structure on economic growth" (p. 158). Since this was the author's assigned topic, one may reasonably question its inclusion in a volume which, in the words of one of the authors, represents a "major stride forward" (p. 636).

Aside from two papers on Soviet economic development which should prove of more interest to specialists in Soviet affairs than to other economists, the most interesting papers were those which attempted to analyze the relationship between economic growth and the growth of an entrepreneurial class. Dr. B. F. Hoselitz posits that since 1700 there has been a "crucial difference between French and British entrepreneurship . . . [in] the attitude toward investment of risk-bearing fixed capital." (See his "Entrepreneurship and Capital Formation in France and Britain since 1700", p. 336.) Accompanied by greater social mobility, British boldness in taking investment risks goes far to explain why at present "Britishers, in spite of setbacks and a gradual stagnation of the rate of economic progress, have a higher average real income than Frenchmen . . ." (p. 337).

Similarly, in appraising the rôle played by "The Entrepreneur in American Capital Formation", Professor Thomas Cochran states that "of fundamental importance to the understanding of this period of tremendous growth [1830-1900] is the fact that potential entrepreneurs came from the already economically well-developed nations of Western Europe..." (p. 341). Finally, H. G. Aubrey's analysis of "Investment Decisions in Underdeveloped Countries" attributes considerable significance to the absence in such countries of both a vigorous, competent group of entrepreneurs and a "tradition of entrepreneurship."

Unfortunately, there was no discussion of the implications for American economic growth of the decline of the entrepreneurial type and the rise of what William H. Whyte calls "the organization man". Only one author mentions the problem even peripherally, and he does little more than note that "the entrepreneur of the mid-twentieth century operates in a different cultural setting and responds to different motivations than did his predecessor of 1850" (Cochran, p. 373).

Basically, *Capital Formation and Economic Growth* is a disappointing book. It attempts to elucidate admittedly difficult and highly complicated problems, but it does not do this very

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well. In defense of the National Bureau and its authors, one may recall Robert Browning's line that "a man's reach must exceed his grasp," but surely there must be *some* limit to the size of the gap which the National Bureau will tolerate.

LEON QUINTO

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Land Tenure: Proceedings of the International Conference on Land Tenure and Related Problems in World Agriculture Held at Madison, Wisconsin, 1951. Edited by KENNETH H. PARSONS, RAYMOND J. PENN, and PHILIP M. RAUP. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.—xxiv, 739 pp. $10.00.

The report here presented is an outgrowth of the first of two rather similar conferences held under the same auspices and about a year apart. The second was the International Conference on Agricultural and Cooperative Credit held at the University of California (Berkeley) in 1952. They are of interest not only for their content but as experiments with new techniques for stimulating and facilitating efforts to improve tenure and credit conditions throughout the world.

In so brief a comment as is feasible here, not even a listing of all segments of the report is possible; much less an appraisal of their over-all and relative merits. Students of political science will be interested in the procedures used and the apparent success or lack of success in these ambitious ventures, perhaps even more than in the facts, principles and analyses set forth in the published reports, though these are by no means negligible.

Both conferences were financed and to some extent supervised by the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture and the Mutual Security Agency. That is, the conferences were an American venture rather than an international one though there are many similarities. Experience gained in the Madison conference was helpful in planning and carrying out the Berkeley conference. There are some differences in emphasis as between the two reports. The Berkeley group apparently attached considerable importance to quick release of the conference proceedings and more direct reporting of the points made in the discussions. Its main report came out in 1952 shortly after the close of the conference. The more extensively and carefully edited report on the tenure conference, which was held a year earlier, was not published until 1956.

This point is mentioned because it may be important in planning future conferences. Is there, for example, any serious

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danger of losing some of the impetus gained in conferences of this kind if the proceedings are not made quickly available while interest is presumably at or near its peak? Question can be raised as to whether there is provision for follow-up that will cause the large outlays of effort and funds to yield their highest possible returns.

Perhaps more important is the question of whether the same input of resources on a regional basis would not reach more people in a more effective way and delve more deeply into the specific problems of the region concerned. Perhaps the almost world-wide approach used was essential as a first step. But much careful thought needs to be given to the question of how these efforts and expenditures can be made more effective in producing actual results in the way of tenure and credit improvement.

The volume itself consists of a great number of papers, discussions and comments by more than a hundred participants and lecturers. These are grouped under some twenty-five general headings such as The Significance of Tenure Adjustments for Economic and Social Development, The Role of International Agencies, The Land Tenure Situation (by regions), Land Tenure and the Introduction of New Technologies, The Communist Approach to the Land Problem in Eastern Europe, Consolidation of Fragmented Holdings, and so on. The opening paper by Kenneth H. Parsons of the University of Wisconsin is a general survey of the situation and problems. It is followed by a series of papers by current or former administrators in the United States agencies and one by Philip Raup of the University of Minnesota.

The succeeding section presents the views of administrators and students of the international agencies. Thereafter the book is made up largely of materials presented and conclusions drawn by the numerous foreign participants in the conference. There is much more which cannot be summarized here even in broad terms. As in all multi-authored volumes, there is wide divergence in the quality and significance of the presentations. However, students of land tenure problems will find much food for thought in this large volume, and those concerned with the techniques of providing technical aid to underdeveloped areas will also find it and the companion volumes from the Berkeley conference worthy of their study and consideration.

MURRAY R. BENEDICT
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The State of the Social Sciences. Edited by LEONARD D. WHITE. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1956.—xiv, 504 pp. $6.00.

The debate between "behaviorists" and "humanists" constitutes the chief interest of the volume under review, which is the record of a round table held at the University of Chicago in November 1955 to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Social Science Research Building at that institution. As the editor, Leonard White, observes in his Introduction, the emphasis among the social science faculty at the University of Chicago is on the "scientific" and "behavioral" rather than the "humanistic" aspect of the subject. The philosophy of behaviorism is expounded in a significant paper, "Towards a General Theory of the Behavioral Sciences", by James G. Miller, professor of psychiatry at the University of Michigan. Professor Miller relates that a group of scientists at Chicago in 1949 adopted the term *behavioral sciences,* "first, because its neutral character made it acceptable to both social and biological scientists and, second, because we foresaw a possibility of some day seeking to obtain financial support from persons who might confound social science with socialism" (p. 29).

The self-imposed task of the Chicago group was to create a set of interrelated assumptions and theorems embracing all aspects of behavior, and capable of being tested by empirical techniques. The behavioral group undertook an intensive study of electronics models, from which they derived the following illustrative proposition of presumed significance for all forms of behavior (including social and political as well as inhuman): "The distortion of a system is the sum of the effects of processes which subtract from the input to reduce strains in subsystems or add to the output to reduce such strains. . . . When variables in a system return to equilibrium after stress, the rate of return and the strength of the restorative forces are stronger than a linear function of the amount of displacement from the equilibrium point" (pp. 56-57).

The behavioral approach is further developed by other contributors to the round table. Herbert Simon makes an eloquent plea for the use of mathematics rather than words (since the latter are emotion-laden, intractible, etc.). Harold Lasswell reviews the impact of psychoanalytic thinking on the social sciences, though in fact it appears that the social sciences are having an even greater impact on orthodox psychoanalytic theory. Clyde Kluckhorn essays a comparison of value-emphases in different cultures. George Murdock suggests, in his study of politi-

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cal moieties, that the two-party system in a modern democracy has much the same function as lacrosse games among the Creek Indians. Other papers deal with psychological needs as a function of social environment, emotionality and work in groups, biosocial theory in human development, the ego and status-anxiety, ecological and cultural aspects of urban research, industrial organization and economic progress, and institutional aspects of economic stabilization. Bernard Berelson, in his appraisal of the study of public opinion over the past twenty-five years, points out that speculation by old-fashioned scholars (like Tocqueville, Bryce, Lowell, Lippmann and Dicey) has been supplanted by the solid work of "quantifiers and pollers". Presumably, real progress has been made. The volume also includes provocative essays by Walter Lippmann and Hans J. Morgenthau on current trends in international relations.

The implicit assumptions and explicit claims of "behaviorism" are forcefully challenged by Professor Leo Strauss in perhaps the most valuable essay of this anthology. "Scientistic" social science, he points out, prides itself on being specialized, interested exclusively in the regularities in human behavior, and politically neutral. The "scientistic" social scientist regards himself as unable to pass any value judgments; "logically he cannot stand up for civilization against barbarism." Strauss repudiates this nihilism, and urges instead a return to the perspective of the citizen who is concerned with *good* government. The social scientist must place values at the center of his discipline, not disregard them. Social science, he explains, cannot content itself with existing social objectives, but must rather "clarify those objectives, ferret out their self-contradictions and half-heartedness, and strive for knowledge of the true overall objectives of whole societies. The only alternative to an ever more specialized, ever more aimless, social science is a social science ruled by the legitimate queen of the social sciences—the pursuit traditionally known by the name of ethics" (p. 418).

Those who believe, with Professor Strauss, that social science should concern itself with burning issues rather than regularities of human behavior will find most of the essays in this anthology poignantly pointless.

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BOOK NOTES

In 1955 the United Nations celebrated its tenth anniversary. The *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955* (New York, Columbia University Press in Co-operation with the United Nations, 1956; xi, 556 pp. $10.50), therefore, has special significance, since in the words of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in his foreword, it " is an effort to reflect and report the course of events " in that anniversary year. This volume follows closely the pattern of the 1954 *Yearbook*. One can hope that finally a plan of organizing the voluminous record of a year's activity has been found which will be consistently followed in the years ahead. While this is a subjective reaction, this reviewer has the impression that the process of condensation, initiated in the 1954 volume, has been carried still further. The total number of pages has been reduced by 100, from 656 to 556. While there may have been a corresponding reduction in the activity of the organization, the fact that this reduction of space extends to all the major categories of United Nations activities, except "Administrative and Budgetary Questions ", suggests that this is not the explanation. It would, I think, be most unwise to carry this process further. Already, as the result of the omission of texts and details of discussions which were included in the volumes up to 1953, the *Yearbook* has lost some of its usefulness for scholars without ready access to United Nations documents. It must of course be recognized that those responsible for the *Yearbook* must meet a variety of demands, not only from readers but also from governments that provide funds needed for preparation and publication. This volume represents a reasonably satisfactory compromise. Furthermore, it is attractive in appearance, it is easy to use, and the material is well organized and presented in a clear and balanced fashion. Like its predecessors, it is indispensable to anyone interested in the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies.—LELAND M. GOODRICH, Columbia University.

The enormous work, *The Road to Peace and to Moral Democracy: An Encyclopedia of Peace* (New York, International Universities Press, Inc., 1955; 2 vols. xiv, 1083; xxvi, 1540 pp. $20.00), by Boris Gourevitch, well merits its subtitle, "An Encyclopedia of Peace ". The author analyzes the contemporary international scene with a wealth of detail, in an attempt to

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point up the necessity for building a firm foundation for peace, based on "the unification of all moral forces of our world in order to realize a thorough reform consisting in a reorganization of International Law towards the protection of the human person by the community of nations and towards the limitation of sovereignty." He argues for an alliance of the churches with the moderate socialists, the labor unions and democratic parties to achieve social reform, since "only the road to moral democracy can prevent wars and revolutions." No one who has studied the course of modern international relations can doubt the essential truth of the author's thesis and it would seem scarcely necessary to marshal over two thousand pages of facts to support it. Dr. Gourevitch's observations demonstrate his keen insight into the motivations of international politics and he illustrates his points with an incredible range of scholarly knowledge. But his chief points become lost as fact is piled upon fact. Although the volumes are useful to the specialist as reference works, for the general reader the staccato arrangement in single paragraph sections of many of the pages prevents easy reading.—L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia University.

Germany and the North Atlantic Community: A Legal Survey (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1956; ix, 217 pp. $6.00), by M. E. Bathurst and J. L. Simpson, is an important and much-needed addition to the growing literature on contemporary Germany. Its objective is to examine from a strictly legal viewpoint the development of Western Germany from the commencement of military occupation in 1944 to the termination of Allied control and the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany as a member of the North Atlantic Community. The authors, both of whom have had legal training as well as practical experience in post-surrender Germany, approach their subject with professional care and authority, although from an admittedly United Kingdom point of view. The volume is scholarly in approach and treatment, and documentation is liberally provided for those interested in pursuing additional research in the subject. Comprised of sixteen short chapters, the study is divided into four chronological parts. These deal respectively with the "Belligerent Occupation" to the time of surrender; the "Military Government 1945-1949"; "The Allied High Commission 1949-1955"; and the contemporary period, "The Federal Republic of Germany in the North Atlantic Community". The title of the book therefore is more appropriate to this final portion than it is to the volume as a whole. This study constitutes a survey of the questions of international law relating to the current Ger-

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man problem. It deals with the legal status and relations of the Western Allies as belligerent occupants of Western Germany, as nonbelligerent military occupants, as civil occupants, and eventually as coequal allies. The authors analyze and assess the legal position of the Western Allies with respect to West German territory and people, inter-Allied relations, and the legal nature of the West German Federal Republic as an emergent "sovereign" entity. Specific attention is devoted to the surrender instruments, basic constitutive occupation proclamations, documents establishing the Control Council and the Allied High Commission, the Occupation Statute and its revision instruments, and the agreements of 1952 and 1954 terminating the occupation and providing for a West German military contribution and for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Other matters considered include the process of Allied review of West German legislation and constitutional amendments, the treaty-making authority (especially the rôle of the occupants), the processes for settling legal disputes, and the like. Certain additional matters might also have profitably been considered, however, such as the reactivation for Western Germany of pre-war German treaties. Similarly, some attention might have been paid to the legal relations of the Western Allies with Berlin as they have related to Western and Eastern Germany and to the Soviet Union.—ELMER PLISCHKE, University of Maryland.

Indicative of the new trend in political science, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York, Toronto, London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956; xx, 557 pp. $6.00), by Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, attempts to employ the findings of modern sociology in an analysis of political behavior in the arena of international politics. Acknowledging their intellectual debt to Weber, Mannheim, Lasswell and MacIver, the authors base their study on the assumption that the agent of action in international politics is man acting within a group which is not necessarily identical with the nation. Thus, unlike many other text writers in the field, the authors reject the notion that the "actors" upon the world stage are monolithic units with fixed policies determined by geography, principle and power; their main focus is on the individual acting within a group according to his aims, demands and expectations and the process by which these ever-shifting aims, demands and expectations cause conflict or result in compromise. While considering the "basic factors" of power the authors also stress the "intangible factors"; that is, they examine the social structures of the nations they are analyzing—the various interest groups, group ten-

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sions, national and group ideologies, social stratification—as well as the more tangible factors of power—natural resources, population, geography, industrial production. From this perspective they feel, and rightly so, that a better understanding of the complexities of international politics, especially of the decision-making process, can be achieved. Similarly, they hold that in any analysis of international politics a consideration of internal political structures is necessary. Using the pluralistic democracy of the United States, the oligarchical élite of Egypt, the single-group authoritarian élite of Soviet Russia, and the multiple-group authoritarian élite of Nazi Germany as case studies, the authors demonstrate that such basic variations in political institutions inherently lead to essential differences in foreign policy. Also, they avoid the pitfalls of the sterile "realist" vs. "idealist" debate. They correctly base their analysis on the assumption that the basis of power relations is not a struggle *for* power in the abstract but a struggle *of* power; that governments do not seek power as an end in itself but rather hope to attain certain goals, rooted in values and interests, and that the means for achieving these goals are conditioned by various power factors—military, economic, political, social and psychological. Thus, as Bertrand Russell has said, power is "the capacity to produce intended effects." Any examination of a nation's international position must consider the effects intended as well as its capacity to produce them. Besides their attempts to give the study of international relations greater depth by analyzing its "dynamics" the authors also examine international law and organization, international economics (giving an excellent discussion of the use of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy), diplomacy, alliances, and other aspects of the means by which foreign policy is implemented. As a whole the book is a valuable contribution to the literature on international politics; however, it is too subtle and complex to be considered as a basic college text.—MORTON SCHWARTZ, New York, N. Y.

Germany 1945/1954 (Cologne, Boas International Publishing Company; 738 pp. $10.00; DM 42.–) edited by William S. Boas, a massive book, handsomely printed and profusely illustrated, is itself a token of its theme, Germany's spectacular post-war recovery. It seems that a great many thriving corporations subsidized the publication of this bulky introduction to the present-day German economy, and it is not surprising that such a public service would carry occasional overtones of private self-advertisement as well. After a brief, generally unexceptionable review of a thousand years of German history and of the evolu-

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tion of Bonn and the political triumph of Dr. Adenauer, there follows a more detailed account of the structural changes in German economy and society. More than half the book is devoted to a description of the various branches of German industry and banking and to the history of individual firms. The book provides a vast and varied assortment of miscellaneous information —everything in fact from countless statistical tables on the German economy and scores of pretty pictures of German scenery and Goethe's study to a complete list of all the medicinal mud baths in the Federal Republic. For student and business man alike, this should be a useful reference work; it is regrettable that the sources of statistical data were omitted, though, as far as this reviewer can judge, they are beyond reproach. The book, of course, is "unpolitical", but a few political prejudices do intrude. It appears in questionable taste to say that the attribution of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 870 "is another instance of the tradition behind European frontiers" (p. 15). Some of the analogies between German and American political experience are tendentious, rather than illuminating, and one regrets the excessive emphasis on the Morgenthau Plan and its devastating impact. Perhaps of greater significance is the insistent warning that the social gains and economic fruits of German recovery ought not to be jeopardized by the prospective demands of German rearmament. Truly the Germans have become more prosperous and more pacific than anyone ten years ago could have anticipated.—FRITZ STERN, Columbia University.

In *Far Eastern Politics in the Postwar Period* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956; xii, 497 pp. $5.00), Professor Harold M. Vinacke has attempted what he has done before and done well--a view of East Asia in the large, with its main lines clearly drawn and the whole design clear and well balanced. There are brought out the main ideas and major forces that have made East Asia as it is today—something the most far-sighted students of Asia could not have foreseen twenty-five years ago and would not have dared to predict if they had. Truly the East does move, and move fast. Vinacke confines himself to the developments since 1945, with enough of the years preceding to provide background. He deals thus with China, Japan, Korea, and then successively with the countries of Southeast Asia—Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. He deals with each in its political, economic and social setting and at the same time gives a well-organized summary of events. The difficult and controversial question of China and her relations with the United States since the com-

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munist revolution is analyzed judiciously and fairly. He gives no prescriptions for American policy toward Communist China or Formosa, which leaves something lacking but perhaps is just as well for a book designed to give the general reader, whether adult or student, a background of understanding and a statement of issues rather than specific recommendations. The key to all that has happened in East Asia in these convulsive years is for Vinacke the passing of imperialism in that part of the world and the dissolution of Western empires there. This he attributes to the fact that the colonial Powers " began to lose their belief in their right to govern others because of their mastery of the art of self-government." And thus " the withholding of self-government from the people in the colonies came more and more to be viewed as inconsistent with liberty within the nation-state as the West began to emphasize the growth and spread of democratic and representative government." Is this really the explanation? Is it not too simple and does it not do too much credit to Western motives? It might be argued that the real reason lies in the fact that two emasculating wars left the colonial Powers too weak to undertake the large-scale punitive actions by which alone nationalistic uprisings in the colonies could have been suppressed. The physical power was lacking, and so was the mood of the people of the colonial Powers, disenchanted with the glories of war and weary with its sacrifice and suffering. Nevertheless Professor Vinacke has written a highly useful book, especially useful for college classes.—NATHANIEL PEFFER, Columbia University.

Students of the economics of the labor market know Gladys L. Palmer as one of the most dedicated and constructive workers in the vineyard. Dividing her time between Philadelphia, where she heads the Industrial Research Unit of the Wharton School, and Washington, where she has long been serving as consultant to the Bureau of the Budget, the Census, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, she is constantly expanding our knowledge of the modern labor market. Her latest contribution, *Philadelphia Workers in a Changing Economy* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956; xiv, 189 pp. $6.00), finds her abstracting from her earlier studies, many published but some in manuscript, facts and figures that enable her to tell the story of the Philadelphia labor market during the first half of this century simply, clearly and authoritatively. Not only is no one in a position to challenge her command over the Philadelphia story, but one would be hard pressed to find a comparable story for any other large city in which the complexities of a half century

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have been so carefully analyzed. Miss Palmer not only deals at length with the important changes that have occurred in the demand for labor in response to changes in industrial and technological developments, but she assesses specifically the import of the Great Depression and the effects of the war prosperity on the labor market. She also has a detailed chapter on changes in the labor force during recent decades in which she compares changes in the Philadelphia labor market with those in the nation at large, explaining wherever possible the discrepancies between the two. Her last chapter, "Economic Development Problems and Employment Policy in Cities", is the one of greatest interest to the non-specialist. Here Miss Palmer, drawing on her extensive knowledge, modestly suggests how city planners can make use of labor market analysis. She calls attention to the limitations of occupational diversification as a hedge against large-scale unemployment; and she believes that "the emphasis on *new* industries is seldom as important as refurbishing and modernizing existing industries." She reminds us that "an important factor in productive efficiency is the size and adaptability of the labor force. . . ." First and foremost, the book will be of value to the specialist, to those who, like the author, are seriously concerned with learning how the labor market operates before developing elaborate theories. Miss Palmer knows too much about the complexities of modern labor markets to jump to facile generalizations. Yet valid theoretical formulations can be developed only on the basis of such solid studies as Miss Palmer and her associates have given us.—ELI GINZBERG, Columbia University.

Students of voting behavior in the United States for years have deplored the lack of an authoritative, periodic compilation of election returns. In *America Votes: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1956; xii, 422 pp. $12.50) they now have such a source for the years since the close of World War II. This volume, edited for the Governmental Affairs Institute by Richard M. Scammon, is the first in what is planned as a series of biennial publications. Organized by states, the handbook gives the results of general elections by county for president (1952 only), governor (for the most recent election), United States senator (1950, 1952 and 1954), and United States representative (1946-1954, except where extensive redistricting has intervened). The returns on elections for president, senator, and governor are broken down by wards or assembly districts in all cities of more than 500,000 population. State maps showing Congressional

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District boundaries are provided, as are maps of the largest cities, giving ward or assembly district lines. Among other useful features of this compilation are plurality and percentage calculations, details on minor party candidates polling more than a trifling number of votes, the names of all major party candidates, and a series of carefully prepared notes on Congressional District boundaries and their alterations, on minor candidacies, and the like. The book gives every evidence of most careful planning and of highly skilled editing. It alone is an impressive achievement. As successive volumes in the series are released—and as the editor is able to expand and refine the coverage to include primary elections and more detailed breakdowns of general election returns—they should become an indispensable resource for any serious student of American election politics.—DAVID B. TRUMAN, Columbia University.

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On Monday, April 22, the Academy of Political Science will hold a Spring Meeting and a dinner at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York City.

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

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

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